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there can be no single value mediating Political conflicts, as 
some forms of liberal neutrality have supposed7. Conflict may be 
ineliminable from politics. Nor need there be clear rules of 
engagement in political conflicts. An. understanding of this truth 
requires an appreciation not merely of -Enlightenment rationalism, 
but of Machiavelli. 
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Cbapter One 
Utilitarianism and Politics 
Utilitarianism and Politics 
1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to determine whether utilitarianism is able 
to provide any recognizable account of political institutions and 
behaviour in its prescriptions for rational agency. The main 
method by which this inquiry will be pursued will be a conceptual 
model of politics or, as it will sometimes be called, of 
political structures, which is intended to capture as far as 
possible within a- treatment of this scope some of the principal 
criteria used to characterize politics in everyday situations. 
This term is meant to be general enough to include those features 
of politics which exhibit some degree of rational coordination, 
whether in the form of institutions, processes, or ideology. Once 
the model of political structures has been outlined, it will be 
used to assess utilitarian treatments of politics. Broadly the 
conclusion will be that utilitarianism can only take these 
structures into account by abandoning its most distinctive 
features as a theory of rational agency. If, on the other hand , 
these features are retained, utilitarianism is no longer able to 
provide any recognizable account of politics as described by the 
model. 
Obviously enough, this places a premium on the model's 
successfully mirroring our conception of politics. Given the form 
of the argument just sketched, which presents the utilitarian 
with the choice between political realism and theoretical 
distinctiveness, it might be objected that the more robustly 
revisionist brand of utilitarian would wish to claim that 
utilitarian policies, if consistently pursued, would require 
political structures so radically different from any now existing 
that there is little point in evaluating the theory by means of a 
model drawn from contemporary political practice. This is really 
a problem concerning the adequacy of the model as a 
characterization of politics. For if it is adequate, the 
revisionist has to explain in what respects his own alternative 
model is identifiable as a description of politics at all. If the 
conceptual displacements required by the alternative approach are 
too great, it may be only in the most depleted sense that his is 
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a theory of politics at all. The argument still takes its 
starting-point from ordinary usage, even if - indeed, especially 
if - the objection is-that the model-does not represent politics 
as it really is. 
Here the difficulty is that the model is meant to capture our 
thinking about politics, but the only way of checking the 
adequacy of the model is by reference to this thinking itself. 
Because of this implicit circularity, the method is open to the 
criticism that it may bias the conclusions to be drawn about the 
relationship between utilitarianism and politics. If a selective 
or distorted picture is given, it is only too easy to show that 
utilitarianism fails to accommodate political structures as 
falsely described. Even before adopting the revisionist approach, 
the utilitarian can claim that the model is distorted, while not 
denying that it is with reference to some such model that 
utilitarianism is to be judged. The objections we consider within 
non-ideal variants of utilitarianism are broadly of this form. 
This is however not so damaging if it can be shown that in 
reformulating the model the non-ideal theorist is forced to 
compromise the principal features of the doctrine: then it will 
not matter so much whether the original model was accurate or 
not, since the conclusions about compromising the theory follow 
even with the utilitarian's own favoured alternative model. But 
these perplexities are a staple problem in philosophical 
argument, when theorists seek to sharpen such notions by means of 
conceptual analysis. The problems here are at least no more acute 
than in other cases where the method is employed. 
We shall, then, be working with a rough and schematic division 
between forms of utilitarianism, as either ideal or non-ideal 
versions of the theory. This distinction is not intended to 
correspond to any of the other distinctions marked in the 
literature between, for example, act- and rule-utilitarianism, or 
between either of these and utilitarian generalization. ' These 
distinctions will indeed concern us later. But the division of 
utilitarian theory into ideal and non-ideal forms is based on how 
corrective an attitude towards human institutions, practices, 
psychology, etc., a given variant of the theory takes. Non-ideal 
theories are prepared to accept as part of the decision-making 
environment the fact that human beings will behave in non- 
utilitarian ways, and adjust the schedule of available actions 
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and consequences accordingly. Ideal theories, on the other hand, 
admit no such 'partial compliance, 
2 
possibilities in their body 
of assumptions. It may be said that this distinction between 
ideal and non-ideal versions of utilitarianism merely parallels 
that between act- and rule-utilitarianism. I shall, however, give 
reasons below for doubting this, and suggest that while the 
ideal/ non-ideal distinction is real enough, that between act- 
and rule-utilitarianism is largely illusory. 
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Bearing these comments in mind, I set out below a conceptual 
model of political structures. There is no attempt to rank the 
characteristics identified in order of importance, nor is there 
any pretence of providing a complete analysis of all aspects of 
these structures, even within the categories distinguished. The 
model merely aims to make explicit certain intuitively 
significant aspects of these structures for the heuristic 
purposes explained above. 
(1) The structures must have some public dimension: this means 
not only that political deliberations must be conducted in some 
public body, but also, and more importantly, that these 
deliberations or processes relate to matters of public concern. 
This is, of course, fairly vague, as concerns both the content 
and the context of deliberation. By way of comparison, it is 
assumed that debates over policy in some private concern such as 
a market corporation are not in the relevant sense public, since 
the ter ms of such debate are not usually dictated by 
considerations of public welfare as (at least on the surface) the 
terms of political debate ar, e. There may of course be certain 
concerns, e. g. the environmental costs of production, which 
obtrude into this domain, of public welfare; the firm may also 
project a corporate image of itself as motivated by public 
service or welfare. But in such propaganda the trade-off between 
these goods and profit is seldom mentioned, and (unlike in at 
least western politics) the assumption is that financial gain is 
both the dominant and legitimate purpose of business. 
This sort of distinction is, admittedly, harder to sustain if 
someone takes a thoroughly reductive view of politics and its 
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rhetoric of concerns as mere rationalizations of self-interest. 
The fact remains however that even a wholly reductive Namierite 
view of political motivation has to explain, at the level of 
appearances, why considerations of welfare bulk so much larger in 
political rhetoric than in corporate image-building. Apart from 
this, there is the brute fact that the financial rewards to be 
had from a career in western politics are markedly lower than its 
practitioners could reasonably expect from devoting their skills 
to other professional pursuits. This is reinforced by public 
controls on corruption in western political cultures, in contrast 
to those countries where bribery and corruption are accepted 
features of political life. There is little need to dwell further 
on this point for our purposes, since utilitarianism would 
presumably wish to take a broadly non-Namierite view of the 
conduct of politics: its welfarist concerns preclude endorsement 
of at least the grosser forms of peculation and political 
bribery. 
This of course leaves it fairly unclear what the matters of 
public concern referred to above are, and how they are to be 
identified as such. I take it as a fact about the way politics is 
conducted that its agenda is neither static nor wholly internally 
generated. For example, dispute over resource allocation, which 
now dominates political debate in western democracies, received 
far less attention in the last century when the public sector 
played a less prominent role in the national economy. Part of the 
reason for the shift was the change in the economic 
infrastructure with its social consequences, which demanded new 
approaches to policy. But these shifts in the subject-matter of 
political argument do not mean that it is not reasonably well- 
defined what is and is not of public concern at any point in 
time. This does not, of course, require an implausibly 
naturalistic view of the political agenda. The content of that 
agenda is determined by what political agents - professional 
politicians and public observers - think it ought to be. That is, 
politics is not just about normative claims, but about views of 
normative claims and their relationship to public action. 
(2) The decisions taken as a result of political debate must be 
backed with force or sanctions of some kind, and more generally 
the notion of power's being exercised must play some explanatory 
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role in discussing and understanding political action. This 
explanatory element is significant, as the existence of political 
power serves not merely to give effect or coercive backing to 
decisions already reached, but also to influence the actions of 
political agents in arriving at those decisions - particularly of 
those on the receiving end of policy. In other words, it is a 
familiar feature of political life that the context within which 
decisions are taken includes the operation of political processes 
themselves, and the use of power alters the choices, with 
attendant costs, open to political agents. 
This does not mean that political decisions are always 
directly and overtly supported by the threat of coercion, though 
this is often true, and some views of political action, such as 
Machiavelli's and Hobbes's, emphasize strongly the part played by 
sheer force in political life - so strongly, in fact, that on 
these views there is little to choose between the notions of 
monopoly force and political power. One objection to so close an 
identification as this is that we customarily take power, but not 
necessarily force, to be intrinsically related to political 
institutions and processes. It is through this institutional 
context that we identify the exercise of power, even where, as in 
military dictatorships, the coercive sanctions which support 
those in power are immediate and obvious. 
(3) Deliberation about political issues must include the 
possibility of conflict. In its weakest form, one which all 
utilitarians can endorse, this claim requires only that the fact 
that deliberation involves making decisions means that there are, 
at the outset, different possible actions available, and 
different outcomes which can be produced depending on what 
decision is taken. It is a necessary feature of acting that the 
world is (even if the action fails to achieve its aim) altered by 
it; there is, at the limit, the alternative of doing nothing 
(leaving the world as it is). 
3 To the extent, then, that there 
are different possible end-states open in deliberation, there is 
a possibility of conflict - that different parties or factions 
may form in support of rival policies or ideologies. 
Of course, the political conflict witnessed in real life goes 
well beyond this, to take the form of systematic or 
institutionalized confrontation between groups organized on 
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ideological, tribal, religious, ethnic, etc., lines. When 
conflict takes on this institutional character, a stronger form 
of explanation is required than that offered by the purely 
semantic considerations about the nature of deliberation 
mentioned above. Where there is endemic conflict of this form, it 
is less clear that the utilitarian can accommodate it within his 
preferred structures of rational explanation. In part the ease 
with which this can be done depends, as we shall see, on whether 
it is ideal or non-ideal utilitarian theory which is under 
review. 
(4) Perhaps more contentiously, there must be some sense that 
politics provides an autonomous area of human concern. 
4 That is, 
it has to be recognized that much of the content of political 
activity and argument is self-generated. Political decisions are 
very often guided or constrained by considerations arising from 
the activity of politics itself - some political actions are 
undertaken and have a point only because there already exists a 
set of political structures which exert an independent force on 
decision-making. 
These are not part of any external goals which politics may 
aim to promote, ' since they have no existence outside politics 
itself. In part this results from the fact that politics, like 
any other complex collective undertaking, involves instrumental 
actions in the achievement of its final ends. But it is not 
merely a matter of performing certain actions for the sake of 
others, but of being able to explain some actions with reference 
to political structures themselves rather than merely to the 
external goal. This can happen because, as already explained, 
political engagement is normally the scene of conflict, in the 
strong sense, and therefore demands that politicians devote much 
of their time to conciliating or overcoming opposition. 
Much more could be said on all these matters, and it may be 
said that there are certain aspects of political structures, such 
as the role of political ideology, 
5 which would need attention in 
any full treatment. While it is certainly true that a good deal 
of explanatory 'work in political analysis can be done by the 
notion of ideology, at this level of generality the aspects of 
these structures which it is important to distinguish c"oncern 
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power, and conflicts waged in order to secure it. Even apart from 
the type of reductive analysis already mentioned, which explains 
apparent ideological conflict as - rationalizations by the 
protagonists of their own interests, it is not clear that 
systematic ideological conflict is necessary to identify a given 
set of practices as political. Factional struggles for power may 
occur outside any ideological context. In this respect the model 
is likely if anything to err on the side of leniency rather than 
harshness towards utilitarianism, since it is at best doubtful 
(as will be argued below) whether much sense can be made of the 
theory as a political ideology and whether, as a result, the 
notion of ideology plays any part in its prescriptions for 
rational agency. 
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The characterization of political structures given above is 
meant to apply in the first instance to the paradigm case of 
national, central governmental or legislative institutions and 
processes, such as policy-making by the central administration, 
debates over statutory measures and so on. There are however more 
marginal applications of the term 'politics' to bodies not 
usually thought of as political institutions - to decision-making 
agencies such as private-sector firms, university 
admininistrations, etc. Reasons have already been given for 
doubting that private businesses are best regarded as political 
agencies. This is not of course to deny that bodies such as those 
mentioned may bear some resemblance to aspects of political 
structures. Apart from the considerations of public welfare 
already mentioned, these bodies usually lack the ideological or 
factional cohesiveness to mirror party- and ideology-based 
politics of the kind witnessed in western democracies. But this 
ambiguity or uncertainty in the extension of the term may be 
seen, in any case, as an advantage: the model reflects the 
vagueness of our understanding of the term, rather than im I posing 
any spurious rigour upon it. 
III 
The *question then is whether utilitarianism can accommodate 
political structures as interpreted in the previous section. As 
already indicated, the argument will offer utilitarianism the 
alternatives of either retaining its most distinctive and (at 
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least prima facie) attractive features, but failing to allow for 
these structures, or allowing for them at the cost of abandoning 
those features. It is the latter prong of this fork that the 
utilitarian will be offered in this section. The focus will be on 
a notable recent example of (what will be argued to be) non-ideal 
utilitarian theory, the two-level analysis of moral decision- 
making presented by Richard Hare in his Moral Thinking. 
7 Hare's 
is a work of moral, rather than political philosophy, and to this 
extent it is a matter for speculation what Hare would regard its 
political implications as being. This is however no more true of 
Hare than of other theoretical utilitarians now writing. 
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In Section I non-ideal utilitarianism was informally defined 
as a version of the theory which allowed for the possibility in 
calculating schedules of benefits and costs that some agents may 
fail to do what, ex ante, is utilitarianly rational, and adapts 
the schedules accordingly. It might be thought from a reading of 
Hare's book that his theory was not of this form, since it argues 
repeatedly for the importance of 'critical [ie utilitarian] 
thinking19 in resolving (what Hare thinks are only apparent) 
moral dilemmas. While it is certainly true that Hare is not 
concerned with intricate calculations of the implications for 
utilitarians of patterns of non-compliance in the behaviour of 
non-utilitarians (as, for example, Regan is), it is nonetheless 
the case that Hare, while observing the two-tier stratification 
of moral thinking, is not prepared, as some utilitarians are, 
merely to discard wholesale everyday habits of moral judgment in 
favour of some general aggregative decision-procedure. This is 
because Hare believes, as these other utilitarians do not, that 
the habits of judgment are for the most part capable of 
utilitarian justification - indeed that their ultimate rationale 
is utilitarian. 
Though this makes it unlikely that Hare would wish to be 
classified as a non-ideal theorist, it remains true that the two- 
level structure looks like a departure from the standard format 
of utilitarian calculation. It appears that Hare's more liberal 
attitude towards the everyday habits of judgment is motivated by 
the belief that their utilitarian justification rests on the fact 
that, these habits having already been formed, a good deal of 
human happiness depends on their continuance. The more corrective 
brand of utilitarian is apt to dismiss these considerations in 
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favour of a belief that the calculations in which he is 
interested can be effected from the ground up, since there is no 
non-circular argument- to show why - these particular habits Of 
judgment should enjoy any priority in deliberation. Indeed, a 
utilitarian of this persuasion could argue that in some 
circumstances they reduce the benefits available to agents 
otherwise disposed to act in line with utilitarian standards of 
rationality. 10 
On the other hand, it may be doubted whether the habits of 
judgment have the rule-utilitarian justification which Hare seems 
to point towards - that they are as vital to human happiness, 
even in the world as it is, as Hare claims. The point here is not 
whether objections like this are well-founded. It is that they 
mark a difference among utilitarian writers, and show Hare to be 
one of those largely prepared to accept that an important 
influence on theutilities available in a given choice situation 
is the way the world is. 
Thus the claim is that Hare counts as a non-ideal theorist 
because he works without any ex ante notion of utilitarian 
rationality. This admittedly involves a slight widening of the 
definition of non-ideal theory to embrace not only the partial- 
compliance cases originally referred to, but, more broadly, 
conservative attitudes towards given but in principle alterable 
features of the decision-making environment (though this still 
allows for cases of partial compliance). Hare might deny this, on 
the grounds that the habits of judgment generate, once 
supplemented with the critical level of moral thinking, the 
greatest utility available; but even if, as Hare thinks, the 
ultimate reason why we are educated in these habits in the first 
place is utilitarian, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the 
utilitarian reasons are themselves dependent on the habits' 
already being in existence, since they provide the raw material 
from which so much of the calculation is performed. 
Hare, as already stated, is not forthcoming on the political 
implications of his two-level theory. But it is fairly clear how 
the operation of the dual structure in the moral sphere would 
transfer to political decision-making. Hare presumably would wish 
to claim that politicians have, on the whole, been brought up to 
make similar moral judgments about lying, promise-keeping, and so 
on, as everybody else, but that, in cases of conflict between 
16 
moral judgments, critical thinking must be used to decide the 
issue. What makes politics distinctive is that the allocation of 
public resources depend, as is seldom the case with private 
citizens, on the decisions of politicians. This no doubt makes it 
more urgent to get the decision right, as the utility numbers 
involved will be much larger than in private cases; but there is 
no reason in the basic theory to suppose that the basic format of 
decision-making is going to be any different in the political 
case. 
In a separate essay, 'Political Obligation', 
" Hare has 
attempted to extend his moral theory to politics (written before 
his adoption of the two-level formalism, but after his conversion 
to utilitarianism). 12 Hare's aim is to give reasons ones which 
derive from the theory, and are not merely consistent with it - 
for accepting political obligations as a sub-species of moral 
obligations. The reasons he presents fall into two categories, 
prudential and moral. Both of these categories include reasons 
derived from the existence of the law itself. Hare discusses 
prudential reasons relating to the penalties attendant on 
disobedience, and moral reasons dependent on others' likely 
compliance with the law. (This of course raises the problem of 
circularity in the justification for our being obliged to obey 
this law: but Hare gives further reasons for obligation in both 
categories, and argues that this, like all other legislation, is 
justified by its utility-maximizing effects. ) 
This is not the place to consider the merits of Hare's 
argument as a utilitarian defence of political obligation. The 
important point for the present purposes is that Hare treats 
political obligation as merely an outcome of the calculative 
procedures applicable to moral reasoning in general. He is, 
furthermore, prepared to allow, as indicated above, for the 
effect of both compliance and non-compliance on an individual 
agent's calculations. Thus the fact that others are obeying the 
hygiene law is an additional reason for my doing so, because the 
likelihood of my causing an epidemic by not keeping clean is 
greater than it would be if most people were also disobeying it; 
and conversely this reason loses its force if most others are 
also ignoring the law. 
At the same time, Hare rules out the possibility of free- 
riding in other cases by referring to the supposed disutilities 
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suffered by those cooperating, even when they are unaware that 
others are failing to cooperate. 
13 This move is justified, as 
often in Hare's work, by a shift to the critical level of 
thinking when consideration of personal utilities alone fails to 
deliver the desired conclusion - in this case, by reference to 
the universal prescriptions violated by free-riding. It is, 
however, highly unclear that these prescriptions, at any rate in 
the form Hare wants them, are consistent with (still less 
required by) utilitarian theory in its unmodified form. 
Such possibilities suggest that for Hare the considerations 
which inform politicians' thinking at the critical level do not 
necessarily duplicate those at work in private citizens' 
practical deliberations. For one thing, the subject-matter of 
political decision-making is likely to alter the criteria in use, 
or the relative weights assigned to them in deliberation. Kinship 
and friendship are obvious examples of the sorts of consideration 
which Hare regards as having a legitimate bearing on our moral 
thinking as private persons, but which are less evidently 
admissible as criteria of political deliberation - not that Hare 
says as much, but criteriological distinctions of this kind, 
between public and private forms of practical reasoning, are not 
ruled out by the dual-level theory itself. 
Or are they? The foregoing has assumed that this is what Hare 
himself would want to say about the political implications of his 
theory. But it is not clear that the two-level structure, when 
coupled with a utilitarian account of rational agency, can 
tolerate such distinctions between private and public spheres of 
deliberation - which is not to be identified with the clear 
conceptual distinction between compliance and non-compliance 
which, as we saw, Hare allows for in his account of political 
obligation. For utilitarianism seems to recommend a single 
across-the-board rule of conduct to its adherents: to act in all 
cases so as to maximize utility. 
This being so, it is hard to see why the context of the 
deliberation, or the identity of the agents undertaking it, 
should in any way affect the relative weights assigned to the 
available options. Indeed, if this were true, it would lead to 
problems of incommensurability - the very problems which 
utilitarians (including Hare) believe their theory to be best 
able to solve. For different agents, depending on their position, 
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would assign different utility measures in some cases to the same 
action, and there would, as a result, be no unique solution to 
the question of what ought to be done (no unique pattern of 
behaviour, involving all causally relevant agents, which 
maximizes utility). The same pattern of behaviour would have 
different utility numbers depending on which agent's perspective 
was taken up, and how that agent was situated. 
The upshot of this discussion is not that the very idea of a 
two-level theory is anti-utilitarian, but that the nature of the 
judgments which Hare is prepared to include at the intuitive 
level of moral thinking make it difficult to sustain any 
consistently utilitarian approach towards agency, since the dual 
structure does not preclude incommensurabilities in the patterns 
of moral evaluation which Hare is prepared to accept. On this 
analysis, Hare fails to take account of the fact that his own 
permissive attitude towards everyday habits of judgment is likely 
to allow too much in for the theory to remain utilitarian. It is 
not immediately clear how the impersonal aggregation required by 
the utilitarian calculus can allow for the influences on agency 
which the kinds of considerations Hare appears to have in mind in 
fact exert on people in acting. One reason for this is the 
subjectivity implicit in the fact that the reasons we have for 
acting have ultimately to be our reasons. 14 
An obvious area in which this comes out is that of personal 
relationships, where differential concern for others means that 
in very many cases deliberation about agency cannot take the 
universalistic form required. by the theory. Thus the kinds of 
sentiment - such as personal affection or rancour - which 
motivate people to act have presumably to be included within the 
utilitarian calculus, even though a committed follower of the 
theory would have to disregard any such sentiments in himself 
when calculating consequences. This makes it very doubtful 
whether utilitarianism can handle these sentiments 
satisfactorily, while maintaining as its ideal a society all of 
whose members act on utilitarian principles. 
This leaves it open to doubt whether the habits of judgment on 
which Hare relies can be as readily justified by rule-utilitarian 
arguments as he assumes. Hare often writes as if unreflective 
utilitarianism were the common coin of moral judgments nowadays, 
but the dilemmas arising. from clashes between the intuitive-level 
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principles inculcated by our moral education in childhood are not 
the only respect in which the ordinary agent departs from the 
strict canons of utilitarian rationality. Another way in which 
this can happen is through our subjective standpoints as agents 
situated in the world. 
This can itself give rise to moral dilemmas, of course, but in 
such cases one limb of the dilemma is not a consideration which a 
utilitarian can consistently allow the special deliberative 
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weight which agents assign to it. To take a well-worn example, 
the sea captain faced with deciding whom to save when his vessel 
is sinking is unlikely to think that whatever weight is carried 
by the fact that one of the passengers is his wife is merely 
cancelled or balanced by the further fact that, after all, the 
other passengers are somebody else's wives or husbands. But 
asymmetries of this type are not confined to perceived moral 
dilemmas. They are a pervasive feature of agency. 
At this point it may be objected that the original criticism 
of Hare's theory, that it failed to allow for the difference 
between the deliberative weights assigned to rival actions in 
public as opposed to private or personal agency, now seems to be 
undermined. It may now appear that the personal considerations 
inadmissible at the public level are precisely what is ruled out 
by the features of the utilitarian approach just identified, so 
that the theory turns out to be less disruptive of political 
action, as conventionally understood, than was argued earlier. 
The point however is not so much that this aspect of politics 
cannot be accommodated within a utilitarian theory of action, but 
that it is dubious whether the distinction between public. and 
private action is one which has much sense or point for the 
utilitarian. It is the possibility of differential rankings, 
depending on the context of decision-making which is alien to 
utilitarianism. If Hare is conservative enough about the content 
of the intuitive-level principles, these differential rankings 
threaten to contravene the utilitarian requirement that any 
rational decision-procedure must be optimific: if, on the other 
hand, Hare rules out such rankings, the theory retains its 
utilitarian credentials (though it remains to be explained in 
Hare's moral psychology how the rankings got into our thinking at 
all), but with the result that his approach can no longer reflect 
the complexity of practical reasoning, and in particular the 
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special circumstances in which political decisions are taken. 
The reply to the objection, then, consists not in denying that 
utilitarianism can reproduce in its own terms the impartiality of 
actual political decision-making, but. in claiming that this 
results not from any appreciation on the utilitarian's part of 
the complexities in our thinking about the relationship between 
public and private agency, but from a blanket procedure which 
happens to fit this aspect of political life fairly well. It is 
its failure to take into account the autonomy of the political 
which marks the utilitarian approach. If the politician is 
required to observe impartiality in policy-making, that is not 
(according to utilitarianism) because of the nature of the 
politician's role, but because this issues from a more general 
requirement of impartiality - one which applies equally to those, 
like the sea captain, in civil society. The reasons underlying 
the demand that politicians behave impartially as regards 
personal friends, relatives, etc., in formulating policy, spring 
from the same grounds which make personal relationships of this 
kind acceptable grounds for partiality in other circumstances. 
This point can brought out from the opposite direction as 
well, when we turn to consider the limits on political 
intervention - particularly in the area of privacy. While it is 
commonly accepted that there should be fairly strong restrictions 
on interference with privacy, utilitarianism has difficulty in 
accepting any hard-and-fast demarcation of public from private 
concerns. Hare could maintain that the desire for privacy is one 
which is strongly felt and must therefore be taken into account 
in any utilitarian calculation. But it looks as if the intuitive 
level is simply taken at face value when, as here, the first- 
order sentiments conduce to the desired conclusion, but are 
subjected to critical-level revision when, as in the free-riding 
case, reliance on unreflective preferences threatens to upset the 
calculation. 
If enough people want a specified individual's privacy 
invaded, for example, it looks as though utilitarianism has to 
sanction this, the offence felt by the individual himself being 
no more than a debit item to be entered on the overall balance- 
sheet. What is needed to avoid this outcome is a set of 
reflective preferences of a rule-utilitarian form against such 
invasions of privacy. But this will only be effective as a 
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manoeuvre if, as Hare argues is true in the free-riding case, 
reflective preferences like this have a first-order foundation. 
There is little reason to think that*this is invariably so. 
This issue has been pursued at length because Hare's own views 
are fairly clear, as is the choice facing a utilitarian who 
wishes, as he does, to bring everyday habits of moral judgment 
into the theory. The ambiguities in Hare's thinking lie in the 
unclarity over how much of the unreflective moral thinking is 
really justifiable in (rule-) utilitarian terms, and what the 
effect is if, as has been argued, it is less than Hare supposes. 
If this is right, there must be some major work of reconstruction 
rather than marginal tinkering to be done on our unreflective 
moral attitudes, unless some argument from a distinction between 
ex ante and ex post utility can be sustained - that is, by 
building into the calculation some element to cater for the fact 
that these attitudes are already in existence. It seems plain, 
however, as already claimed, that Hare has in mind some less 
pragmatic justification than this for his acceptance of these 
attitudes. 
The discussion has further suggested that utilitarianism 
cannot make room for any notion of a sui generis political 
morality, where the moral requirements on agents in other areas 
of life are either relaxed or strengthened or reformulated to 
suit political conditions. If utilitarianism cannot make sense of 
the idea that rationality depends on the agent's situation, there 
is no reason to think that it will allow for the possibility that 
its rational requirements can be modified according to context. 
It is not clear how far Hare is prepared, to allow for such 
contextualization; but if he is, it is hard to see how he can 
remain a consistent utilitarian. 
IV 
It is instructive to consider how an apparently quite 
different brand of utilitarian theory performs when analysed 
along the same lines as Hare's. In the previous section, non- 
ideal theory was defined as a version of utilitarianism which 
does not operate with an ex ante understanding of rationality, 
i. e. prior to human institutions, practices, and so on, but uses 
these as raw materials for a utilitarian calculation. It should 
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now be clear in what respects Hare can be seen as a non-ideal 
theorist. Regan, 16 by contrast with Hare, is far more concerned 
with utilitarian responses to partial compliance - with agents' 
failure to act in what (ex ante) would be the utilitarianly 
rational way. Regan thus works with a notion of ex ante 
rationality, but only as a starting-pOint from which to develop 
cooperative utilitarianism, his own partial compliance theory. 
Regan argues that there are two properties which a utilitarian 
theory should have, but which cannot be combined in a single 
theory. In particular, no version of act- or rule-utilitarianism 
can combine the properties, as each of these, contrary to the 
extensional equivalence thesis of Lyons, possesses one, and only 
one, of the desirable properties. Only act-utilitarianism, 
according to Regan, has PropAU, 
17 the property of issuing to each 
separate agent the instruction to act so as to produce, in the 
circumstances, the best consequences she can in that situation. 
Only rule-utilitarianism, on the other hand, has PropCPP, 
18 the 
property of issuing to all agents the instruction collectively to 
produce by their actions taken together the best consequences 
achievable by any pattern of action. Because they possess these 
exclusive properties, Regan argues, act- and rule-utilitarianism 
are mutually non-entailing. He offers his own cooperative 
utilitarian theory as an alternative which, it is claimed, comes 
as close as any theory can to combining PropAU with PropCOP. 
Regan uses a matrix of the form shown below" in arguing for 
the claim that act-utilitarianism lack PropCOP. 
Agent 2 
push 






Regan's argument is that if for some reason either of the 
agents decides to not-push, act-utilitarianism will require the 
other to follow suit and not-push also, since this is the only 
way to achieve y, the best consequences available to the latter 
agent in these circumstances; but rule-utilitarianism requires 
each agent to push in a situation such as that modelled above, 
since this pattern of action is the only one which achieves the 
23 
greatest benefit attainable by collective action, namely x. 
Hence, Regan thinks, the two forms of utilitarian theory produce 
conflicting prescriptions for action- in this case, since rule- 
utilitarianism tells both agents to push, but act-utilitarianism 
will require its followers in some situations to not-push. So the 
two theories cannot be equivalent, as Lyons argues, 
20 since a 
theory with PropAU will lack PropCOP. 
In arguing for the failure of the reverse entailment, Regan 
introduces the notion of a universal prescription for action 
(UPA), 21 which, on his definition, is a feature of rule- 
utilitarian theories. A UPA is in effect a list of actions 
assigned to agents: if each agent performs the action assigned 
under the UPA, the best overall consequences will be achieved. 
Thus in the above matrix the UPA would assign to both agents the 
action 'push', though there is no presumption, in general, that 
the actions assigned to different agents under the UPA must be 
the same under some non-trivial description. 
Regan argues that a rule-utilitarian theory, incorporating a 
UPA,, lacks the flexibility to deal with the possibility of non- 
compliance by some agents, without collapsing back into act- 
utilitarianism and so, on the previous argument, lacking PropCOP. 
If, in the above matrix, either agent should fail to perform the 
UPA-prescribed action of pushing, the other agent is still 
required to push even though this action no longer realizes the 
best consequences in these altered circumstances. Regan argues 
that the UPA cannot be modified to allow for conditional 
prescriptions without becoming act-utilitarianism22 - for this is 
just what the latter is, a set of instructions to all agents 
prescribing actions contingent on how all other agents behave. 
From here Regan develops his own theory of cooperative 
utilitarianism. The essential idea is that the theory is 
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adaptable, which means that it takes into account the 
possibility of non-compliance . by some agents. Agents act in 
accordance with cooperative utilitarianism if they combine to 
produce the best consequences they can, given the behaviour of 
other agents not following the theory. This might be thought t0 
be circular, given the mention of the theory itself in the 
definition, but as long as there are univocal utility measures 
for each possible permutation of actions, it is theoretically 
possible to define a best pattern of behaviour for any subset of 
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agents relative to the actions of agents in its complementary 
set. 
Regan's account of. the theory emphasizes that the agents who 
follow it do so not merely by chance, but conscious design. It is 
important that agents see themselves. as cooperators, and 
recognize reciprocal intentions to cooperate in other agents. 
This means that agents can fail to act in accordance with the 
theory even when they produce, adventitiously, the best 
collective outcome open to them. One possibility this raises is 
that action could be concerted through institutional means, for 
example, in order to secure the best available consequences. 
Regan is not explicit about how this might take place. But in 
practice there would be room for provisions of this kind as a 
means of achieving the best consequences by, for example, 
disseminating relevant information to cooperators, formulating 
programmes of action over the longer term, issuing propaganda, 
and so on. Regan's version of part ia 1-compl ianc e utilitarianism 
would allow for some form of party organization within a non- or 
imperfectly utilitarian society, as a means of concerting action 
. 
to achieve the best available consequences. Since it does not 
begin from the premiss that the utilitarian need only be 
concerned with what is rational ex ante, it is, on the 
definitions already given, a non-ideal theory. 
Regan's arguments against the extensional equivalence thesis24 
are, however, unconvincing, and as a result his own brand of 
cooperative utilitarianism lacks the clear-cut advantages over 
traditional theory which he claims for it. The problem with the 
arguments using matrices like that above is that they address 
themselves to different levels of information when applied to 
act- and rule-utilitarianism. If it really is true, in the 
matrix, that one of the agents has, for some reason, not-pushed, 
then it -is undeniable that act-utilitarianism will require the 
other agent to not-push also, despite the fact that before the 
first agent acted, both were required under rule-utilitarianism 
to push. But the fact that one agent has failed to do what rule- 
utilitarianism prescribes cannot be used to show its non- 
equivalence to act-utilitarianism where the latter is able to 
adapt to this new information. Unless the theories produce 
different prescriptions in identical circumstances, nothing can 




applied to the situation where one of the agents had already not- 
pushed, it too would require the other to follow suit. 
Regan's arguments to prove the impossibility of building 
conditional prescriptions into the UP. As of rule-utilitarianism 
are perhaps designed to head off objections of this kind. But it 
is hard to see why it should be thought impossible for such 
conditionals to feature in the rule-utilitarian apparatus. It 
looks as if act-utilitarianism issues, before anyone has acted, a 
form of UPA to its followers - the same one as rule- 
utilitarianism; and that once some agents have acted, act- 
utilitarianism there is just a unique pattern of action by the 
remaining agents which maximizes utility (or a set of equal best 
such patterns). This is not a conclusion which Regan is well- 
placed to resist, given his own exposition of the cooperative 
theory. For, as was noted above, the latter relies on the 
assumption that adaptability will enable agents to achieve the 
best outcomes available to them in the face of non-utilitaria4 
behaviour by others. 
Only if it is possible to define sets of actions of some 
agents which are optimal relative to a given pattern of behaviour 
by the remaining agents will the notion o. f adaptability make 
sense. But these are just the conditional prescriptions for 
action which we envisaged being added to the UPA of rule- 
utilitarianism. On closer inspection, it turns out not that Regan 
has identified rule-, act- and his own cooperative utilitarianism 
as separate theories, but that they are all one. They all rely, 
with no more than verbal differences, on relativizing best 
consequences of actions by some agents to given patterns of 
action by the rest. 
If this is right, there are fewer options for the utilitarian 
than Regan claims to have identified. This need not mean that the 
part ia 1-compl ianc e brand of utilitarianism must be seen as the 
only authentic version of the theory, though if the arguments 
above are right, it is undeniable that this is of considerable 
importance in the utilitarian approach to rational agency. There 
are however forms of utilitarian theory, such as utilitarian 
generalizatign, which feature no such property of adaptability or 
conditional prescriptions. On this showing, the main difference 
i-ad non-ideal theory would consist not in radically 
I ; Ir 
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but in different levels of informational input, concerning in 
particular the actions or intended actions of other agents. It 
would not be a matter of fundamental incompatibility between 
competing forms of utilitarianism, but, merely of there being, 
unsurprisingly, different patterns of optimizing action for a 
given agent or set of agents, depending on the available 
information. 
Much confusion in writings by utilitarians or about 
utilitarianism arises from a failure to appreciate fully the 
distinction between optimizing relative to a given set of 
actions, and, on the other hand, a global view which takes all 
agents' actions as open to modification. Regan is of course aware 
of this distinction in the abstract, but blurs it in discussing 
the supposed difference between act- and rule-utilitarianism. If 
the important issue is what levels of information, corresponding 
to given states of action, are taken as the starting-point of the 
calculation, there is no reason to think that there is any purely. 
theoretical difference between forms of utilitarianism focussing 
on global calculation and those dealing with. partial compliance. 
Hare's treatment is marked, as was argued in the previous 
section, by an ambiguity over the scope of the intuitive-level 
principles, and their utilitarian justification. This led to 
uncertainty about how much of what, on the basis of the model 
presented at the start, we recognize as political structures, 
could be fitted in with Hare's theory. It is now apparent that a 
similar ambiguity is latent within Regan's theory, and indeed 
within utilitarian theory generally. The unclarity in Hare's 
theory results not from some failing peculiar to him, but from a 
more general uncertainty in utilitarianism about what to include 
in the calculation as raw material, and what to treat as 
potentially subject to rational correction through utilitarian 
analysis. While on the one hand, it is problematic what, on the 
global view, should go into the initial calculation, it is also 
unclear why a consistent utilitarian should refrain from 
modifying the human institutions and practices which enter into 
ex post calculations. The political structures which provide a 
starting-point for the calculations of ideal theory are 
themselves liable to criticism from within that theory. 
These considerations further reinforce the conclusion that 
there. is no distinctively utilitarian theory of political 
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structures and their role in bringing about or facilitating what, 
from the utilitarian viewpoint, is rational action. In a theory 
such as Regan's, which sets out to determine how utilitarians 
should respond to the prospect of non. -utilitarian behaviour by 
others, there appears to be little. account of what the former 
rationally should do, if anything, apart from devise strategies 
for adapting to the latter's non-compliance. That is, if a theory 
like Regan's has anything to say about political structures, even 
by implication, it seems to be of a purely instrumental nature: 
to the extent that Regan is prepared to allow for political 
structures at all the justification will be that tactical 
acceptance of sucý structures is warranted in the name of 
strategic utility-maximization. 
If this is indeed the form of argument which a Regan-style 
utilitarian advances, it at least has the merit of being clearer 
about its commitments and their justification than Hare is; but 
the underlying problem remains that, since there is no 
independent reason for the existence of political structures, the 
argument is open to the objection that an ideal state of the 
world would dispense entirely with these structures. This section 
has argued that Regan, in his appraisal of rule-utilitarianism, 
does not escape the force of this objection. Only if there is a 
well-defined understanding of ex ante utility can: it even appear 
that act- and rule-utilitarianism come into conflict. 
Thus similar problems afflict Regan's theory, in its attempts 
to account for political structures, to those faced by the 
superficially very different theory of Hare. Just as Regan is 
lef t with a view of politics as wholly instrumental, so the 
equivocations in Hare's position conceal what is either a 
fundamentally non-utilitarian moral outlook, or else one which 
authentically utilitarian, but which can no longer provide any 
independent justification for the existence of the political 
structures. Because, as has been argued, there are no real points 
of difference in theoretical terms, as opposed to informational 
levels and starting-points for decision-making, between the forms 
of utilitarian theory which we have considered, this pull towards 
the ideal is bound to assert itself. The next section turns to 
examine a utilitarian theory which responds to this pull by 




It should be plain from reading Parfit's book Reasons and 
Persons25 in what sense his work can be regarded as a 
contribution towards ideal theory. Parfit uses utilitarianism as 
a critical tool in his book, as a means of probing and, as he 
hopes, undermining the assumptions about rationality and personal 
identity which he sees as motivating non-utilitarian attitudes in 
everyday moral thinking; he is, as he states at the start of the 
book, a revisionist philosopher rather than one who is content to 
analyse and explain already-current beliefs. 
This approach raises questions about Parfit's methodology. His 
usual mode of argument is to ask how intuitively we would 
respond, presumably equipped with current 'common sense, 26 moral 
beliefs, to the numerous hypothetical examples he devises. If we 
are not to accept the pre-existing moral beliefs or attitudes at 
face value, the question arises why these beliefs should be 
uncritically invoked in response to Parfit's hypothetical 
examples. These examples may show that our current beliefs cannot 
be used as a basis from which to extrapolate general principles, 
since they prove contradictory when any attempt of this sort is 
made; but that does not show that we were really utilitarians all 
along, or that the pre-existing beliefs can be selectively used 
as a basis for utilitarianism as Parfit's methods appear to 
suppose. 
Parfit might respond that this approach is a necessary first 
step in his broader strategy to expose the inadequacy of 'common 
sense' morality. If this morality proves to be incoherent, Parfit 
might argue, there is good reason to abandon it in favour of some 
alternative theory, such as utilitarianism, which is free of 
inconsistency. But, w hether or not 'common sense' morality, as 
Parfit interprets it, does contain these inconsistencies, it is 
extremely doubtful whether his litany of practical examples, and 
our supposed unreflective responses to. them, can establish that 
this morality is inadequate compared to its utilitarian rival. 
As with Rawls' editing of non-philosophical moral beliefs in 
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reflective equilibrium, there must always be more than one 
method of resolving (what may be only prima facie) conflicts in 
moral reasoning. In Rawls' case the aim is to achieve some 
rapprochement between first-order moral beliefs and their 
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theoretical articulations. But Parfit's theory, and the 
philosophical method he uses to argue for it, leaves - or perhaps 
exploits - an ambiguity between' rely - 
ing on the 'common sense' 
beliefs, and showing their incoherence as the prelude to 
replacing them with something radically different. Utilitarianism 
may do the latter: Parfit certainly thinks it results in dramatic 
shifts of (among other things) political priorities. But the 
wider the gap between the utilitarian destination and the present 
starting-point, the harder it is to see how current moral 
attitudes can propel us across it. 
- In this respect it is instructive to compare Parfit's approach 
with that of Hare. The difficulties raised by Parfit's style of 
reasoning interestingly parallel those of Hare discussed in 
Section 3. There it was noted that Hare has problems in 
justifying the intuitive-level moral judgments from a utilitarian 
standpoint. Similarly, Parfit's methods leave us with the 
question why, on his revisionist brand of utilitarianism, there 
should be any part for the uncorrected moral attitudes to play, 
given that much of the argument of his book is aimed at 
overturning these attitudes. Nor is this similarity accidental, 
if, as claimed in the last section, the ideal/ non-ideal theory 
distinction turns less upon theoretically contentious issues than 
on the stage at which utilitarian analysis is brought to bear. 
The problem remains for Parfit how to specify, from the 
standpoint of ideal theory, the content of any moral beliefs 
purged of utilitarian assumptions. In the same way, Hare's 
ambiguity over the nature of the intuitive-level habits of 
judgment could be explained by the critical level's threatening 
to subsume all moral judgments, while, at this level, it was hard 
to decide what determined their content. 
What really distinguishes Parfit from Hare, then, is at most a 
difference over how much ordinary moral thinking can be brought 
uncorrected, or with minimal correction., into the utilitarian 
framework. Like Hare., Parfit is unforthcoming on the political 
implications of his work, but it is at least clear that he thinks 
its consequences for public policy would be fairly radical. For 
example, Parfit supposes that accepting his philosophical 
arguments on moral rationality and personal identity entails a 
commitment to promote demographic and energy policies quite 
different from those in force anywhere28 - not least because 
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Parfit's conclusions require a much greater degree of central 
planning in these policy areas than at present, there being 
currently no global strategy for determining the use of scarce 
resources like energy, or for deciding population levels. 
It is not possible to discuss at any length the arguments 
which lead Parfit to these conclusions. Happily, however, the 
details of Parfit's arguments about rationality and personal 
identity are tangential to our present concerns, which relate to 
the political implications of different styles of utilitarian 
theory. Whereas Hare's broadly conservative attitude towards 
current moral beliefs suggests that his two-level theory can 
accommodate recognizable political structures virtually intact, 
it is far less clear that Parfit's more critical stance is as 
undisruptive of the existing political order. This becomes 
apparent when it is asked how we get from the present political 
arrangements which in Parfit's view results in the pursuit of 
irrational, because non-utilitarian, policies, to an ordering of 
the world where the policies he favours are implemented. 
Parfit has nothing to say on this in his book, a surprising 
omission in view of his emphasis on hard-headed practicality. It 
is not, after all, as if Parfit is not a consistent or thorough 
enough utilitarian to appreciate that desirable end-states must 
have offset against their utility the costs incurred in realizing 
them, or, more generally, that part of the assessment of overall 
outcomes concerns whatever is involved in securing the final goal 
-a consideration which may itself be sufficient to alter the 
goal itself. This is another indication, presumably, that Parfit 
is operating from the vantage-point of ideal theory, where it is 
assumed that human institutions, political processes, and so on, 
are malleable enough to permit the implementation of whatever the 
theory itself requires. But there is no reason to think even if 
this is so that the ideal theory can merely absolve itself of all 
responsibility for explaining how political structures are to be 
adapted so as to realize the final goals of the theory. 
Unless Parfit hopes that world politicians will be swayed by 
the arguments of Reasons and Persons, therefore, there has to be 
some account of how the present non-utilitarian state of politics 
can be brought into linewith Parfit's policy prescriptions. It 
may be that Parfit believes this to be theoretically 
unproblematic: that there has to be some account of how 
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politically the policies would be implemented, and the associated 
costs included in the overall calculation, but that no matters of 
substance depend on the nature of the political mechanisms by 
which this is to be achieved. Even from the standpoint of ideal 
theory, however, there has to be some account of how the favoured 
policy is not merely implemented, but also of how utilitarians 
can reach a position where they can implement it. There must, in 
other words, be some strategy for gaining power in a world where 
politics is seldom, and never systematically, run on utilitarian 
lines. 
It is doubtful whether ideal theory can maintain the division, 
which we have conjectured to lie behind Parfit's failure to deal 
with these issues, between policy and the political means by 
which it is to be implemented. It is not very realistic to 
suppose that strategies for gaining power, once put into 
operation, are likely to leave policy wholly unmodified, not only 
because these strategies, as already mentioned, themselves incur 
costs in enforcement, but also because the process of political 
persuasion induces changes in policy, as a means of canvassing 
more widespread support. Given Parfit's starting-point, that 
common-sense morality is non- or imperfectly utilitarian, it is 
important to make good this gap in the theory. Sometimes 
utilitarian writers seem to assume that the very act of producing 
a theory is all that is needed to remedy this deficiency. But (as 
has been more extensively discussed in socialist writings) the 
theoretical work has to be supplemented by some programme for 
gaining power, which does not rely only, or even in some cases at 
all, on the strength of the purely theoretical arguments 
themselves. There has to be some explanation, not just of what it 
is rational to do, but how to deal with (what is seen as being) 
others' irrationality. 
29 If this is not to demand some compromise 
in the content of the utilitarian directives to agents as to how 
they should act, it becomes pressing to formulate some 
explanation of how power is to be gained and held. 
Another set of questions raised by this latter consideration 
of how utilitarians are to exercise power once having secured it. 
Again here there is the possibility of wielding power through 
existing political channels, by means of the usual legislative 
and executive institutions, and this is fairly intelligible on at 
least certain forms of non-ideal theo ry. But any ideal theory 
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which eschews the conventional avenues for reaching power is 
unlikely to rest content with the pre-existing political 
structures. For example, in democracies like those of western 
Europe there are usually institutionalized confrontational or 
non-utilitarian elements built into -these structures which the 
ideal theorist is committed to dismissing on the grounds of their 
irrationality. 
Parfit is, again, non-committal on the issue of what political 
structures would attend the ideal utilitarian society, where 
power is wielded exclusively by utilitarians (of Parfit's own 
stamp). This latter qualification is not without importance, as 
the differences between utilitarian theorists would influence the 
formation of policy even in a world in which utilitarianism was 
the dominant political doctrine. Even if the ideal-theory 
assumption is permitted, that the problems of gaining and 
retaining power can be ignored, it still remains to be shown how 
the disputes which rage between utilitarians in present-day. 
academic discussion will disappear or be of no political account 
in the ideal-world conditions where utilitarians are entrenched 
in power. 
The supposition of much ideal theory such as Parfit's is that 
those in power will not only be utilitarians, but of his 
preferred variety. If this is dismissed as grossly implausible, 
we are left with the prospect-, even where utilitarians are in 
power, of familiar disputes over the policy implications of 
shared beliefs, and the likelihood that the realities of 
political power will modify the antecedently rational policy. 
Once the policy-altering nature of power and political processes 
in general are taken into account, this pure ideal perspective 
merely vanishes, and we are pushed back towards the 
accommodations which the non-ideal theorist has to make, both in 
allowing for the possibility of dispute between utilitarians, and 
also, more fundamentally, of having to cope with a world in which 
few people are utilitarians of any sort. 
It is not hard to see why this dimension of indeterminacy 
should lie beneath ideal theorists' failure to deal with the 
phenomenon of political power. For utilitarianism's appeal as an 
action-guiding doctrine is that it is both comprehensive, in 
applying in principle to all circumstances in which a decision 
has to be made, and optimific, in specifying a unique best course 
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of action (or set of equal best actions) as that which it is 
rational to undertake. The comprehensiveness stipulation demands 
that the value or values in terms of which the rational 
calculation is to be conducted are projectible onto all 
situations where practical deliberation is called for: the 
optimific condition, that there is at most one value into which 
all others are translatable in order to decide what it is best to 
do. 
Once these conditions are accepted, there is no room for the 
idea that values decisive in some areas of practical deliberation 
may fail to apply to others at all, or that where a value or 
values do apply, it may not be possible to resolve finally what 
practical bearing they have on action, in the sense that it may 
be unclear what actions count, and why, as enacting the values in 
question. It is clear that practical indeterminacy of this form 
underlies much political dispute, especially such as occur in 
political cultures where certain values, such as liberty, are 
accepted by both parties to the conflict; but this is not the 
sort of dispute which the ideal utilitarian can countenance, even 
though internal disputes between utilitarians seem largely to be 
explainable by reference to these aspects of value. 
For these reasons it is highly doubtful whether the 
telescoping of value required for the utilitarian calculus to 
retain its appeal is really possible. One of the ways this 
becomes apparent is in the difficulty of assigning concrete 
utility numbers to presented courses of action. Some theorists, 
like Regan, assume the problem away by defining outcomes 
precisely in terms of utility numbers; while this is an 
acceptable means of approaching some theoretical issues, it gives 
no clue as to how practical outcomes are to be assessed in 
utilitarian terms. Others, like Parfit, assume in examples that 
outcomes are straightforwardly reducible to numbers (e. g. of 
beneficiaries of the competing actions). 
But even this presupposes a ceteris paribus condition, as 
otherwise there would be no ground for assuming as Parfit does 
that the number of beneficiaries is the criterion of assessment. 
Whatever the Benthamic maxim that each is to count for one and 
none for more than one may mean, it cannot for the utilitarian 
just be that a given benefit has the same utility measure 
regardless of who receives it. But if the above claims about the 
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nature of value are right, there may be no clear-cut 
quantification of the sort the utilitarian seeks. As a result, 
the assumption of ideal theory that pure calculation can resolve 
political disputes, is at best highly questionable. 
This emphasis on calculation as. the method of determining 
policy must exclude the endemic conflict witnessed in the real 
world of politics. This absence of conflict means that the ideal 
utilitarian ordering of the world lacks at least one important 
feature of political structures as defined at the start. What 
seems to emerge from Parfit's work and that of other ideal 
theorists is a view of the world where politics has in its 
essentials been superseded by administration - where the broad 
distinction between politics and administration, is that the 
former is concerned with policy, the latter with its 
implementation. It is far from clear that these can be kept 
completely distinct, even in thought, as it would be odd if no 
considerations of practicality entered into discussion of which 
policy to pursue. An important political consideration is whether 
a proposed measure can, given the world as it is, be made to 
work. 
It is perhaps this vagueness in the demarcation between the 
spheres of politics and administration which a utilitarian 
account of public decision-making can exploit, by reducing, in 
effect, all questions of policy to those of practical 
enforcement. But, in spite of the unclarity of the distinction, 
it is plain that the content of real-world politics is not 
exhausted by the purely practical issues of implementation. As 
this section has argue4, the balance is largely taken up by 
controversy over the practical import of values, which 
utilitarianism is notoriously bad at reproducing in its version 
of public decision-making. It is not 'a logical consequence of 
holding that there is some unitary value in terms of which all 
values can be expressed, that assessing outcomes in terms of the 
fundamental value is neutral: there could be two or more 
(mutually untranslatable) such values, and if so, the fact that 
each of these could separately express the other values in its 
own terms would not necessarily yield any means of choosing 
between them. 
Alternatively, it might be held that a sharp distinction 
exists between facts and values, and value-neutrality can only be 
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maintained on the factual side of the divide. But utilitarians 
usually do assert that the calculus is neutral, because they 
think that utility provides a unique standard of value-reduction, 
and because any fact/ value distinction in utilitarianism is 
likely to leave nothing on the evaluative side. If value is 
allowed to retain the features distinguished above in the 
discussion of its role in political conflict - if, in other 
words, it corresponds to our idea of value at all - it. will not 
give the utilitarian what is desired from the calculative 
procedure. 
30 Sidgwick's writings, to which Parfit acknowledges his debt, 
give an interesting illustration of the reduction of politics to 
administration. Sidgwick occupies in some respects an 
intermediate position between ideal and non-ideal theory, since 
he expressly aims to cater for the existence of non-utilitarian 
agents, while remaining committed to the view that society can 
be, and is best, run only by utilitarians. A result of these 
commitments is that Sidgwick comes up with an ideal society ruled 
in accordance with utilitarian doctrine, but in which this fact 
is concealed from those, presumably the majority, who would, if 
they knew about this, would prefer it not to be. 
It is an implication of this position that agents' perception 
of their interests may be mistaken. Sidgwick's ideal society is 
one in which no real political conflict can occur, because the 
structure of the society is such that conflicts over the weights 
to be assigned to preferences, which for the ideal utilitarian is 
the sole variety of political conflict, is filtered out in 
advance. Once the conclusion has been drawn that there is at most 
one ultimate value, the only political controversy can be over 
how that value guides action or policy, and the major source of 
indeterminacy in the particular value which utilitarians favour, 
whether people's preferences are to be taken at face value, is 
deliberately excluded from (public) discussion. 
Against this it might be objected that even in a society as 
tightly controlled by utilitarians as Sidgwick's ideal, there 
could be policy disputes of a kind, just as, for example, there 
could be disputes over policy within a socialist society. If 
there is nothing unintelligible in the idea of conflict between, 
say, the supporters and opponents of a policy of rapid 
industrialization in some backward socialist economy, then it is 
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equally possible that a Sidgwickian society could witness 
conflicts within the ruling group in deciding which policies 
maximized utility. All that is absent from either of these 
situations, it may be said, is the deep value-based ideological 
conflicts familiar in many western democracies; but in the 
account given in Section 2 above, ideology was not seen as an 
essential component of political structures. 
These considerations are, however, insufficient to show that a 
Sidgwickian society would have an authentic political culture, 
and ignore disanalogies between such a society and its socialist 
counterparts, which arise from the peculiar character of 
utilitarianism as a theory of action. While it is true that 
socialist cultures may espouse one supreme value, equality, and 
utilitarians another, utility, both of which may allow 
differences of practical interpretation, it is one of the 
advantages supposedly enjoyed by utilitarianism that it provides 
clear answers to questions of policy and individual action. If it. 
is admitted that the notion of utility is ambiguous, it becomes 
much less easy to defend, or even understand, the ostensible 
rationale of the Sidgwickian dictatorship of utilitarians. 
Only if the latter are enlightened as well as despotic is 
there any ground for keeping everyone else ignorant of how 
society is being run; if utility proves to be practically 
ambiguous, it is less likely both that the rulers will have the 
monopoly of even utilitarian wisdom which Sidgwick assumes, and 
that there will be an unchallengeable utilitarian mandate for 
keeping the truth hidden from society at large. Sidgwick's 
grounds for this form of society were themselves, consistently 
enough, utilitarian, and if utility is an ambiguous value, that 
must cast doubt on the governing arrangements themselves. 
Here we return once again to the point argued throughout this 
chapter, 
. 
that the more consistent a theory is in its 
utilitarianism, the less capable it is of incorporating the sort 
of political structures outlined at the start. This section has 
suggested that a Sidgwickian despotism could only retain its 
original justification if discussions of policy can be kept free 
of the conflicts of value which characterize real-life political 
disputes. If the central feature of utilitarianism is its 
optimific decision-procedure, any authentically utilitarian 
theory must eliminate value-based conflict, and this requires in 
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effect the end of politics, or at least of one of its most 
fundamental aspects. The converse point also holds, that any 
utilitarian theory which accepts the-possibility of conflict will 
be that much better equipped to understand political structures, 
but at the cost of no longer being a utilitarian theory in the 
full sense. This claim was argued for in Section 4, where 
ambiguities in the base-line from which decisions were taken were 
explained, in Hare's case, by the vagueness in the distinction of 
levels, itself the product of doubt over the utilitarian 
justification for the intuitive principles; and in Regan's case, 
by the pull towards a version of ideal theory in which the need 
to tailor utilitarian strategies to fit others' non- 
utilitarianism no longer exists. 
Essentially the problem is utilitarianism's open-endedness as 
a theory of action. This also explains, as already mentioned, the 
difficulty in maintaining any hard-and-fast distinction between 
ideal and non-ideal versions of the theory. While on the one hand 
its aggregative. procedure demands some quanta of value if the 
calculation is to be possible at all, it is, on the other hand, 
difficult to see what non-arbitrary choices can be made as to 
what form this value should take -a problem which arises not 
only with different interpretations of utility itself, but also 
in the practical significance of these interpretations. 
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This open-endedness means that there can, for the utilitarian, 
be no specifically political motives, virtues, or traits of 
character. 31 This is not true only of the category of the 
political in relation to utilitarianism: it is equally true that 
the doctrine can make no sense, for example, of the correlative 
moral noti6ns, because utilitarianism sets out a quite general 
algorithm for decision-making, applicable to all areas of life. 
Having once ascended to this level of generality, however, it 
becomes hard to see what is to be put into the calculus. In this, 
though not in its purporting to provide a decision-procedure for 
all cases of practical deliberation, utilitarianism resembles 
Kantian moral theory, which is likewise unable, within the 
category of the moral, to identify particular contents for actual 
categorical imperatives, an unsurprising result in view of Kant's 
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emphasis on the strictly sui generis character of the moral 
realm. Similarly utilitarianism runs into problems of content 
once it has been decided that all practical considerations are 
projectible onto at most one category of value. The result is an 
empty schematism, which because of its limited perspective cannot 
avoid arbitrariness in its prescriptions for action. 
This schematism has had its parallels in the real world of 
politics also. In particular, the aggregative and instrumental 
presuppositions of utilitarianism have found their echo in a 
commonly-held view of politics as concerned with utility- 
maximization (both in public expectations and in politicians' 
rhetoric). Politics is presented as an area of human activity in 
which disagreements at most concern strategic planning - over how 
best to realize the benefits which, it is assumed, everyone 
wishes above all to secure. It is especially striking that the 
rhetoric of utility-maximization should be so dominant when the 
political disputes in which it is deployed so often display the. 
value-pluralism which falsifies it. 
This tacit utilitarianism has its counterpart in a Weberian 
style of bureaucratic management, a natural concomitant of the 
managerial idiom of contemporary politics. 
32 This should not be 
surprising given the instrumental assumptions informing much 
political debate: within this order of assumptions the bureaucrat 
plays a logistical role, providing the administrative means to 
promote the ends of policy. In this respect, bureaucracy is the 
neutral place-filler called for by utilitarian theory, adapting 
itself to whatever policy objectives are placed before it. But 
(as will be argued in the following chapters) this neutrality is 
illusory, and the rhetoric of efficiency and control is 
unavoidably the expression of a particular ideology. 
Like Kantianism in its recent applications to political 
theory, utilitarianism sets out to deal with the fact of value- 
pluralism, a recurrent political problem, at least in western 
democracies. Kantianism tries to handle pluralism by setting out 
a transcendent category of value, which is capable of overriding 
or at least mediating between other values when they conflict. 
Utilitarianism, on the other hand, aims to make conflict appear 
illusory, by showing that such disputes can be resolved by 
invoking a single criterion of value. 
Both of these approaches, as attempts to deal with pluralism, 
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eliminate the political as the forum within which conflicts of 
values occur. A constant problem for liberalism is how to keep a 
grip on this aspect of the political, while preserving the 
pluralism which liberalism, whether with enthusiasm or 
resignation, takes to be a fact of life. It is readily 
understandable, therefore, that both the Kantian and the 
utilitarian rejections of politics should have enjoyed support 
within liberal theory, as a means of preserving value intact, one 
way or another. 
But it is highly doubtful whether either the utilitarian or 
Kantian approaches do succeed in this, and more doubtful still 
whether the conflicts of values which the liberal regards as 
inevitable can be artificially sealed off as part of the private 
realm, while leaving any recognizable content to politics. 
Conflict is ineliminable from politics, and it is naive to think 
that the values about which the liberal wants to be tolerant or 
pluralistic can be kept out of the political arena. That is why 
utilitarianism, if it is to keep faith with its utilitarian 
origins, cannot afford a notion of politics. 
Notes 
1. In the text, the basic distinction assumed between act- and 
rule-utilitarianism is the latter's endorsement of rules of 
conduct which may, on occasion, result in individual actions 
which are disutile. Numerous questions arise, within this broad 
distinction, about, for example, the identity and individuation 
conditions of actions, and what classes of consequences have to 
be taken into account for the utilitarian calculus. Given the 
text's acceptance of the extensional equivalence thesis, it is 
not pressing to pursue these issues here. All that matters is 
that, in the case of any ostensible such act (such as the case 
where a computer mailing system occasionally sends out a bill to 
a customer for a sum below the unit cost of sending the bill 
itself) the action is only identifiable within the context of a 
system whose overall operation is or is not itself utile. Given 
univocal utility measures, and adequate information, there is no 
reason to think that there is not a single answer to whether or 
not a given action is utile. Utilitarian generalization is taken 
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to be the issuing of identical prescriptions (mutatis mutandis) 
to all identically situated agents, regardless of whether this 
embodies a general rule (which need-make no such universalistic 
prescriptions) or of whether it leads each- agent to perform 
individually utile actions. Here again, it is hard to see how 
there can be any utilitarian justification for such a system 
unless it yields outcomes which are utile. 
2. The term 'partial compliance' is due to John Rawls: see his A 
Theory of Justice (oxford 1971), pp8. 
3. Sartre, in his classic existentialist phase, would claim that 
inaction is still action of a sort, even where it involves no 
conscious choices: see his Existentialism and Humanism (London 
1948). It is doubtful whether mere inactivity manifests the 
intentionality without which human existence loses the name of 
action. But, in any case, the point still holds if we take it. 
that realizing this state of inactivity brings about (or 
perpetuates) a state of affairs in the world. 
4. The locus classicus for this position is Machiavelli in the 
Prince and Discourses, though, more contentiously, its roots may 
be traced back to Thucydides or Socrates (in his Platonic 
incarnation in the Republic). To claim this autonomy for politics 
is not of course to deny that an important part of politics - on 
many modern views, its totality - is the causal realization of 
public benefits in, for example, the areas of economic or social 
policy. What is denied ' 
is that this exhausts the content or value 
of politics as a human concern, a claim which will be taken in 
the text as a prime assertion of instrumentalism. 
5. See e. g. J. B. Thompson, Studies in the Theory of Ideol2ZX 
(Cambridge 1984). 
6. Admittedly, there exists a certain ambiguity over the form 
which a utilitarian political ideology might take, corresponding 
to the duality discussed in the text between ideal and non-ideal 
theory. In other words, the non-ideal theorist might appropriate 
some external ideology (such as socialism), claiming that given 
the way the world is this is the best method of promoting utility 
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- even though in conceivable counterfactual circumstances some 
other ideology, or none, might better serve this end. Although 
utilitarian assumptions and rhetoric pervade modern political 
discourse, this option has not been widely canvassed in 
theoretical writings by utilitarians. The alternative is to 
regard utilitarianism itself as a political ideology (as 
presumably Parfit, for example, does), enjoying similar status 
to, but in competition with, socialism and other political 
ideologies. This alternative makes it all the more pressing to 
answer questions of organization and practical implementation. 
7. Richard Hare, Moral Thinking (Oxford 1982). 
8. But see also Hare's article 'Political Obligation', in 
T. Honderich (ed. ), Social Ends and Political Means (London 1976). 
9. See Hare, op. cit. p25f. 
10. Parfit is one such, arguing that the 'common sense' judgments 
presumably delivered by these habits of judgment lack utilitarian 
jpstification (and indeed logical coherence). See Section 5 
below. 
11. See note 7 above. 
12. Hare seems to believe that the same metaethical formalism can 
encompass widely differing moral theories. He assumes in Moral 
Thinking that the universal prescriptivism for which he argued as 
a Kantian in The Language of Morals (Oxford 1963) still holds 
good, despite his conversion from Kantianism to utilitarianism. 
13. Hare, op. cit. pg. 
14. On this point see Bernard Williams, 'Persons, Character, and 
Morality', repr. in his 
, 
Moral Luck (Cambridge 1981), esp. 
Section III. Williams' target there is mainly Kantianism, but it 
is striking (as Williams himself would claim) that the central 
thrust of his criticism applies equally to utilitarianism - the 
criticism being, broadly, that Kantianism is incapable of 
handling the structuring of agents' moral life by personal 
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relationships, and imposes an impersonal universalistic structure 
of moral obligations on agents. This opens up a gap, as Williams 
argues, between morality, construed-along Kantian lines, as a set 
of rational prescriptions for action, and agents' subjective 
reasons for acting as they do. Similarly, utilitarianism only 
allows these elements to structure the moral life in so far as 
they emerge anyway from the felicific calculus. In Sidgwick's 
phrase, the position of the moral agent is not that of an 
embodied subject, but 'the point of view of the universe'. 
15. See Williams, ibid., p18 
16. Donald Regan, Utilitarianism and Cooperation (Oxford 1980). 
17. For Regan's definition of PropAU, see ibid., pp3-4. 
18. See ibid., pp4-5. 
19. See, e. g. ibid., p18, p85. 
20. David Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Oxford 
1965). 
21. See Regan, op. cit., p85. 
22. For this argument see ibid.., pp87-90. 
23. See ibid., p6. 
24. Ibid., p6. 
25. Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford 1984). 
26. Parfit introduces this term (ibid., p99) without any prior 
definition. As a result, it is a matter for speculation what 
application it has in the real world - whether, for example, the 
moral judgments imputed to it by Parfit are indeed the 
deliverance of common sense. Still more questionable is Parfit's 
assumption (again unargued) that this morality has objectives, as 
is implied by his claim that it is in certain situations 'self- 
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defeating' . This would of course be possible if (as it comes 
naturally to utilitarians to assume) morality is there to secure 
external goals (this is implicit in Parfit's parents and children 
example, ibid. p96-9). This may be true if the moral goals is 
defined as, for example, the prevention of harms to one's 
children. But morality is not merely about securing certain 
states of affairs - or at least not unarguably so. It may also be 
about given agents' acting so as to secure them. The moral life 
of the parent involves not merely the securing of benefits for 
his or her child - for example by hiring a nanny for the purpose 
- but personally acting so as to secure those benefits. Here 
again, we find that personal relationships structure moral life 
in ways unaccounted for by the impersonal aggregation of 
utilitarianism. 
27. Rawls introduces this term in A Theory of Justice, p20f. 
28. See Parfit op. cit., Part IV. 
29. While the rudiments of a utilitarian non-compliance seem to 
have been considered by, for example, Henry Sidgwick, modern-day 
utilitarians - Regan being a notable exception - have either 
pursued the corrective brand of theory propounded by writers like 
Parfit, or sought, as does Hare, to produce utilitarian 
justifications for established patterns of moral reasoning. 
30. See Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics (London 1907). 
31. See Bernard Williams, 'Politics and Moral Character', repr. 
in Moral Luck. 
32. As Alasdair MacIntyre has clearly pointed out: see his After 
Virtue (London 1981), pp26-7. 
Chapter Two 
Kant, Moral Agency and Politics 
Kant, Moral Agency, and Politics 
I 
Recent decades have witnessed a resurgence of interest among 
Anglo-American political philosophers in Kantian moral theory. 
Despite their many and obvious differences, the work of Rawls, 
Dworkin, Gewirth, Nozick and others' owes a common debt to Kant, 
whose most striking manifestation is these writers' shared 
concern with the moral subject - with, that is, the idea that 
persons are bearers of special moral claims which cannot merely 
be negotiated away or used as bargaining chips in 'the calculus 
of social interets'. Given liberal theory's concern with the 
moral claims of the individual, this is not surprising, as it is 
Kantian moral theory which above all exalts the moral subject 
both as agent and, in the Kingdom of Ends, as the object of moral 
action. Thus Kant's injunction, in one formulation of the 
Categorical Imperative, to treat other moral agents never merely 
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as means but as ends in themselves , has been taken up by liberal 
theorists as the basis on which to support claims about persons 
as autonomous or bearers of rights against, for example, 
aggregative utilitarianism or some other form of welfarism. 
While it is not very hard to see why neo-Kantianism should 
have come into vogue among liberal philosophers, it is less clear 
that Kant's moral theory can merely be accommodated within 
liberalism without disrupting some of its other central concerns. 
One major set of questions relates to the liberal's belief in 
neutrality, that public institutions and policy should as far as 
possible remain impartial between different conceptions of the 
good. Only if Kantian theory can be shown to be neutral in this 
sense can it enjoy the foundational status within liberalism 
which philosophers like Rawls have claimed for it; otherwise, the 
liberal appears to have little defence against the objection that 
he is advancing a substantive theory of the good which, in 
violation of neutrality, is preferred to other such theories. We 
therefore need some argument to show either that Kantianism makes 
no substantive commitments between conceptions of the good, or at 
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no substantive commitments between conceptions of the good, or at 
least that any commitments of this kind which it does make are 
3 
practically agreed. 
In pursuing this issue, the best st arting-point is in Kantian 
theory itself, and more specifically in its account of the moral 
subject. This seems the best place to start, as this is the place 
where (as was asserted above) the concerns of liberalism and 
Kantianism coincide. In attempting to clarify the relationship 
between the self and conceptions of value we need to establish 
both 
(1) the identity conditions of the self, and 
(2) how, as moral subjects or otherwise, the self as identified 
in (1) can be seen as bearing value. 
The answers to these questions may be connected: it may be held 
that the conditions which must obtain for a self to continue 
through time, for example, coincide with the conditions required 
for a self to bear moral value. There is, on the other hand, no 
reason on the surface to think that this must be so, and some 
4 
writers, such as Williams, give largely distinct answers to 
these questions. Nevertheless, in Kant's philosophy there is, as 
will be explained, a tight fit between the metaphysical 
construction of the subject and his account of moral agency - at 
least, on one interpretation -of the former. There is, moreover, 
little doubt that this is what Kant himself intended. 
This suggests that liberal theory cannot dispense entirely 
with metaphysical claims, contrary to, for example, Ackerman's 
assertion that liberalism is committed to no particular 
metaphysics or epistemology, nor to specific answers to I[blig 
questions of a highly controversial character'. 
5 This need not 
mean that value-neutrality must be violated. One line of 
argument, as has already been mentioned, is to invoke the 
allegedly consensual nature of the (public conception of the) 
subject, as in Rawls' interpretation of citizenship in terms of a 
'moral personality' constructed from shared moral beliefs current 
in society. 
6 But, as should become apparent in what follows, the 
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Kantian basis of Rawls' theory is dangerously attenuated. In 
producing an account of the subject generalized enough to be 
consensually acceptable, Rawls risks leaving it unclear how the 
residual subject can bear any moral weight at all. 
This is the burden of Sandel Is critique of Rawls in his 
7 Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Sandel argues that Rawls, 
Kantianism commits him to a 'radically disembodied' self which is 
too thin to support the strong moral claims, especially those 
concerning personal desert, required by Rawls' Difference 
Principle. The present chapter aims to locate these difficulties 
more precisely in Kantian metaphysics, and to suggest how 
ambiguities in Kant's conception of the subject of experience 
threatens to reduce to inconsistency those theories which rely on 
strongly Kantian assumptions, such as those referred to at the 
8 
start. Sandel's approach perhaps understates these difficulties, 
not least because his own 'radically situated' alternative to the 
Kantian subject is, as will be argued below, implicit within 
Kant's metaphysics of experience, as a dubiously coherent 
counterpart to the noumenal subject. 
Although the focus in this chapter will be on Kant himself, 
the arguments presented here are intended to be more widely 
applicable, to liberal theory in general. Thus the difficulties 
identified in Kant's notion of the moral subject are to be taken 
as symptomatic of a more serious malaise in liberalism, namely an 
incoherence in its understanding of the individual as the supreme 
repository of moral value. The argument amounts to a denial that 
there can be any value-neutral inference from answers to question 
(1) above, to answers to (2). There is no point from which a 
consensual notion of value embodied in persons can be used to 
resolve or mediate political conflict. The response to the 
miscarriage of Rawls' efforts to establish a consensual standard 
lies not however in a different answer to (1) as Sandel argues, 
but in questioning the priority enjoyed by the self in liberal 
thought. Once the force of this point is grasped, it becomes 
clearer that the value-neutral politics sought by liberal 




This section will- consider, in -a necessarily cursory form, 
Kant's analysis of the metaphysical 
-subject 
in the Critique of 
Pure Reason. As has already been asserted, Kant envisages a close 
relationship between the answers to questions (1) and (2) - 
between, that is, the identity or individuation conditions of 
selves, and the grounds on which we ascribe value to selves. 
There are, however, reasons for thinking that the attempt to 
derive this value from answering (1) threatens Kant's account of 
individuation itself with incoherence. Kant argues in the 
Critique that 
[man, I who knows all the rest of nature through the 
senses, knows himself also through pure apperception, 
and this, indeed, in acts and inner determinations 
which he cannot regard as impressions of the senses. He 
is thus to himself, on the one hand phenomenon, and on 
the other hand, in respect of certain faculties which 
cannot be ascribed to sensibility, a purely 
intelligible object. I entitle these faculties 
understandifig and reason. 
It is Kant's general doctrine in the Critique that we cannot know 
things as they are in themselves, and that our knowledge of the 
world is confined to appearances or 'phenomena'. When this 
doctrine is applied to the human subject, it seems to yield the 
conclusion that the subject as it is in itself cannot be an 
object of knowledge: I cannot know myself as I really am. And 
this looks like a denial of the possibility of self- 
consciousness, at least if the latter is understood, plausibly, 
as knowledge by the subject of itself as subject. Yet Kant says 
in the passage that man is I to himself... a purely intelligible 
object'. Is this a contradiction? 
if not, we need some explanation of how the 
supersensible subject is differentiated from the rest of the non- 
phenomenal world as an object of human knowledge. Kant's claim is 
that man can know himself 'through apperception': in other words, 
by means of the faculties of understanding and reason 'which 
cannot be ascribed to sensibility' rather than the phenomenal 
route through which, according to Kant, we acquire our other 
knowledge of the world. It may be that Kant has in mind, as his 
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use of the phrase 'transcendental unity of apperception' 
suggests, an application of the general transcendental argument 
which he uses elsewhere in the Critique, of the following form: 
(1*) Conditions C are required for there to be experience; but 
(2*) there is experience; so 
(3) conditions C are met. 
Taken in this way, Kant's argument is that it is a condition of 
there being experience at all that there is something, namely a 
subject, which has that experience; but there is experience; so 
there must be a subject. The positing of the subject is a 
precondition of experience itself, because the idea that there 
could be experience which was not predicated of an experiencing 
subject is unintelligible. From this form of argument there is no 
warrant for inferring the existence of a self-conscious subject, 
since there is nothing in the above argument to show that only 
this kind of subject could have experience. There is no obvious 
self-contradiction in the notion of a continuing subject of 
experience, which however lacks knowledge of itself. If this is 
indeed the most the argument shows, Kant faces problems further 
on in the argument, when he comes to apply the metaphysical 
construction on the subject to his moral theory. We will return 
to this difficulty later. 
Even before we reach this stage, however, Kant faces a 
question about the knowledge of the subject of experience 
available to us by means of the transcendental argument. 
According to the argument above, the knowledge we-can have of the 
subject is not given by the normal route, that is, 
experientially, but rather inferentially, through 'understanding 
and reason'. This might seem to be the conclusion Kant is 
seeking, since on his standard distinctions it is by these 
faculties, rather than by direct experience, that we can acquire 
knowledge of things as they are in themselves: that is, the 
subject can gain knowledge of itself as it really is, or self- 
consciousness. 
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This however presupposes that intellectual self-knowledge can 
be identified with self-consciousness. It is debatable whether 
Kant favoured such a- conclusion, given his remark at one point 
that 'although this thought [that there is a unitary subject] is 
not itself the consciousness of the synthesis of the 
representations, it presupposes the possibility of that 
synthesis'. 10 Kant, then, appears to accept the force of the 
objection in the last paragraph, that the transcendental argument 
is insufficient to establish a subject's self-consciousness. But 
even apart from this textual point, it is not very easy to see 
how in principle one could unite the representations given in 
experience as those of a unitary subject, while retaining any 
coherent distinction between the subject and the world. 
Any theory of the nature of the self requires some account of 
the subject's limits, otherwise there is nothing to tell us how 
subjects are differentiated from one another. But there appears 
on the present argument to be nothing within experience which 
could lead one to that distinction - all that is immediately 
presented is a manifold of sense-impressions and other 
sensations, with no indication of what in these representations 
is properly one's own. There is for example nothing to mark a 
particular physical sensation, such as a pain, as belonging to 
one subject rather than another. Hence the line between the 
subject and the world, from the standpoint of that subject, seems 
to be pushed back to coincide with that dividing the phenomenal 
world from that of the faculties. 
But if this is so it is no longer clear in what sense we are 
justified in saying that the separate representations in 
experience belong to a single subject, rather than any number of 
different subjects - or at least as many as there are 
representations. Now it looks as if the transcendental argumený 
relied on the assumption that the unity of the subject was 
already given in experience, and that it was this which made it 
senseless to think that there could be subjectless experience. 
Even if it is granted that there must be some subject to 
accompany each representation, this does not by itself show that 
these must be unified within a single centre of consciousness. It 
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is only if these representations have already been identified as 
mine that they can be colligated by a unitary subject. 
These considerations might prompt. us to try to draw the limits 
of the subject within experience. Most obviously this manoeuvre 
would involve some attempt to identify a distinguishing feature 
of certain types of experience which marked them as being of 
(that is, representing, as well as merely belonging to) a 
subject. While it is doubtful whether any such attempt 
corresponds to Kant's intentions, he seems at times to invite 
this sort of interpretation. It gains currency, for example, from 
considering the nature of the knowledge which the subject has of 
itself, as Strawson has noted, 
11 
and in particular the fact that 
while Kant treats the supersensible subject as existing outside 
time, it seems undeniable that any self-consciousness must both 
'belong to the history of, and must be consciousness of some 
episode belonging to the history of, a being which has a history 
and hence is not a supersensible being'. 
12 
Kant's problem here is that his construction of the 
supersensible world as timeless, and hence beyond causal 
determination (which on his account is necessarily temporal), 
leaves it unclear how the subject occupying this world is related 
to the empirical human subject - roughly, the human organism - in 
the phenomenal world. If we accept that self-consciousness is 
historically determinate, to the extent both that the appearance 
of the subject in self-consciousness and that this consciousness 
itself are part of the world of phenomena, it looks as though 
1[t1he reference to myself as I (supersensibly) am in myself 
drops out as superfluous and unjustified', so there is no reason 
to say that 'in empirical self-consciousness, I appear to myself 
13 
as other than I really am'. On this reading, the supersensible 
subject just disappears from view, as incapable of explaining the 
historically conditioned nature of human subjects' awareness of 
themselves, 
This is not to say that this alternative phenomenal view is 
necessarily successful in resolving the problem considered above, 
concerning the limits to be drawn within experienc. e between the 
subject and the world; though abandoning the transcendental 
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argument for the unification of the subject would at least 
eliminate one source of difficulty in dealing with the problem, 
namely the argument's inability to explain how the subject, 
standing outside the world of experience, is distinguished within 
it. While the alternative approach has not been proven to resolve 
this problem satisfactorily, it does at least look more promising 
to take the subject as non-inferentially given within experience. 
One reason for favouring this approach is that it does not suffer 
from the same difficulties as the transcendental argument in 
explaining the fact of self-consciousness. 
This survey has unavoidably been cursory, but it should have 
indicated some areas of difficulty in Kant's theory of the 
subject, and in particular suggested how his assumptions about 
the nature of experience lead to problems in his account of the 
supersensible subject. From this it might be thought that the 
inference from Kant's metaphysics to his theory of moral agency. 
was less direct than Kant himself supposed - that the fit was 
less close between the theory of individuation or subject- 
identity given in answer to (1) above, and the account of value 
given in response to (2). As will be argued in the next section, 
one reason for this may be that no answer to (1) which implies 
any clear answer to (2) can maintain value-neutrality in its 
account of the human subject. 
III 
This section will not attempt any full-scale treatment of 
Kantian theory, any more than the previous one tried to deal 
comprehensively with Kantian metaphysics. The aim, more modestly, 
will be to trace the issues pursued so far to Kant's account of 
moral agency. While it may be true that his theory of the 
supersensible subject is shaped in part by Kant's conception of 
what it is to be a moral agent, this section will argue that the 
latter cannot avoid the metaphysical difficulties raised earlier. 
As will be explained, the root of the trouble lies in Kant's 
requirement that the moral agent should be both an object of the 
understanding as a thing knowable in itself, and when undertaking 
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moral reflection, a self-conscious author of actions in the 
world. 
The moral agent, for Kant, is capable of rationality only in 
so far as he is metaphysically free, where to be free in this 
sense requires that the agent stands outside the determination by 
causes which characterizes the phenomenal realm. Because of the 
sharp line drawn by Kant between the phenomenal and the 
supersensible or noumenal worlds, it is not strictly accurate to 
think of him as a compatibilist about the question of free will 
and determinism. That would require Kant to regard the same set 
of facts (under at least some identity conditions) as admitting 
simultaneously of two different interpretations or analyses; but, 
as has been indicated already and will come out again in what 
follows, it is far from clear that we can identify, for these 
purposes, some single such set. Without some grasp of identity in 
this area, it is not evident that we have, as Kant perhaps 
supposed, a compatibilist theory rather than some form of 
dualism. Given Kant's assumptions, it is only on this basis that 
a moral agent can be free, 'for to be independent of 
determination by causes in the sensible world (and this is what 
reason must attribute to itself) is to be freel. 
14 
Kant's absolute denial that empirical considerations can play 
any part in morality surfaces again in his view that the content 
of moral principles as rules of conduct must derive from the fact 
that the principles are self-addressed by agents as purely 
rational beings. 
Empirical principles are always unfitted to serve as a 
ground for moral laws. The universality with which 
these laws should hold for all rational beings without 
exception - the unconditioned practical necessity which 
they impose - falls away if their basis is taken for 
the special constitution of human nature or from the 
accidental circumstances in which it ig-Placed*15 
The categorical nature of morality demands that moral agency 
be free of contingency. Since this means that' empirical facts 
such as those of human nature can play no part in shaping the 
content of morality, it is not to human beings as such, but as 
(potentially) rational agents that moral imperatives are 
addressed. only in this way, according to Kant, can morality 
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retain its autonomy. Thus, by contrast with some noncognitivist 
theories, such as emotivism, the Kantian account abstracts 
entirely from motivation in its explanation of our reasons for 
acting morally; and abstracts, equally,. from the actual empirical 
consequences an action will produce, in assessing its moral 
character. 
In view of Kant Is uncompromising rejection of considerations 
like this, it is important to identify the basis of moral agency 
in Kantian theory. It is Kant's project to found morality on 
considerations of rational agency alone. Only in this way, as we 
have seen, can the categorical status of morality be guaranteed. 
When it comes to specifying the content of the categorical 
imperatives, however, which are held to be the sum of morality, 
it is difficult to see how this-content can be generated from a 
basis as narrow as Kant wants. The more he cuts away from the 
possible basis of morality, the harder it is to know what content 
morality is left with in his theory. 
It might be thought that Kant's description of the Kingdom of 
Ends gave a specification both of this content, and an 
explanation of how it can be produced from the considerations 
about rationality. Kant's idea is that the subject of the Kingdom 
are persons qua rational moral agents, and it is their status as 
ends in themselves which is held to determine other agents' moral 
actions. Thus the second formulation of the categorical 
imperative holds that every rational agent should 1[alct in such 
a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person 
or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but 
16 
always at the same time as an end' . Whether a formulation as 
general and abstract as this can yield some of the rather 
concrete substantive moral positions Kant favours may be 
doubted. 17 But even leaving aside the matter of how well this 
version of the categorical imperative squares with the first- 
order principles Kant himself endorsed, it is highly dubious, 
more generally, whether the subject of the Kingdom of Ends has 
been characterized fully enough to produce first-leývel principles 
of any sort. 
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Kant offers, through the formulation of the categorical 
imperative, a criterion by which the morality of actions may be 
assessed. In its most perspicuous form, this criterion is whether 
the action in question treats other rational agents as ends 
rather than as mere means. But, bearing the arguments of the 
previous section in mind, it is highly unclear what the nature of 
these rational agents is, and how, consequently, their presence 
in the Kingdom of Ends can have any relevance to action in the 
phenomenal world. In that section it was argued that on the 
first, transcendental interpretation of the subject, there was no 
obvious point of contact between the subject and its experiences 
of the phenomenal world - or at least not one of which the 
subject itself could be aware. In particular, it was unclear how 
a certain kind of experiential content, that of the subject 
itself, could be distinguished within experience. 
But, if this is so, we are lef t with no clue as to how the 
self-consciousness required for Kant's highly reflective account 
of moral agency can be secured. What the subject needs, in 
applying the universalizability criterion to prospective actions, 
is an understanding of what, as an embodied agent, it involves 
for that subject to act in the world; but if, as was argued in 
the last section, the transcendental form of argument was not 
strong enough to provide an explanation of the subject's self- 
awareness, it appears that the degree of reflectiveness required 
for this criterion to be workable is unattainable. There is no 
path back, on this reading of Kant's argument, from the concrete 
phenomenal-world consequences which have to be taken into account 
in deciding whether an action is morally acceptable, to the 
position of the purely rational agent - for that is a position 
which no self-conscious being, in Kant's construction, could 
occupy. 
The same point comes out in the reverse direction, when we 
consider the route from the supersensible world, where the moral 
agent is situated, to the world of phenomena. Even if we 
possessed (as this chapter has argued we do not) a clear 
conception of how the noumenon or supersensible subject can be 
self-conscious, and could apply this to moral agency, we are 
still left with the problem of explaining how decisions taken by 
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this subject, standing as it does wholly outside the world of 
phenomenal causation, can bring about events within that world. 
Kant's rigorous separation of the noumenon as free moral agent 
from the world of causes leaves it unintelligible how that agent 
could do anything to alter the determinism of the phenomenal 
realm - the more so when the agent is conceived of as lying 
outside time, in which, Kant held, causal determination can alone 
occur. On Kant's construction of the noumenon/phenomenon 
distinction there cannot be any univocal identity conditions 
linking particulars in the phenomenal world with particulars in 
the supersensible world; as a result, we cannot identify 
temporally specific phenomena as the causal products of, or 
indeed as bearing any special relationship to, the deliberations 
of the moral agent. 
The last few paragraphs have located areas of difficulty in 
Kant's metaphysics of the subject, as it applies to his theory of 
moral agency. Kant's problems arose from his insistence on 
keeping the moral agent wholly outside the world of phenomena, 
These problems multiply when we consider the dual aspect of the 
moral subject, as the object, as well as the author, of moral 
action. The formulation of the categorical imperative given 
above18 enjoins agents to treat humanity always as an end, never 
merely as a means: this is because I[rIational nature exists as 
an end in itself'. 19 
But, again, in view of the identity problems already 
discussed, it is not clear how actions undertaken in the 
phenomenal world can treat noumena as means., or indeed as ends, 
when Kant has framed his distinctions in such a way that there is 
a minimal connection between moral subjects and their phenomenal 
status as human beings. This leaves it very uncertain how 
decisions as to how to treat the latter can in any way be guided 
by reference to considerations about the former. We are left with 
a large gap between the extra-temporal, non-embodied condition of 
moral subjects, and the fact that what seems to determine the 
actions of these moral subjects is a rather specific set of 
causal relations between physical actions and the condition of 
human bodies. 
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These difficulties ultimately derive from Kant's presentation 
of the noumenon as being a free agent only by virtue of being 
situated outside all causal determination. It is perhaps this, as 
20 Strawson surmises, which impels Kant to draw so sharp and 
unconvincing a line around the supersensible subject - it is only 
in this way, given his assumptions, that he can present that 
subject, qua moral agent, as being free. If this is so, Kant 
surely pays an unacceptably high price for his doctrine of 
metaphysical freedom, a price which includes unintelligibility in 
his account of reflective moral agency, and a severely incomplete 
explanation, at best, of how the existence of noumena as rational 
beings can shape decisions about what human agents are morally 
required to do. 
It is fair to say that these are serious shortcomings in a 
moral theory. This is not the place to speculate as to how far 
they might be resolved by adopting the second approach outlined 
in the previous section, of abandoning the notion of a noumenal 
realm for a subject given, and limited, phenomenally. This would 
of course mean jettisoning the idea that subjects, and hence 
moral agents, are metaphysically free in Kant's sense: the 
necessary condition of metaphysical freedom, that agents stand 
outside causal determination, cannot be satisfied if subjects 
(and hence agents) are purely phenomenal beings. 
The important point for this chapter and the argument as a 
whole is that such a manoeuvre would remove entirely the basis on 
which Kant saw morality as being founded, for the reason just 
given. This indicates once again the closeness of fit between his 
account of subject-identity and the moral theory. This leads us 
back to the question raised at the start of this chapter, whether 
the transition from an account of the subject to a theory of its 
moral value can be effected without compromising neutrality. one 
of the attractions of Kant's ethical theory, as has been 
observed, is its seeming even-handedness: it ascribes moral 
qualities to persons as rational agents, and thus (virtually) 
everyone qualifies for citizenship of the Kingdom of Ends. And 
indeed, this is what Kapt himself surely intended. Equality of 
citizenship is only achieved, however, by banishing contingency 
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from the moral realm - any contingency which threatens to import 
a moral distinction between persons. 
As this section has argued, however, there is a heavy price 
attached to this moral egalitarianism. -a price which has to be 
paid in more than one currency. The view of the moral agent as 
noumenon renders persons, as moral agents, inaccessible to 
reflective self-awareness. It leaves us with a puzzle about the 
relationship between moral reflection and the causes of action in 
the world. And it gives us little to go on in deciding what the 
content of morality should be - in particular, why the 
substantive imperatives yielded by the theory should be so 
closely bound up with the fate of rational beings in their purely 
phenomenal aspect. 
The first of these difficulties is perhaps purely internal to 
Kantian theory itself. But the latter problems directly concern 
the theme of this chapter, the relationship between the nature of 
the self and its moral status. Without some resolution of these 
difficulties we are left with no justification for the centrality 
of the self in Kant's moral theory. The next chapter will pursue 
this problem in neo-Kantian liberal theory. As a preliminary to 
that investigation, it will be instructive to consider how the 
imponderabilities in Kant's moral theory reappear in his own 
political philosophy. 
IV 
Many of the criticisms made of Kantian ethical theory will 
resurface in the next chapter, when we consider the construction 
of the self in neo-Kantian liberalism and the neutralist project 
in contemporary liberal thought. In this section, however, the 
focus is on Kant's own political doctrines. The aim is to trace 
the consequences of the views discussed already for Kant's view 
of the relationship between morality and politics. In particular, 
the issue is whether Kant's theory of the self can support his 
belief, echoed in some of his modern followers like Rawls, in the 
methodological priority of moral over other (and especially 
political) concerns. The further question this raises, when we 
59 
move on to consider modern neo-Kantian theory, is whether the 
moral priority enjoyed by the self in contemporary liberal 
thinking is warranted. - If the Kantian priorities are arguable, 
then a particular, self-based, version of those priorities must 
also come into question. 
Kant's most emphatic statement of the subservience of 
political considerations to morality appears in the Appendix to 
Perpetual Peace. There Kant asserts that 'all politics must bend 
the knee before right', and 
whatever empirical politics may say to the 
contrary,... [al true system of politics cannot-take 
a single step without first paying tribute to 
morality. For as soon as the two come into conflict, 
morality can 21 cut through the 
knot which politics 
cannot untie. 
It is not of course Kant's point that morality is somehow more 
effective than politics itself in providing political solutions 
to problems of policy, but that morality exercises an absolutely 
overriding claim in situations where moral and political demands 
conflict. For Kant politics can only occupy the space left over 
when morality has marked out its territory. As a result, 'there 
can be no conflict between politics, as an applied branch of 
right, and morality, as a theoretical branch of right'. 22 
Kant's belief in the deliberative priority of moral over 
political concerns is founded directly on his doctrine of 
metaphysical freedom. It is the possibility of free agency, in 
Kant's sense, which both creates a potential conflict between 
politics and morality, and shows how that conflict is to be 
resolved. 
If, of course, there is neither freedom nor any moral 
law based on freedom, but only a state in which 
everything that happens or can happen obeys the 
mechanical workings of nature, poiitics would mean the 
art of utilizing nature for the government of men, and 
this would constitute the whole of practical wisdom; 
the concept of right would then be only an empty idea. 
But if we consider it absolutely necessary to couple 
the concept of right with politics, or even to make it 
a limiting condition of pol CS, it must be conceded 
that the two are compatible. ' 
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If, that is, the world could be exhaustively described as 
a chain of causal interactions, there would be no room for 
considerations of moral right in -political deliberation; the 
politician would merely be another cog in the midst of a fully 
determinate physical system. Here, again, we see that Kant is not 
properly described as a compatibilist about free will and 
determinism, since he regards the two as logically incompatible - 
autonomy is only possible if the phenomenal world is excluded 
entirely from moral deliberation. Moral agency can remain free 
only if it stands outside the chain of natural causation. 
Some commentators, such as Murphy, 
24 have argued that Kant's 
moral philosophy is incoherent unless we construe moral freedom 
as consisting not in (to use Kant's own terminology) free Wille 
but rather as free 
, 
Willkur - the former, on Kant's distinctions, 
being the 'holy will' insusceptible of moral error, and the 
latter being subject to contingent determination by phenomenal 
motivations. In an argument which interestingly parallels the 
theodicy of writers like Plantinga, Murphy maintains that freedom 
is inapplicable to beings who always act rightly. Since the 
possibility of error is a condition of freedom, free will can 
only be ascribed to creatures with Willkur rather than Wille. 
It is doubtful, in response to this reconstrual of Kant, 
whether there is any incoherence in the idea of beings who, of 
their own free will, always act rightly. As with Plantingals 
arguments, if freedom is taken as compatible with universal 
causal determination at all, there is no greater difficulty in 
the idea that agents always freely act rightly than in the idea 
that they sometimes lapse morally; these lapses being, on 
Murphy's interpretation, expressions of freedom as much as are 
autonomous moral actions, albeit, in cases of moral 
transgressions, of free Willkur rather than free Wille. 
Such a distinction between types of freedom might be 
sustainable if Willkur was seen as a departure from autonomy into 
causal determination of one Is actions. But this can hardly be 
what Kant has in mind. For the dual-aspect theory holds that in 
some sense all action is causally determined, but that (at least 
autonomous) action can be redescribed in non-deterministic terms. 
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Furthermore it is hard to see in what sense, for Kant, action 
caused-by phenomenal motivations can be regarded as free. Hence 
Willkur, for Kant, must comprise a free and an unfree component, 
the former being Wille itself, which by definition is free. 
But, this being so, it is unclear why there should be thought, 
even prima facie, to be a conflict between moral and political 
considerations, once the latter have been identified as belonging 
to the empirical, phenomenal realm. On the dual-aspect theory, 
there is, as Kant himself remarks in the passage quoted above, 
just no contest between autonomous agency and phenomenal 
determination: once an agent appreciates the force of morality, 
he will not be motivated by phenomenal 'inclination' - not 
because these motivations will merely cease to exist, but because 
any fully rational agent will perceive that the grounds of duty 
lie elsewhere. 
There is, as a result, some difficulty in understanding how a 
Kantian can allow for moral conflict in politics - both in the 
form of conflict between different moral demands on political 
agents (since in Kant's view there can never be any clash between 
moral obligations), and of conflict (as envisaged by the 
quotation above) between morality and non-moral political 
concerns. Public policy is conducted in irreducibly phenomenal 
terms, which gives little ground for thinking that its field of 
action can ever come into contact - or conflict - with morality. 
To state the contrast schematically, we are left not with a 
Platonic republic of politically institutionalized morality, but 
with Machiavelli. 25 
The Kantian approach to politics, as interpreted in this 
chapter, leaves very little scope for the sorts of conflict 
witnessed in real-life political argument. Once it is concluded 
that morality bounds the concerns of politics entirely from the 
outside, any possibility that political conflict might involve 
difference over the practical implications of value disappears. 
This is a consequence of Kant's insistence on the categorical 
nature of duty, that if a situation involves morality at all, it 
must be in a way which is free of all practical (and a fortiori 
moral) "ambiguity. Kantianism narrows the gap between the 
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politician and the private moral agent, by collapsing all 
political decisions into a completely general theory of rational 
action. What is lost on the way is any sense that moral concerns 
may apply in different and often conflicting ways to practical 
decision-making in general, and to political decisions in 
particular. The neutrality sought by modern liberal theory has, 
in a sense, been achieved, but only by removing conflicts of 
moral value from politics. 
It was suggested at the start that modern liberal theories 
based on Kantian ethics risked compromising their commitment to 
neutrality. The argument was that the Kantian construction of the 
self has to proceed. wholly in abstraction from empirical 
determinations (such as agents' psychological motivations), whose 
contingency in Kant's view subverts the categorical status of 
morality. As a result, both Kant and his modern liberal followers 
are faced with a dilemma. The neutral self of Kant's argument 
only retains its neutrality by retreating to a transcendental 
account of subjectivity from which (at least in the theory of 
Kant himself) all empirical considerations have been eliminated. 
This makes it hard to see how the self, thus described, can help 
to resolve moral disputes - particularly over the practical 
implications of value. 
Of course Kant believed that he had provided, in the Kingdom 
of Ends, a practical content for the categorical imperative, 
which would guide action in the world. Hegel and others have 
reasonably doubted whether the form of universal prescriptivity 
is as successful in generating a content for morality as Kant 
himself thought. But, whether or not Hegel was right about that, 
it is hard to see how the theory can handle value-pluralism as 
liberalism has traditionally aimed to do. If the theory really 
does deliver substantive practical content, there will no longer 
be, from the standpoint of the theory, any way of accounting for 
the diversity of value which exists in society - or of explaining 
why the state should be neutral between forms of life embodying 
these values. 
This is not to claim that there is a necessary tension between 
neutrality and pluralism. Indeed, it might be thought that 
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neutrality was precisely the liberal response to the existence of 
plural values: in other words, that the only way of respecting 
this diversity of value was to remain, as far as possible, 
impartial between competing conceptions of the good. This is not 
to claim that neutrality is required by. pluralism - the policy 
implications of plural values are not obvious, and even the 
endorsement of such diversity in society need not demand the out- 
and-out impartiality sought by neutrality. At the same time, 
however, neutrality is clearly one way of attempting to preserve 
this diversity. 
But it is less clear that Kantianism provides a satisfactory 
basis for neutrality, if at least the latter is designed to 
support pluralism. Either Kantianism remains purely formalistic, 
in which case its foundational status in liberal society, as a 
basis for political institutions and processes, seems to be 
called into question; or else it embodies specific commitments as 
Kant thought, and it seems incapable of guaranteeing a 
pluralistic society: policy, on this alternative, presumably has 
to be brought into line with the fundamental value, thereby 
closing off the possibility of entrenching diversity by political 
means. 
This is not of course the end of the argument. It remains open 
to claim (as for example Larmore does) that there is a value so 
fundamental that it can allow for the diversity of other values 
characteristic of a pluralistic society. A fuller evaluation of 
this response will appear in the next chapter. For the time 
being, it may be doubted whether any one value really is 
universal and fundamental enough to perform this role. Pluralism 
may mean not merely that there is, at a level other than the 
fundamental one, diversity of values, but that this diversity 
extends also to beliefs about the nature of the fundamental value 
itself. 
Perhaps liberalism, contrary to what some recent writers such 
as Ackerman have claimed, can dispense with neutrality without 
ý6 
undue discomfort. As is perhaps implicit in what has already 
been said, this partly depends on how wide a range of 
applicability is claimed for neutralist principles. There may be 
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areas of policy in which different conceptions of the good or, 
less grandiloquently, different items which people value, are 
treated unequally or -at least differently by public policy, but 
which involve no violation of neutrality. 
Certainly such violations will be all too frequent if what is 
required is that different objects of value always receive equal 
treatment, because this is impossible. There is no detraction 
from liberalism's commitment to neutrality if it is restricted to 
operating that principle only when it can. It is perhaps 
difficult for liberalism to abandon neutrality entirely, given 
its epistemological underpinnings. Even the political pragmatism 
which is often invoked against neutrality has to make 
epistemological claims about what, given the limits on our 
vision, it is expedient to do, and that brings back the old worry 
for liberalism, about why even this claim to knowledge is 
privileged. And this dilemma is fully reflected in Kantian moral 
theory, which either holds up as the supreme object of value a 
self so replete as to subvert value -plural ism, or consigns the 
moral subject to a limbo of vacuity. An important aspect of that 
vacuity is the self's exclusion from any role within political 
life. 
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Kantianism and Contemporary Liberalism 
In the previous chapter it waq argued that Kantian moral 
theory is in important respects incoherent. While Kant requires 
his metaphysical doctrine of transcendental selfhood to support 
the claim that rational (and therefore moral) agency is beyond 
phenomenal determination, the moral subject's nature as noumenon 
leaves it incapable, on this account, of causally acting in the 
world. Nor is it clear how the status of human agents as 
phenomenal beings is supposed to decide which actions we are 
morally required to perform. As a result the causal antecedents 
of moral agency are obscure, as are Kant's reasons for thinking 
that the presence of other rational agents determines the content 
of morality. 
The present chapter aims to extend this criticism by examining 
neo-Kantian moral theory, and in particular its applications in 
contemporary political philosophy. Here the treatment must be 
selective, since Kant has exercised a pervasive influence, both 
directly and indirectly, on much recent theory, especially in the 
United States, and full consideration of all work of broadly 
Kantian inspiration produced in the past few decades would demand 
far more space than is available in this work. By confining the 
analysis to some of the most notable and influential examples of 
neo-Kantian theory, it should. be possible to gain some grasp both 
of its affinities with Kant's own writings and of its wider 
impact on contemporary liberal philosophy. This task is made 
easier by the fact that some of the most prominent work in the 
field owes a fairly obvious debt to Kant's own writings. ' 
On the whole Kant's influence has been channelled through his 
moral rather than his political theory. 
2 The first part of this 
chapter will give a brief indication of this influence, with the 
aim of suggesting something of its nature and extent in modern- 
day political philosophy. There will however be no attempt to 
decide whether the interpretations of Kant implicit in the 
writings of his modern followers are valid, though it is of 
course assumed by the format adopted in this and the previous 
chapter that elements of Kant's theory are traceable in the work 
of contemporary theorists. 
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Most of the chapter will, however, be devoted to a critical 
assessment of this body of work as an attempt to ground 
liberalism in Kantian moral theory. - In particular, it aims to 
establish whether these writings avoid the problems identified in 
the previous chapter. The ultimate concern will be whether neo- 
Kantian liberal theory can perform its foundational role while 
preserving any understanding of the distinctiveness and autonomy 
of politics as an argumentative and decision-making process. In 
this discussion it will be suggested that the problems in Kantian 
moral theory also afflict the work of his modern followers, and 
that these emerge most clearly in an inadequate understanding of 
the relationship between moral value and political dispute. There 
is good reason - good liberal reason - to think that value-based 
conflict is ineliminable. Part of what this means, as liberals 
themselves have often remarked, is that conflict may itself be a 
dimension of value, one which cannot in all cases be eradicated 
without moral cost. Politics could not play the part it does in 
human life in the absence of such conflict. An important 
consequence of neo-Kantian theory is that political dispute can 
no longer help to resolve disputes about values and their 
practical implications since such disputes in effect no longer 
exist - the theory redefines politics in such a way as to 
preclude them. 
I 
As has already been remarked, this chapter cannot attempt a 
comprehensive survey of neo-Kantian moral and political theory. 
The detailed analysis will accordingly be confined to two notable 
recent writers working, as will be argued, within Kantian 
assumptions. Whereas the first of these, John Rawls, is explicit 
about the Kantian roots of his theory, Alan Gewirth, the second, 
has disclaimed Kant as a precursor, maintaining that his moral 
3 theory is without historical precedent, being derived solely 
from reflection on the nature of agency. 
Thi's disclaimer will make necessary a somewhat lengthier 
treatment of Gewirth's Kantianism than Rawls'. The conclusion 
will be that the emphasis on agency does not mark any difference 
of substance between Gewirth's theory and Kant's, since the 
argument from the nature of action does not, after all, depend on 
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considerations of rational agency alone, but on a moralized view 
of the agent. At the other end of the argument, Gewirth is less 
explicit than Rawls - about the politibal implications of his 
theory; in his book Reason and Morality Gewirth is more concerned 
to prove the general thesis that. rights are derivable from 
generic features of action than to specify the content of 
4 
particular rights. It is, nonetheless, fairly clear that Gewirth 
envisages the first-order rights as dealing, familiarly, with 
such matters as privacy, personal liberty, non-interference, and 
so on - familiar, that is, as the content of rights within 
liberal theory. This is not surprising, given the role of the 
moral subject in underpinning the theory. It is only given a 
prior view of the subject as being, in some sense, the supreme 
repository of value in the world that it becomes important to 
specify conditions on legitimate action. 
. 
We begin, however, with the explicitly Kantian theory of John 
Rawls, as expounded in his book A Theory of Justice and numerous 
5 
subsequent articles. This discussion will focus on two features 
of Rawls' theory where his debt to Kant is particularly evident - 
the device of the Original Position and the methodological 
apparatus of reflective equilibrium, the latter having been more 
6 
recently amplified or replaced by a tconstructivist' procedure. 
This seems a good place to start, since the metaethical 
standpoint of constructivism, and of reflective equilibrium, is 
meant to formalize the intuitive moral judgments embodied in the 
Original Position: the latter's appeal is meant to derive from 
its encapsulating moral notions or beliefs which we already hold, 
and its delivering conclusions (i. e. the principles of justice) 
conforming with our prephilosophical beliefs about what is fair. 
This is the formal-basis of the theory, and the source, as Rawls 
hopes, of its appeal, that it gives theoretical effect to moral 
convictions which we already hold. 
It may be said that there is nothing particularly Kantian 
about the method of reflective equilibrium, or of constructivism 
as such; all these require is that we arrive at sets of moral 
jud gments capable of being reduced to consistency when the lill- 
considered' judgments among them are discarded. Thus, at the 
minimum, all that the methodology of reflective equilibrium or 
constructivism demand is consistency in our (dispositions to 
assent to) moral judgments. 
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In response to this objection it is worth saying, first, that 
although there is indeed nothing uniquely Kantian in this method, 
reduction to consistency along lines-similar to this is at least 
a necessary feature of Kant's moral system. Because Kant regarded 
moral imperatives as being exclusively categorical, there could 
be no circumstances in which an agent was confronted with two or 
more incompatible moral claims upon him. For in such situations 
one imperative would have to override the other, and this would 
mean that the second was, after all, not categorical, but 
conditional upon the first's not applying. 
Similarly, the deontological metaethical structure of Rawls' 
theory of justice requires that the principles derived from the 
theory are categorical, in the sense that they 'are not subject 
to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests'. 
7 
Since the principles of justice have this non-negotiable status, 
any argument for them must conform to 'considered' moral 
judgments which share this status. In the process of reflective. 
adjustment, recognizing the validity of the principles of justice 
may itself induce us to revise the substantive judgments to which 
we assent. This process of adjustment is meant to be reciprocal 
- we are meant to derive general moral principles from 
philosophical reflection, while discarding any such principles 
which entail intuitively unacceptable first-level judgments. But 
by the end of the process, we are supposed to be left with a set 
of principles which are 'in accordance' with the 'everyday 
judgments we... make'. 
8 
It can also reasonably be -maintained that Rawls' more recent 
constructivist procedure is a reworking, in a more explicitly 
Kantian vein, of the reflective equilibrium method of A Theory of 
Justice. In Rawls' Dewey lectures, the emphasis shifts from an 
individual's reaching an equilibrium between his moral principles 
and first-order judgments, to a conception of moral theory in 
which 1[olbjectivity is to be understood by reference to a 
suitably constructed social point of view'. 
9 Here the idea is 
that the principles of justice codify moral beliefs already 
current An society, and which (for example) inform in part the 
content of political debate. Rawls seeks to construct, from the 
materials provided by the current moral notions, a consensual 
standard, that of the moral person, which we can all accept after 
reflection. It is not claimed that the moral standard is trans- 
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historically valid, merely that it encapsulates the shared 
standards which Rawls believes to underlie familiar disputes such 
as those where alternative policies appear to offer a choice 
between promoting freedom as against equality. 
This dimension of historical contingency might be thought to 
be at odds with the Kantian view of morality as being 
unconditionally binding and free from (e. g. cultural or 
historical) contingency; but Rawls sees Kant's theory as 'the 
leading historical example of a constructivist doctrine'. 10 The 
Kantian element in Rawls' constructivist position is held to 
consist in the priority accorded to the notion of moral 
personhood, in contrast, for example, with what Rawls labels the 
'rational intuitionism'. of Sidgwick, Moore and Ross; " the 
latter, in contrast with Kantianism, hold that there is 'a moral 
order that is prior to and independent from our conception of the 
12 
person'. 
It is questionable whether there is anything particularly 
Kantian about the constructivist methodology itself, as opposed 
to the specific notion of moral personhood which provides the 
materials from which the construction is made. Kant himself would 
surely have regarded the categorical imperative, and the actions 
which it enjoins, as gaining its force from considerations of 
rational agency alone, rather than from an assessment of current 
moral beliefs. 
Similarly, the publicity requirement, which Rawls presents in 
the Dewey lectures and elsewhere13 as a constructivist notion, 
while being an authentically Kantian requirement upon agents, 
principles of moral action, is not obviously derivable from the 
idea of a constructed morality alone. It is at least conceivable 
that the moral notions at large in society might not accord such 
centrality to the person as a moral notion, even if it is hard to 
see how constructivism could result in social and political 
institutions which violated the publicity condition. 
14 However 
this may be, Rawls' theory is clearly Kantian both in its central 
'model conception' of moral personhood, if this is identified 
with the rational agent of Kantian theory, and in the 
deontological priority of the 'right' over the 'good'. 
It is because the notion of the moral. person enjoys this 
centrality in our moral thinking that Rawls believes it to be 
justifiable to introduce the theoretical device of the 'Original 
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Position' as a means of deriving the two principles of justice. 
If we accept the ground rules and conditions of the Original 
Position as equitable because they conform to or formalize . the 
moral beliefs we already hold, then. we will be committed to 
accepting the outcome of the deliberations which go on behind the 
'veil of ignorance' as also being just. Hence the Original 
Position works in the theory as a means of spelling out the 
consequences of our prior moral convictions. The veil of 
ignorance restricts the information available to the parties in 
the Original Position so as to conceal from each person 'his 
place in society, his class position or social status' and 'his 
fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his 
15 intelligence and strength, and the like'. 
The conditions of the Original Position are so arranged as to 
eliminate the natural and social contingencies which are held to 
be irrelevant to persons' status as rational agents: the 
limitations on the parties' knowledge as decision-makers in the 
Original Position are imposed because the rational capacities, 
which are unaffected by these restrictions, are the essence of 
the parties' moral personhood. Seen in this way, the Original 
Position turns out to be a modernized version of the Kantian 
Kingdom of Ends. What is left when the personal attributes 
excluded by the veil of ignorance are subtracted, in the 
amplified presentation of the theory given in the Dewey lectures, 
are the two moral 'powers', the 'Reasonable' and 'Rational' 
capacities of agents. What emerges, then, is a fundamentally 
Kantian conception of the person, and this conception can be 
seen, Rawls thinks, as an elucidation of our actual moral 
thinking about persons. 
Rawls has latterly denied16 that the view of the person 
implicit in the construction of the Original Position relies on 
any controversial metaphysical claims. The theory rather 
involves, in Rawls' view, a 'political conception of the 
person', 
17 
according to which the 'moral powers' are given effect 
in the values enshrined in public institutions and procedures. As 
this is meant to be the end of the theory, however, it is hard to 
accept that it can also, at least without circularity, be its 
beginning: the theory was meant to provide some theoretical 
rationale for adopting a certain set of political structures, and 
it can hardly do this if the theoretical construction is made 
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from the very structures in question. Presumably Rawls would 
regard the non-metaphysical status of his conception of the 
person as arising also-from the method of its construction: since 
the conception is built directly out of the moral beliefs which 
people actually hold, there is no need to introduce any 
questionable metaphysical doctrines in its support. It is the use 
of these beliefs as a basis for constructing the public 
consensus, rather than the ultimate foundation or justification 
of the beliefs, that Rawls wishes to explain. What is important 
is the fact that the beliefs are held, not their philosophical 
grounding. 
It is, however, doubtful whether Rawls can evade so easily all 
obligation to justify the metaphysics of the Original Position. 
Even if it is true, in some sense, that the final conception of 
citizenship which results from the theory codifies or formalizes 
moral notions already held by real people, this does not mean 
that no metaphysical assumptions have been used in the process of. 
construction. The very process of constructing a set of shared 
public values out of the disparate and often inconsistent moral 
judgments made in everyday situations may demand such 
assumptions. 
This is already implicit in the fact that, if the original 
judgments really are inconsistent, there must be alternative ways 
of reducing them to consistency, and it is hard to rule out the 
possibility that some metaphysical apparatus will be needed in 
the reduction - certainly some consideration will have to be 
brought in to decide why one form of reduction should be chosen 
rather than another. For example there must in the Original 
Position be some minimal conditions of identity upon the 
contracting parties, so that they can rationally calculate their 
best self-interested strategy in the light of the possible 
outcomes: only if these outcomes are identifiable, when the veil 
of ignorance is lifted, as ones which they have chosen, will 
Rawls' argument have any force. As the veil of ignorance excludes 
a wide range of personal attributes from the knowledge of the 
parties in the Original Position, the identity conditions are 
contestable. As Sandel has argued, 18 Rawls is relying on a 
'radically disembodied' self, one bereft of (what are thought of 
as being) its contingent attributes. 
This is not necessarily to claim (as Sandel's use of the label 
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'disembodied' might be taken to suggest) that Rawls ends up with 
an unconditionally Cartesian view of the self as contingently 
embodied but essentially mental. But the restrictions imposed on 
the self in the Original Position, and Rawls' extended account of 
moral personality in his writings. since A Theory of Justice, 
suggest that he does indeed rely on controversial metaphysics 
both in his assumptions about personal identity, and in his 
understanding of the relationship between this and the moral 
value of persons. This does not show by itself that Rawls must 
run into the same problems as Kant encounters in explaining moral 
agency. This issue will be examined in the next section. There 
must at least be some explanation of how, given Rawls' abstract 
conception of the self, the existence of other rational agents 
operates as a constraint on what actions may morally be 
performed, or what public principles of justice may be adopted in 
Rawls' 'well-ordered society'. 
It appears, then, that Rawls' constructivist method has to 
rely at some stage on metaphysical claims of one form or another, 
even if his task is confined to developing publicly applicable 
moral notions out of (philosophically unexamined) original 
beliefs. Since the initial situation is one of conflict between 
conceptions of public institutions and policy, it is at best 
doubtful whether there can be any direct progression from shared 
moral beliefs, even if they exist in the first place, to the 
resolution of such conflict. What may be at issue., after all, is 
precisely what metaphysical notions underlying these shared moral 
beliefs. 19 Even if people are unanimous in the values which they 
profess, this does not show that similar unanimity must prevail 
about the metaphysical claims which these values license. As the 
argument so far has tried to show, Rawls' theory relies on 
assumptions about the identity of persons and how this bears upon 
our understanding of persons' moral worth. 
In his book Reason and Morality Alan Gewirth believes himself 
to have shown, without reliance on controversial metaphysical 
claims, how reflection purely on the nature of rational agency 
entails moral commitments, and specifically to the assignment to 
all agents of rights, as individualized moral claims against 
other rational agents. In Gewirth's view, his argument depends 
solely on a consideration of the so-called generic features of 
action - those features which must be present in order that a 
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piece of behaviour counts as action at all. Hence the argument is 
supposed to depend only on logical or semantic premisses about 
agency. From these premisses Gewirth hopes to prove that anyone 
is committed, purely in virtue of being an agent, to accepting 
that they are morally obliged to perform certain actions and 
refrain from others in the appropriate circumstances. 
The core of Gewirth Is argument is that I[sI ince the agent 
regards as necessary goods the freedom and well-being that 
constitute the generic features of his successful action, he 
logically must also hold that he has rights to these generic 
20 features and he implicitly makes a corresponding rights-claim'. 
That is, there are certain necessary conditions which must be 
satisfied if action is to be possible, among which are (a certain 
amount of) freedom and well-being. Assuming that it is impossible 
rationally to will any action without at the same time willing 
its necessary conditions, it follows that each rational agent 
must will a certain amount of these goods. 
From this Gewirth concludes that each agent is logically bound 
to accept that these goods are likewise necessary to all other 
rational agents if they are to act. The conditions of non- 
interference with my freedom and well-being, which I am logically 
obliged to will in my own case as necessary to my acting, must by 
parity of reasoning apply to my fellow agents as well. This being 
so, I acknowledge that I have logically to accept that other 
agents must receive a measure of the generically necessary goods. 
This establishes, Gewirth believes, valid rights-claims by each 
agent in respect of all other agents: the rights-claims set out 
the formal logical requirements of agency. These rights-claims 
are intended to embody the acceptance by each agent that the 
generic features of action impose the obligation to respect the 
generically necessary goods of all other agents. Hence Gewirth 
claims to have arrived at substantive moral conclusions from 
considerations of rational agency alone. 
An assessment of . this argument 
is deferred 'until the next 
section. The present task is to expose the latent Kantian 
assumptions in Gewirth's argument. As has already been observed, 
Gewirth regards the agency-based derivation of morality as wholly 
without precedent, since I[allthough the importance of action for 
moral philosophy has been recognized since the ancient Greeks, it 
has not hitherto been noted that the nature of action enters into 
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the very content and justification of the supreme principle of 
21 
morality'. It might be wondered whether, for example, the 
existence of any such supreme principle was a claim to be argued 
for rather than 'noted'; this assumption. apart, Gewirth dispenses 
with any explicit metaphysical foundation for his attempted 
derivation of morality from rational agency. 
The question, however, is whether his argument proves to 
depend, apart from tacit assumptions about the nature of 
morality, on further claims about the status and nature of 
agents, as Kantian theory explicitly does. If this does turn out 
to be the case, Gewirth seems to be threatened with parallel 
objections to those made against Kant in the previous chapter, 
where the problems in Kantian moral theory were traced to his 
account of the metaphysical subject. This is not to say that the 
full apparatus of Kantian metaphysics lies beneath the surface of 
Gewirth's argument. But he is likely to run into similar problems 
to those of Kant if his argument presupposes a moral subject. 
parallel to that which Kant creates from his metaphysics of 
experience. 
As has been said, Gewirth starts from the premiss that there 
are certain generic goods necessary for action, and that these at 
least include freedom and well-being. It might be thought that 
this claim was almost vacuously true, since anything recognizable 
as action in the world will require such goods if 'freedom' is 
just explicated as 'freedom of action', and 'well-being' as 
? capacity to act', or something similar. It looks, indeed, as 
though Gewirth has in mind some formulation of this level of 
generality, so that 'the agent's well-being is to be identified 
primarily even if not exclusively with the general abilities nad 
conditions required for attaining any of his purposes' , 
22 
Although agents must pursue determinate goods, or conceptions of 
well-being, in their lives, it is the general capacity to pursue, 
in some specific form, such a conception which constitutes the 
generic feature of action: 'it is not the particular purposes or 
outcomes but rather the generic abilities and conditions that for 
the agent primarily constitute his well-being, since they are the 
necessary conditions of all his pursuits of his purposes'. 
23 This 
requires that agents are identifiable separately from the 
particular ends which, at any point, they are pursuing. Agents 
are not, in Sandel's terminology, 
24 fradically situated' selves, 
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identified with the particular ends they pursue, but more like 
the 'radically disembodied' selves which, in Sandel's view, lies 
behind Rawls' presentation of the Original Position. 
This of course does not show that Gewirth is working with a 
Kantian conception of agency, but it-does suggest that he cannot 
avoid making some commitments about the nature and identity of 
agents in his argument. This to some extent lessens the force of 
his claim to rely only on considerations about action itself. One 
way in which this becomes apparent is not merely in the thought 
that particular actions are irreducibly attached to individual 
agents, but also as Gewirth acknowledges that actions acquire 
their meaning and content from their playing a role in wider 
projects of the same agent; this is true even of the 'radically 
situated' agent whose identity consists in the unity of the 
project which he pursues. 
Gewirth may say in reply that he is not considering the 
question at this level, but is rather concerned with entirely. 
general features of agency shared by all individual actions, 
whatever their content and whoever performs them. This is of 
course a quite coherent line of response, but it moves Gewirth 
far closer to the neo-Kantian position of Rawls, for whom 
'[t1here is no need to identify individuals with their existing 
25 
conception. of the good, with their actual plans of life'. What 
comes out of this stage of the argument, then, is the assumption 
both of (temporally continuous) agents as authors of action, and 
the conceptual separability of these agents from the particular 
goods or projects they pursue. 
Gewirth's second premiss is that it is impossible rationally 
to will an action without also willing its necessary conditions. 
It might be thought that the necessity referred to in this 
premiss was that of logical identity - that anyone who willed an 
action must will its conditions because this is what it means to 
will an action. From the argument set out above, however, it 
appears that Gewirth has in mind a more substantial notion of 
necessity than this, concerning the part played by action in 
implementing conceptions of the good. On this reading Gewirth is 
claiming that it is a necessary condition of acting that an agent 
possesses a determinate conception of his own good, which must 
comprise or include freedom and well-being; as a result, the 
agent is rationally committed to willing these latter goods. 
79 
This presumably introduces a closer relationship between 
action and its necessary conditions than that of cause and 
effect, as it is -unlikely that-. Gewirth is advancing the 
implausible thesis that an agent is committed, by willing an end, 
to willing also whatever is causally necessary to produce it. At 
the same time, the fact that Gewirth is concerned with goods 
defined generally enough to serve as the conditions of any 
actions whatsoever suggests that he is operating with an entirely 
abstract and general conception of agency. It is as being acting 
on quite general considerations of rational agency that the 
conditions hold. 
This can be brought out further by examining the nature of the 
goods which in Gewirth's view must be willed by the rational 
agent. On the face of it, there is no need for any agent to 
consider, on the level of generality assumed by Gewirth's 
argument, what conditions must be satisfied if he is to act at 
all. All that is required, it appears, is that there are some 
determinate goods which he aims to pursue in his actions, and 
this need not involve any general thoughts about agency. If so, 
the generalization step of the argument is threatened, since it 
relies on each agent's being committed, purely through identity 
of inference from identical situations, to accepting that the 
generic goods are needed for all other agents to act. Unless the 
conditions are set at the most general level, it looks as if all 
that an agent will be required to recognize is that anyone else 
identically situated to himself will need the same range of 
particular goods to fulfil the purposes which he in fact has. 
This certainly yields a weaker conclusion than Gewirth is 
seeking: it is far from clear that this leads us from reflection 
on agency into morality, as opposed to the recognition of a 
trivial logical truth. That is, the considerations about the 
necessary conditions of agency threaten to permit only a limited 
universalization, from the particular, circumstances of a given 
agent, and this must be a less strong conclusion than Gewirth is 
seeking. 
This perhaps explains why Gewirth has to resort from the 
outset to a wholly general conception of agency. In his treatment 
agents are divorced conceptually from whatever ends they happen 
to pursue at any given time, and the conception of agency with 
which they are credited has, for the universalization step of 
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Gewirth's argument, to be set at the most general level. There 
is, moreover, a further respect in which the argument relies on a 
substantive, and quasi-Kantian, view of agency. For the 
universalization step to go through, there must be some 
explanation of why other agents' purposes are to be taken into 
account in the first place - of why it is a relevant 
consideration in analyzing the rationality of an agent's action 
whether it deprives others of their generic goods. It is not 
obvious that any agent who fails to take account of the latter in 
practical deliberation is convicted of logical inconsistency, as 
Gewirth claims. For that to follow, it would be at least a 
necessary condition of the agent's deliberating that he was aware 
of other agents standing in an analogous relationship to their 
purposes as he does to his. But it is unclear why this must 
figure in an agent's deliberations: surely it is logically 
possible for a person to engage in practical reasoning without 
this awareness of others as authors of action. 
If this is right, it looks as though Gewirth has both to 
provide an account of agency, and to show that this account must 
appear in the deliberations of any rational agent. Gewirth also 
has to show, even once this account is to hand, why the 
considerations must have practical force for the agent, in 
guiding his projected actions. In response to this second point, 
an argument might be constructed from the allegedly prescriptive 
26 
nature of desires. 
That is, it is held that whatever is desired is desired as 
something good; and some measure of freedom in acting is 
necessary for the pursuit of whatever is desired. Furthermore, on 
the least objectionable version of ethical naturalism, identical 
evaluative properties must supervene on the instantiation by two 
27 
objects of identical sets of non-evaluative properties. Any 
agent desiring freedom as necessary to the satisfaction of his 
other desires, and therefore regarding it as a good, must in the 
light of this also accept that such freedom is good, because 
instrumentally desired, for other agents as well. So any process 
of deliberation which yields the conclusion for a given agent 
that his purposes are good must by the same token force him to 
accept that others' purposes are good also. One way of giving 
moral effect to this conclusion is to ascribe rights to each 
agent against all others in respect of the generic goods of 
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action. 
On this interpretation, Gewirth's argument is that any agent 
must grant practical 'force in his deliberations to the purposes 
of others, since otherwise his own purposes would lack the 
prescriptive or evaluative force they have for him. In this form 
the argument still relies, of course, on the agent's reasoning, 
with a generalized conception of agency, back to his own case, in 
deciding what he can rationally will. The importance of this 
revised version of the argument, however, is -that it attempts to 
show how any rational agent is compelled to give force to others' 
purposes in his practical deliberations. 
Whatever else may be said about the argument in this form, it 
is doubtful whether the sense of 'good' needed for the 
naturalistic entailment step is strong enough to produce the 
conclusion Gewirth wants. While it follows from the premiss that 
whoever desires something regards it as good, that anyone who 
desires something (i. e. freedom or a measure of well-being) as 
necessary to satisfying his other desires must see that thing as 
good, it does not follow that a person must regard the things 
desired instrumentally by others as good. This is so even if it 
is also held that anyone who thinks something good because he 
desires it must regard others as thinking the objects of their 
desires good. Even this does not require an agent to think of 
others' purposes as being, in any unqualified sense, good, nor 
for that matter good for the persons seeking them. Agents only 
have to recognize others' purposes as seeming good to those 
pursuing them. 
Gewirth's argument cannot work by attempting to endow others' 
purposes with the motivational force which an agent's own 
purposes have for himself. It is only if the agent is already 
disposed to regard the. existence of other purposive agents as 
founding some claim - for example a moral claim - on his action, 
that these purposes will acquire any deliberative weight for him. 
The argument from the symmetrical deliberative positions of each 
agent with respect to all the others gains little leverage 
against, for instance, a Stirnerian egoist who uses this symmetry 
to support an argument for moral individualism. 
What is needed, then, is some grounds for thinking that agents 
must regard it as relevant to their deliberations what others 
similarly situated would be motivated to do. But it is hard to 
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see how this can happen unless the agent concerned has made some 
prior decision that others ' ends are to be given deliberative 
weight: the point is not so much that there is no transition from 
non-moral to moral deliberation in practical reasoning, but that 
the purely formalistic considerations advanced by Gewirth are 
insufficient to explain how any agent unmotivated originally to 
grant them weight can come to do so merely by reflection on the 
nature of action. 
It is this, perhaps, which pushes Gewirth further in the 
direction of Kantian moral theory than he is prepared to 
acknowledge. Once the idea is abandoned that Gewirth's argument 
rests on the motivations an optimally rational agent could come 
to acquire through reflection on agency, we are left with the 
position, more Kantian in appearance, that there is a rational 
constraint, or set of constraints, which hold irrespective of 
agents' motivations, on our actions as rational beings. In other 
words, Gewirth's assignment of rights to the generic goods of 
agency looks like a paraphrased version of the Kantian claim that 
there are moral imperatives which hold unconditionally 
(specifically, in this case, regardless of agents' subjective 
motivations) on rational agents as such. 
This becomes clearer once it is appreciated that Gewirth's 
argument cannot rely for its force on the actual motivations of 
agents. If it did, the argument would have to take account of the 
fact that many agents ignore others in their deliberations. 
Consistency alone is not enough to compel agents motivated as 
they are to accept the right of others to the generic goods of 
action. Gewirth's argument relies solely on considerations about 
the nature of action in general, not on any reconstruction of 
deliberative processes which an agent might undertake from an 
original set of motivations. 
While Gewirth is not as explicitly Kantian as Rawls in his 
moral theory, he nonetheless is forced to rely on something very 
similar to Kant's conception of moral agency if his argument is 
to succeed. Without some such conception there is no reason to 
think that agents are committed, purely by their being agents, to 
accepting Gewirth's moral conclusions. It is not sufficient to 
point to the existence of other agents in the world in arguing 
for Gewirth's principle of generic consistency, since it need not 
enter into an agent's deliberations how others' projects will be 
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affected by some course of action which he wishes to pursue. 
Such considerations will only have any bearing on the agent's 
practical reasoning -if it can be- shown that there is some 
antecedent requirement of an 'external reasons, 
28 form that 
agents acknowledge the existence of other agents and adapt their 
actions accordingly. The most obvious form of external reasons 
claims are those mounted by (a cognitivistically interpreted) 
morality, which makes it a criterion of rationality whether 
agents take into account and act upon the fact of other moral 
agents' existence. this narrows the distance between the Kantian 
Kingdom of Ends, where agents act out of respect for each other 
as rational beings, and Gewirth's account of the generic 
conditions of agency. 
Gewirth's neo-Kantianism is thus apparent in an implicitly 
moralized view of agency. It emerges also in the separation, to 
Which, as has been argued, Gewirth is committed, of agents' 
motivation from the grounds of moral obligation, which is a 
notable feature of Kant's theory of moral agency. 29 The mutual 
rights Gewirth derives cannot be contingent on particular 
motivations which agents may happen to have, but rather depend on 
quite general conditions of agency. This generality comes out in 
the restriction of Gewirth's argument to those conditions which 
apply to all action. The argument is concerned with general 
conditions of compossibility in actions, that is with sets of 
actions (of different agents) which can be performed 
simultaneously. 
This, again, bears a strong resemblance to the Kantian 
requirement that moral action must be founded on universalizable 
maxims, the content of which is to be determined, in Kant's view, 
by asking what actions could consistently be willed by a society 
of purely rational agents. Similarly, for Gewirth the generic 
features of action have to be so defined that the rights which 
emerge at the end of the argument sanction compossible sets of 
actions. This is after all the point of the generic consistency 
requirement, that it generate sets of actions all of which can be 
performed. Thus while universalizability need not enter into the 
content of the agent's reflective thoughts about his own actions, 
it operates as a tacit condition on action. 
The generality of Gewirth's argument is also apparent in his 
interpretation of the generic conditions themselves. While it 
84 
would be misleading to claim that his understanding of the 
conditions of action in any way presupposes the full apparatus of 
Kantian metaphysics, - it remains true that Gewirth's emphasis on 
freedom as a generic condition has to be taken in a highly 
abstract sense. As we have already. seen, it is not enough for his 
argument to view freedom merely, fo r example, in terms of what 
agents subjectively happen to want: there has to be some wholly 
general formulation of the notion, which enables it to serve as a 
fundamental condition of all action. It is unclear how this 
notion of freedom, set at this level of generality, can play much 
part in circumscribing the actions which agents can perform, 
unless it is implausibly supposed that the sorts of actions 
Gewirth wishes to proscribe by means of the PGC are such as to 
prevent some agents acting at all. If this is not so, there is no 
reason to think that an argument based on the necessary 
conditions of agency will be powerful enough to preclude (what 
Gewirth would regard as) gross violations of persons' rights. As 
was argued in the last chapter, similar problems beset Kant's 
attempts to derive substantive moral conclusions from his 
noumenal conception of freedom. 
This section has tried to bring out some salient points of 
contact between Kantian theory and the work of Rawls and Gewirth. 
As Rawls himself has remarked, 
30 this relationship is one of 
analogy rather than identity, but, as has been argued above, the 
similarities are strong enough to identify both Rawls and Gewirth 
as Kantian writers. The next section asks whether they 
accordingly fall prey to the criticisms made of Kantian moral 
theory in the previous chapter. 
ii 
It will be helpful to begin by presenting a brief comparison 
between the main features of Rawls' argument and that of Gewirth. 
This comparison is intended to trace (what will be argued are) 
the shortcomings of these theories to the common inspiration in 
Kantian moral theory. As the previous section tried to show, 
despite the substantial differences of approach between Rawls' 
and Gewirth's work, the underlying Kantian similarities, whether 
acknowledged or not, are clear enough. If the problems afflicting 
these theories are indeed of Kantian origin, the question arises 
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whether the Kantian project was doomed to failure from the start. 
This question will be considered in the next chapter. 
The exposition of Gewirth's neo-Kantianism in section I. of 
this chapter emphasized the centrality of the moral agent in both 
theories, though it may be said that for Kant this notion forms 
the starting-point of the theory rather than, as for Gewirth, its 
conclusion. As has already been noted, the notion of moral 
personality is likewise a fundamental idea in Rawls' theory, and 
particularly in the writings he has produced since the 
publication of A Theory of Justice. 
Rawls' theory of moral personality extends the abstract 
conception of agency first presented in his account of the 
Original Position. For Rawls, the fundamental notions informing 
moral personality are the so-called 'moral powers', namely 'the 
capacity for a sense of right and justice' (the Reasonable) and 
'the capacity for a conception of the good' (the Rational). 
31 As 
has already been observed, the latter capacity does not require 
that individuals are identified with their current conceptions of 
the good, and indeed other aspects of Rawls' theory, such as the 
account of primary goods, demand that these conceptions are 
revisable. 
Similarly, Gewirth's argument in Reason and Morality assumes, 
as was mentioned, that agents are not to be identified with the 
specific ends which they pursue; this was held to be essential to 
Gewirth's case, that the understanding of agency was set at the 
most general level. As with the parties in Rawls' Original 
Position, the assumption underlying Gewirth's argument is that 
agents are 'radically disembodied, 
32 to the extent that their 
identity-conditions are set independently of their particular 
conceptions of the good. This already involves certain 
metaphysical commitments regarding the nature of persons, and 
about our reasons for valuing the ends they pursue. 
Rawls is certainly more explicit than Gewirth about the moral 
content of his model of personality. The participants in the 
Original Position are explicitly defined as 'self-originating 
source[s] of claims, 
33 
upon the provision by society of scarce 
goods. It is the capacity of moral persons reflectively to form a 
conception of the good and then mount claims upon society as a 
means to its fulfilment, rather than the content of that 
conception, which imposes moral requirements on the other members 
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of society; conversely, the presence of other agents pursuing 
their own conceptions of the good constrains the possible goods 
which an agent can pursue while acting on his own conception.. The 
decisions taken behind the veil of ignorance occur within an 
already moralized framework - one whose moral content Rawls has 
emphasized in his more recent writings, in contrast with his 
earlier stress on rational decision-making mechanisms in A Theory 
of Justice. In the revised version of the theory, this means not 
only that circumstances in which the principles of justice are 
decided are so arranged that morally arbitrary attributes of 
persons are excluded from consideration, but also that the 
factors to be taken into account by the parties in determining 
the principles include an awareness of others' status as moral 
persons. 
While Gewirth's approach does not build moral considerations 
as directly as this into the argument, there is reason to think, 
as we have seen, that the argument depends on the tacit 
assumption that persons bear certain moral claims against one 
another. How far are these to be identified with the 'moral 
powers' of Rawls' theory? In so far as Gewirth is thinking mainly 
of persons as setting for themselves projects and concerns which 
shape their lives, it might be supposed that his argument laid 
emphasis on the claims of the 'Rational' rather than the 
'Reasonable' - in other words with self-interested calculation 
rather than with any moral or altruistic concern for others. This 
is indeed what Gewirth takes himself to be doing: the argument is 
meant to lead from self-interest into morality. But once the idea 
is rejected that it is the intrinsic content of the ends which 
persons pursue which gives those ends value, in favour of the 
view that they acquire value vicariously, as the ends of persons, 
it is much harder to resist the conclusion that the conception of 
agency is already moralized, and in a way which accords primacy 
to the moral claims of persons. 
Gewirth would of course reject this interpretation of his 
argument, as it denies that the rights-based conclusions which he 
draws can be reached solely by means of logical or semantic 
considerations about agency. But once the possibility of the 
rational egoist is introduced, Gewirth seems to be faced with a 
choice between accepting that such a person has rational grounds 
for flouting (what Gewirth regards as being) the rights of 
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others, or imputing to the agent some reason or set of reasons 
lying outside his 'subjective motivational set', 
34 
which purport 
to present the agent with reasons for acting in ways in which he 
is currently unmotivated to act. Only if some argument supporting 
the latter conclusion is given can Uewirth maintain that agents 
are required by pure considerations of rationality to accept the 
limitations on their actions imposed by the PGC. 
There is certainly no element of the 'Reasonable' in Gewirth's 
argument in the sense of an express acknowledgement by agents of 
right and justice as moral values. This does not however mean 
that the argument dispenses entirely with any assumptions about 
agents' moral capacities. Apart from anything else, if the 
argument is to have any practical effect, agents must be capable 
of understanding the moral constraints imposed upon them by the 
presence of other agents and of acting upon them. Beyond this, 
each agent must be thought of as able to respect others' purposes 
because they are the purposes of other agents. This requirement 
could only be avoided if each agent were already subjectively 
motivated to respect others' purposes. But the assumption of the 
argument is that this is not so, and indeed it would render the 
argument unnecessary if it were already true. Unless, then, 
agents are thought of as having the motivational capacity to act 
on moral reasons, and the ability to recognize such reasons in 
the first place, Gewirth's argument will not establish any 
unconditional practical necessity to observe persons' rights from 
the generic features alone. 
While it is true that the methodology both of reflective 
equilibrium and of constructivism, its replacement in Rawls' more 
recent writings, have little in common with Gewirth's argument 
from the generic features of agency, both Rawls and Gewirth work 
with a highly formalized conception of agency. This emerges 
partly through a conception of persons' moral status as 
independent of their particular ends , but also in the assumption 
that it is possible to draw substantive conclusions about the 
rational requirements on agents from considerations of this 
degree of generality. 
This is not to question the possibility of making any 
philosophical statment about rational agency; but it does not 
follow from the truth of this claim that a philosophical theory 
-will be able to deliver substantive conclusions about which 
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actions rational agents will or will not perform. Ultimately this 
demands that there must be a set or disjunction of goods which 
any being who is rational must want. It is doubtful whether there 
is even a disjunction of such goods - at the limit, it is 
possible rationally to reject the (causally necessary) conditions 
of all agency. Suicide is a rational possibility, and one which 
Gewirth seems to recognize as causing problems for his theory. 
35 
Apart from this denial of the existence of intrinsically 
rational goods, there is a peculiarity in any attempt, within the 
broadly liberal assumptions of Rawls and Gewirth, to specify 
certain goods as intrinsically rational, in the sense that any 
rational agent will pursue or desire them, whatever else he 
pursues or desires. For the picture which both Rawls and Gewirth 
present is of agents as 'radically disembodied' choosers of their 
ends. If their accounts of rational agency are cast in fully 
general terms, it is hard to see, given the plurality of possible 
goods, how any can be earmarked to all rational agents as such. 
. 
It is an avowed aim of both writers to produce a theory which 
achieves maximum generality by accounting for the diversity of 
goods (with minor exceptions)36 which agents in fact pursue. 
Agents are depicted as bare choosers confronted with an array of 
possible goods with which to structure their lives. Since these 
goods are plural, incommensurable and, given scarcity, often 
exclusive, there has to be some decision taken, for the purposes 
of public policy, between these goods; but as far as possible37 
public provision should refrain from biasing the choice between 
the competing goods by differential funding or otherwise 
favouring some of these goods over others. 
Once this degree of neutrality is thought of as desirable, 
however, there no longer appears to be any basis on which agents 
can choose between the competing alternatives. Once agents, 
viewed either as parties behind the veil of ignorance in the 
Original Position, or as the locus of capacities for rational 
action, it is difficult to see what considerations, at this 
level, can inform their choices and consequently to understand in 
what sense the latter are to be thought of as rational. This 
reflects a wider problem confronting a certain strand of liberal 
theory, that its metaphysical view of the agent as an 
untrammelled chooser leaves it obscure how any choice can be made 
by a self this thin. In its quest for a self free from contingent 
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determinations of its choices liberal theory is left, in the end, 
with a self too attenuated to be capable of deciding anything. 
This problem seems to be a direct. result of neo-Kantian 
attempts to derive a value-neutral account of the self and its 
choices. It may be said in response to the criticisms voiced 
above that for the philosophical purposes of Rawls and Gewirth we 
can just divide through by the common factor shared by each 
rational chooser, and this leaves us with something like the 
participants in the Original Position, or Gewirth's model of 
agency. What the argument of Rawls and Gewirth are concerned 
with, it may be said, are not real-life choices, but a general 
analysis of rational commitments on all agents. 
One line of response to this is to ask, as Sandel does, 
whether this possibility is as coherent as it may appear at first 
sight. It may be that selves are so identified with certain of 
their projects that this abstraction makes no sense of their 
status as agents. They may also be strongly characterized by 
certain (moralized or non-moralized) traits of character, the 
virtues and vices being an obvious example. This possibility will 
be considered more fully in the final chapter. For the present it 
may be noted that the very notion of virtues of character poses 
intractable problems for a Kantian view of morality. It is plain 
that such virtues may be unequally distributed among agents, and 
therefore that agents' moral capacities may vary from one person 
to another, rather than depending exclusively on their status as 
rational beings. 
Similar difficulties arise when we move from considering the 
relationship between the self and its ends to the self's status 
as .a 
bearer of moral worth. As Rawls explicitly admits and 
Gewirth, as has been argued, also assumes, there has to be some 
explanation of how the self, as a moral subject, comes to be seen 
as making categorical claims on the actions of others: there must 
be some attributes of the self in respect of which these moral 
claims hold. But the more the conception of the self is narrowed 
to accommodate the liberal notion of a metaphysically free 
chooser, the harder it becomes to understand how the residual 
subject can be thought of as mounting any significant moral 
claims, or, in practical terms, how projected courses of action 
could infringe upon the territory occupied by such a self. The 
corollary of interpreting metaphysical freedom as the absence of 
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any specific objectives is a self whose existence in the world 
seems to make little difference to the factors influencing 
agents' practical thinking about what ought to be done. 
This is, of course, the reverse of the conclusion which both 
Rawls and Gewirth want, as it is the existence of moral persons 
or rational agents which is supposed to give rise to the 
principles of justice or rights to free action. If we define 
persons or agents at the most general level as bearers of 
capacities for rational or moral agency, it may be said, this 
does not leave us without an explanation of how the existence of 
these individuals can have a practical influence on our concerns: 
it is precisely the fact that they have these capacities which 
entitles them to consideration in the practical deliberations of 
others. 
The criticism, however, relates not to the derivation of these 
entitlements from persons moral or rational capacities, but to 
the difficulty of understanding how the mere presence of these. 
capacities could have practical effect. At the same time, it may 
reasonably be said that rational agency, as conceived of by 
Gewirth, does place certain minimal obligations upon the public 
authorities, to provide at least a subsistence income to citizens 
under their jurisdiction - without some such minimal provision, 
all agency will, for some individuals, be impossible. This is not 
to say, of course, that Gewirth has demonstrated that any 
rational agent must accept the need for at least this level of 
welfare, but merely that the capacities are causally dependent 
upon it. 
Once the subject's freedom is abstracted from substantive 
pursuits, it is hard to see what possible courses of action could 
impede or restrain the capacities themselves - all the actions do 
is limit the available ends, which we have been given no reason 
for believing to be valuable in themselves. Against this, it may 
be objected that the exercise of the rational or moral capacities 
will be severely restricted if others' behaviour is not itself 
subject to appropriate constraints; it is not the existence of 
these bare capacities which provides the basis for agents' moral 
entitlements (it may be added), but their practical exercise. If 
the entitlements consist not in the capacities themselves but in 
their exercise, there may be grounds for guaranteeing the 
maximization of the latter by prohibiting certain forms of 
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interference with agents' freedom of action. 
This line of response is all right as far as it goes. If no 
limitations at all -are placed on how agents may act, it is 
obvious that the ability of some to pursue their ends may be 
impaired. Nor is the point answered by the consideration that, 
after all, the imposition of such limitations is similarly going 
to restrict agents' ability to pursue their ends. It is possible, 
as in Prisoner's Dilemma cases, to imagine situations in which 
the unrestricted pursuit of self-interest leads to worse self- 
interested outcomes for all agents than if some control or at 
least coordination had been imposed. This does not of course 
establish what limitations are to be placed on agents' freedom of 
action, but it would provide some argument from rational 
considerations alone for the principle that agents were committed 
to accepting some restrictions on their actions. 
This would not fully answer the original criticism, that Rawls 
and Gewirth fail to show how their view of the rational or moral 
agent can produce the particular action-prescriptions for which 
they argue. But it would retain some hold on the idea of agents' 
moral worth consisting in a rational capacity, while not leaving 
the agent beyond the reach of all possible actions in the world. 
Some further argument would be required to specify the nature of 
the limitations: this chapter has argued that they cannot be 
provided by considerations of practical rationality alone. What 
we might be left with are sets of compossible actions, each one 
of which can, when taken by itself, consistently be pursued by 
agents. But consistency by itself is not sufficient to decide 
between these sets; though it might be possible to define from 
these some core set of actions or goods, analogous to Rawls' 
primary goods, or Gewirth's generic goods of action, which was 
common to all these sets. 
It should readily be observed that the line of criticism 
pursued so far in this section strongly resembles the objections 
raised against Kantian theory in the last chapter, and it will be 
helpful to examine the respects in which Gewirth's and Rawls, 
work both reflect the difficulties in Kantian theory, and depart 
from it in certain respects. In the last chapter it was argued 
that Kant's construction of the moral subject leaves questions 
unanswered both about how the moral subject can act in the 
phenomenal world, and about the factors which can influence the 
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subject's decisions about which actions to perform. The objection 
was the Kantian theory preserved the metaphysical freedom of the 
moral subject by drawing a sharp line between the noumenal 
- 
and 
phenomenal worlds, but at the cost of leaving inexplicable the 
practical dimension of moral agency. This was traced to Kant's 
account of the metaphysical subject of experience as lying wholly 
beyond phenomenal determination, and it might be supposed that, 
once this metaphysical background was removed, its associated 
problems might disappear with it. 
Kant's difficulties arise, as the last chapter argued, from 
his insistence that free agency can only occur outside the 
phenomenal world: we cannot then explain how the moral subject 
can effect any actions in that world. Despite their avoidance and 
indeed explicit disavowal of Kantian metaphysics, however, both 
Rawls and Gewirth may be unable to avoid similar problems in 
their own theories. We have seen that these theories present a 
picture of the agent as being wholly separate from any contingent 
attributes when deciding on the principles of justice, or upon 
structures of rights. It is only on this basis that agents can be 
regarded as free choosers of their ends - as standing outside 
those ends. 
Once this has been imposed as a condition of the agent's 
freedom, it is unclear how he is to make any decisions about what 
particular ends to pursue, as the notion of agency has been so 
narrowed as to remove any basis on which a choice might have been 
made. While this difficulty is not formally identical with the 
problem about moral agency in Kant's theory, Rawls and Gewirth 
seem also to be unable to explain how the agent can move from the 
purely formalistic account of the rational subject to the pursuit 
of concrete ends. In the same way as Kantian theory is unable to 
explain how the noumenal subject can act in the phenomenal world, 
modern liberal theories which seek to free the individual from 
determination by factors external to his or her condition as a 
rational agent have difficulties explaining how free agents can 
arrive at practical decisions. 
There is also, as should now be clear, a common problem in 
both Kantian and neo-Kantian theory regarding the agent's ability 
to take decisions about action as a result of rational 
deliberation. Even leaving aside the metaphysical questions 
concerning agents' freedom, it still has to be shown how agents 
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could arrive at any decisions with practical effect about their 
rational obligations. In Kantian theory, this difficulty appeared 
in the form of an indefinite number of sets of consistently 
universalizable prescriptions for action: as Hegel pointed out, 
despite Kant's reliance on the character of institutions such as 
promising to derive the content of the categorical imperatives, 
and whatever may be the case in this example, it is at best 
highly doubtful whether Kant shows that universalizability is a 
sufficient condition for a proposed action to be morally 
acceptable. 
Similarly, the procedural treatment of rationality presented 
by Rawls and Gewirth is unable, without introducing further 
assumptions, to deliver any concrete conclusions about moral 
requirements on action - the additional input being, in Rawls' 
case, the arguments based on decision- theoretic reasoning under 
uncertainty in the Original Position, and in Gewirth's case, a 
far more substantial and moralized view of the agent than Gewirth 
himself acknowledges. 
Part of this indeterminacy in Kantian theory issues from 
uncertainty over the practical implications of the the moral 
reasons which are meant to guide agents when they are deciding 
what to do. In the formulation of the categorical imperative 
which enjoins agents to treat others never merely as a means but 
also as an end, it remains unclear what practical force this 
general injunction has, without further argument about what 
practically it involves to treat someone as an end in themselves. 
We saw in the last chapter that Kant's rigid separation of the 
noumenal and phenomenal worlds failed to explain how morality, in 
the form of categorical imperatives, could have any bearing on 
events in the phenomenal world, even though, on a common sense 
view, the content of any acceptable set of moral beliefs would be 
involved, to a very considerable degree, with the treatment of 
phenomenal objects, such as human bodies. It was therefore 
uncertain how the status of persons as noumena could he thought 
to have any bearing on the actions which moral agents were 
required to perform. 
It should now be clear that the construction of the moral 
subject in Rawls' and Gewirth's writings runs into similar 
difficulties. For in these modern works the moral person or agent 
is too thinly characterized not only to be capable of practical 
94 
decision-making, as already argued, but also to be the critical 
factor influencing others' moral deliberations. Once again, in 
their efforts to present a subject free from contingent 
attributes, as an unconditioned pursuer of its ends, liberal 
theorists are unable to explain how 
-a 
subject drawn so narrowly 
can be of such importance to moral and political decisions. 
This is true even if, as Larmore38 has recently insisted, we 
should regard liberalism as a purely political philosophy rather 
than some all-inclusive philosophy of man. Whether or not 
liberalism is best described in such terms, an awkward question 
remains about how the subject, thus defined, can appear as the 
principle factor influencing public policy and the structure of 
political institutions. Even if the so-called lexpressivist' view 
of the state is rejected, 
39 
as a contravention of the liberal 
theorist's sought-after moral neutrality, there still needs to be 
some explanation of of how such pared-down political institutions 
as do exist are there for the sake of an individual defined in 
such a way that all the subjective sources of value which provide 
structure and meaning to persons in their lives are eliminated. 
This highlights one of the curious anomalies of liberal theory, 
that it holds up the individual as its supreme value, yet denies 
any part in deciding political arrangements to the conceptions of 
value which giveý individuals' lives meaning. 
This is not to say that it is logically inconsistent to hold 
both that in some sense the individual is the main consideration 
in devising political arrangements, and that the values which 
individuals pursue or enact in their lives may be diverse and 
plural. But it is a peculiarity of neutralist theories like 
Larmore's that they remove all subjective sources of value from 
the political arena, while also claiming that there is a supreme 
value, the individual, which exists regardless of whether it 
does, or even can, figure in the practical concerns of actual 
persons. 
This suggests that the relationship between moral pluralism 
and the neutrality which is seen by many modern liberal theorists 
as both a necessary and desirable feature of liberalism may not 
be as harmonious as often supposed. On standard theory, 
neutrality is invoked as the appropriate response to the presence 
of diverse conceptions of the human good. Since there is in fact 
a plurality of mutually incompatible beliefs about value held by 
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the members of society, with no correct or agreed mechanism for 
resolving conflicts about values, the best that can be hoped for 
is that the public authorities act as umpire between these 
values. Even if full impartiality proves impossible, the argument 
runs, neutrality is nonetheless the best available means of 
dealing with the heterogeneity of value. 
The problem with this position is not merely that, as has 
already been suggested in previous chapters, neutrality is 
compromised if a particular moral ideal, that of the person, is 
adduced in support of neutrality - the particular moral values 
being respected as those held by persons. Beyond this, and the 
implicit restrictions on the scope within which neutrality can 
operate, there is the problem that neutrality itself looks like a 
particular value or ideal, or at least its invocation as the best 
means of arbitrating between diverse values has this appearance. 
Here a defender of political neutrality might reach for a 
distinction of levels, and claim that a line must be drawn 
between the area within which first-order conceptions of value 
operate (the private), and on the other hand the public 
principles which are meant to regulate the competition between 
them. But it is not clear that the scope of pluralism can be 
delimited this easily. It is reasonable to think that such a 
distinction between public and private spheres is part of the 
conceptual apparatus of a particular value-system, namely 
liberalism, and one which other systems may reject. This is all 
the more obvious if the argument for neutrality has itself to 
rely on claims about value. 
For these reasons, it seems questionable whether neutrality is 
sanctioned by a belief in moral pluralism. In the case of Rawls 
and Gewirth, this doubt emerges in the failure of the supposedly 
consensual ideal of the moral person, or of a purely descriptive 
notion of agency, to yield the moral conclusions which these 
writers seek. There is no route leading from a morally neutral 
(either non-moral, or unanimously approved) starting-point into a 
conclusion which defends moral pluralism. For either this 
starting-point into a conclusion which supports moral pluralism. 
For either this starting-point is moralized in advance, in which 
case neutrality stands in danger of being violated at the outset, 
or else it is genuinely free of moral commitments, and then seems 
to be incapable of delivering any moral conclusions with 
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practical force. This is what we found in transferring the 
criticisms made of Kantian moral theory to his modern successors, 
that the non-moralized self, while arguably neutral in its moral 
content, was too insubstantial to issue in principles of justice, 
or sets of rights, with significant content. 
The previous chapter concluded by examining the impact of 
Kant's moral theory on his political philosophy. It gave reasons 
for doubting whether, in view of Kant's overriding emphasis on 
the primacy of moral over political considerations in action, 
there was any autonomy left to the activity of politics in his 
theory. Since politics is defined as a sphere of action whose 
imperatives are hypothetical rather than categorical, any 
conclusion of political reasoning must in principle be defeasible 
if there is some conflicting moral requirement which bears on the 
circumstances of the decision. The conclusion was, as this 
chapter has tried to re-emphasize, that neutrality can only 
figure in liberal theory at the cost of compromising some of its 
other commitments, notably its bias towards a sceptical 
epistemology: this is another version of the problem already 
considered in this chapter, that it is hard to construct a 
neutral justification for neutrality itself, which does not 
undermine moral pluralism. 
40 
Thus if there is no commonly-accepted method of resolving 
conflicts between values, it is not obvious that it is open, even 
given an accepted understanding of 'neutrality', to appeal to 
this as a pragmatic solution to the dispute. Rawls and Gewirth 
both seem to be attracted towards a broadly neutralist position, 
but are unable to show how it can be combined with a full 
commitment to pluralism. One of the ways in which this comes out, 
as the remainder of this chapter will argue, is in an attempt, 
for which they provide little argument, to limit the scope within 
which pluralism operates. 
This emerges most obviously in a limiting of the scope of 
politics in these theories. For Rawls the political institutions 
of his well-ordered society are designed to embody the shared 
conceptions of value which his constructivist method uses in 
formulating the principles of justice. Rawls sees value-based 
conflicts, such as those over the implications of value for 
public policy, as the fundamental feature of political life in 
modern-day democracies; he takes his task as being, accordingly, 
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to devise a set of political arrangements which can as far as 
possible obviate these conflicts. In this connection Rawls 
identifies what he -takes to be the fundamental shared moral 
notion held in contemporary western societies, that of the 
person, and elaborates from it an ideal of citizenship, or 
'political conception of the person'. 
41 The point is that 
citizenship embodies a publicly disseminated ideal of the moral 
claims of persons, and helps to define the space within which 
individuals' private conceptions of the good may be pursued. Thus 
Rawls presents a picture of a diversity of individual notions of 
the good, mediated by the consensual moral values enshrined in 
the public institutions. 
One question which this approach raises is whether in the face 
of plural moral beliefs the consensus Rawls seeks is broad enough 
to produce any significant principles of justice, or instititions 
to implement them. If no sufficient wide basis exists on which to 
found these institutions, there will be no justification for 
distinguishing between the neutral public sphere, embodying the 
shared ideals, and the private realm in which individuals are 
free to pursue their favoured conceptions of the good life. For 
in this case one of the points at issue between different values, 
or systems of value, may be precisely where, if anywhere, the 
line is to be drawn between private and public spheres or, more 
fundamentally, whether such a distinction is desirable at all. 
Given the initial diversity of beliefs, there is nothing to 
prevent its taking the form of disagreement over the extent to 
which public institutions can justifiably intervene in persons' 
lives, and in what ways. 
These are, or can easily become, political questions. It is, 
for example, a familiar point of disagreement between advocates 
of capitalist and socialist systems of production to what extent 
the state should interven in the market to redress inequalities 
of income distribution brought about by its uncontrolled 
operation. Rawls may claim, in response, that the principles of 
justice arising from his argument are general enough to 
accommodate disputes of this nature. But if they are, it is hard 
to maintain that the principles model our shared values 
accurately enough to be able to mediate disputes over freedom and 
equality, as enacted over a particular issue of public policy. 
One of the ways in which value-based conflict can emerge, as has 
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already been observed, is in disagreement over the practical 
courses of action sanctioned by values which in themselves are 
shared. These facts weaken the ability of the agreed principles 
to settle political disputes when they arise. If, on the other 
hand, the principles are sharpened so as to be capable of giving 
concrete answers to questions of policy, it then becomes doubtful 
whether they really embody shared values. 
It is persuasive to think of real-life political debate as 
providing a forum in which these disputes over value are fought: 
political argument is partly about the consequences of policy for 
moral values, and the rational interminability of such argument 
testifies to the insoluble nature of conflicts between values 
invoked during its course. At least part of the time political 
debate implicitly or explicitly is about the significance which 
politics itself should be given in human concerns. This alone is 
enough to cast doubt on the neat separation of institutional 
public consensus from the diversity of values permitted at the 
private level. 
None of this need be taken to imply some adversarial model of 
political debate, rather than a consensual model. Political 
argument can occur within a context of shared values. But even 
if, at a general level, values such as freedom and equality are 
agreed by political adversaries, much scope remains for dispute 
over the relative weights to be assigned them in particular 
policy issues and the extent to which a proposed course of action 
will involve favouring one action at the expense of another. 
While political debate is not, much of the time, about the 
single-minded promotion by one side of some value no less single- 
mindedly rejected by the other, a lot of room is still left for 
political manoeuvre within a broadly shared set of values. Some 
of these dimensions of political engagement seem inadequately 
served by Rawls' theory, which assumes, on the whole, that since 
argument in politics is concerned with questions of value, it is 
only necessary to arrive at a consensual set of values in order 
to render such arguments obsolete. 
These gaps in Rawls' treatment of politics can perhaps be 
traced to his Kantian model of moral theory. In part they can be 
accounted for by Kant's rigid subordination of political to moral 
concerns in practical reasoning. Rawls' theory reproduces this 
order of priority both in Rawls' belief in the methodological 
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primacy of moral theory over other branches of philosophy42 and 
in the related assumption that once theoretical modelling has 
been carried out in line with the constructivist procedure, there 
will be little left for political processes themselves to 
contribute towards deciding questions of social distribution. 
In part, also, Rawls' Kantianism emerges in the supposition 
that certain kinds of consideration operate in practical 
reasoning so as to override or eliminate entirely others with 
which they might come into conflict. This is a distinct point 
from the one about the priority of morality over politics, since 
it -applies within, as well as between, these deliberative 
spheres: what is in question here is the idea that certain sorts 
of reason can enjoy an absolute priority with respect to others 
even within some such sphere. The most obvious example of this in 
Rawls' theory is the lexical ordering of the two principles of 
justice, and between the two Parts of the second principle. But 
it seems to be an endemic feature of political engagement that. 
disagreement can occur over just such questions of priority. The 
notion of a hierarchy of concerns is internal to a particular 
theory of what human beings are or should be, and cannot be 
produced merely by constructing a model of people's shared 
beliefs about value. 
A similar desire to reduce practical concerns to a schematic 
deliberative hierarchy is apparent in some of Gewirth's work, 
43 notably his essay 'Are there any absolute rights? '. There 
Gewirth tries to show that certain rights are absolute in the 
sense that they can in no circumstances be justifiably overridden 
whatever other costs are incurred by respecting them. Despite 
Gewirth's distinction between 'abstract' and 'concrete' forms of 
moral absolutism, 
44 
perhaps made with Kant in mind, it is unclear 
how far this distinction can be maintained in practice, as 'the 
concrete absolutist is concerned with consequences and empirical 
connections, but always within the limits of the right he upholds 
as absolute'. 
45 
Rights are one way of assigning special deliberative weight 
to certain forms of concern. Gewirth seems to assume, however, 
that these rights must be absolute if the moral claims about 
persons which they embody are to be defensible against an 
aggregative moral theory such as utilitarianism. It does not 
follow from saying that there are no rights which cannot be 
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overridden in some circumstances that all deliberative concerns 
are projectible onto some unitary scale of value, such as 
utility. It may be that the moral-. concerns which give rise to 
these rights conflict in certain situations with other such 
concerns, and there is no neutral method of resolving the 
conflict. In cases like this, it cannot be true that the concerns 
that the rights claim expresses must Itrump, 
46 the others, since 
it is a feature of these situations that the conflicts which they 
involve are, in some sense, insoluble. This is not 
utilitarianism, as it denies that the conflict can be settled by 
reference to some single standard, whether of rights or utility. 
Gewirth seems to be drawn to something very like a Kantian 
hierarchy of concerns, his denials notwithstanding. 
While the reduction of politics to moral theory is less 
obvious in Gewirth than in Rawls, there remains a fairly clear 
reductivist bias in the attempted derivation of rights from the 
generic features of agency - where, again, the influence of 
Kantian thinking is detectable. We find, in Gewirth, a similar 
choice to that which Rawls faces in spelling out the political 
implications of his theory. Either the rights are framed at such 
a general level as to be nearly vacuous, in which case the theory 
fails to deliver conclusions with any practical force, the 
content of the rights being ppecified by political decision; or 
else there is practical content in the rights, but this pre-empts 
any debate over their practical significance. 
Gewirth does not perhaps wish to produce a very general theory 
for tackling issues of distribution. in the way Rawls seeks to do, 
and it could be argued from this that the area within which the 
rights generated by the PGC operate is supposed to be closely 
circumscribed. But this does not detract from the attempt to 
place absolute limits on what may in practical and hence 
political terms be done, while if the generic goods are indeed 
about the causal conditions of agency, there will be important 
political questions to be answered about what agents need in 
order. to satisfy these conditions, and about what political 
measures are justifiable to ensure that agents receive the 
relevant goods. These are questions to which liberal theory 
returns a notoriously uncertain answer. 
Rawls' and Gewirth's Kantian debts are most obvious in their 
efforts to use Kant's moral theory to ground liberal 
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individualism. But their attempts to clear a space within which 
individuals may pursue their private conceptions of the good life 
leaves it unclear why, given that the.. aim is to allow this 
diversity of value, the value of individualism itself should be 
privileged in this way. It is not through an enforced restriction 
of its field of operation, but in recognizing the conflict of 
values which pervades politics, that pluralism is most fully and 
coherently expressed. 
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Instrumentalism: Some Antecedents 
Instrumentalism: Some Antecedents 
I 
Instrumentalism, the view of politics constructed from the 
materials assembled in the foregoing chapters, has little to say; 
about politics as an autonomous activity. Where utilitarianism andý 
neo-Kantianism, the instrumentalist theories considered in 
previous chapters., have found anything to say about politics at 
all, their attention has been directed mainly to institutional 
analysis - for example, in Rawls' writings, 
l to specifying theý 
political institutions of the perfectly just or well-orderedý 
society. Utilitarian work, on the other hand, divides itselfl 
between technical discussions, in welfare economics, of the,, 
conditions within which supposedly optimific decision-procedures 
for public choice can operate, and, more recently, in the work ofý 
2 Parfit, Singer, Harris and others, concentration on the details 
of policy, with little consideration of the processes by which 
policy is decided. 
What is lacking in both the utilitarian and neo-Kantian 
approaches is an appreciation of how political processes can 
modify policy by altering the options available for practical 
action and by altering agents' understanding of the relationship 
between policy and value-based commitments. The present chapter 
sets out to expose some of the central assumptions underlying 
instrumentalist theory and, by suggesting alternatives to these 
assumptions, to point towards a different, non-instrumental view 
of politics. 
Traditionally liberal theory has seen politics as occupying a 
confined - in some recent treatments, vanishingly small - space 
within human concerns, in an area circumscribed by other, private 
sources of value and obligation. In the theory recently expounded, 
for example, by Larmore, 
3 
politics is ideally a neutral residuum 
left over when the partisan commitments permissible in private 
life alone have been subtracted. For Larmore, political neutrality 
is the corollary of value-pluralism: it is because values are 
irreducibly heterogeneous that public institutions and policy 
must, as far as possible, remain neutral between private 
conceptions of the good - or, at any rate, departures from 
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neutrality must be justified by reference to public procedures. 
In direct contradiction to this, the present chapter will argue 
that accepting the heterogeneity of-value demands the rejection of 
political neutrality as conceived by modern liberalism. One aspect 
of this heterogeneity is to be. found in the indeterminate 
relationship between different values, and between values and 
public policy. Concentration, in liberal pluralist philosophy, on 
the grander cases of abstract confrontation between rival sets of 
values has obscured the more humdrum possibility that such 
indeterminacy may arise in questions of practical agency also. 
Arbitrating between private conceptions of value becomes far more 
difficult if there is no value-free or agreed method of regulating 
the competition between values in practical action. Moreover, the 
entire ' notion of a hard-and-fast division between public 
neutrality and private partisanship can only be sustained if these 
realms can be kept apart. But it is unclear that pluralism is 
compatible with such a demarcation. 
This claim, that there can be no plausible neutrality in the 
presence of a commitment to pluralism, does not mean, as has 
sometimes been supposed, that all human concerns must become 
politicized (nor that any hitherto private concern may not in 
conceivable circumstances become politicized). To reject any 
monolithic distinction of public from private concerns is not to 
claim that everything is therefore reducible to the former - quite 
the contrary, since an acceptance of pluralism requires (as will 
be argued) that any single dimension of value cannot serve as that 
onto which all others are projected. 
Pluralism is precisely the claim that value is not so 
projectible, and that different categories of value cannot stand 
to one another in any fixed or hierarchical relationship. To take 
a familiar example, it is not clear that there can be any 
determinate relationship within a pluralist account of value, 
between moral and political concerns, as separate categories of 
reason for action; in particular, there may not be any definitive 
means of resolving the conflicting claims, in practical 
deliberation, of moral as against political considerations. If 
morality enjoyed some form of 'lexical, 
4 
priority over other 
categories of practical reasons, pluralism could not be true, as 
the latter is just the denial that there is this sort of 
hierarchical relationship between different kinds of reasons for 
108 
action. 
At this point it is advisable to draw a distinction, which will 
be' of some importance in the following discussion, between 
different forms of pluralism. It is fair to say that most 
philosophical discussions of pluralism have worked with the 
assumption that pluralism is a notion applicable within moral 
theory: that is, it has been assumed that pluralism identifies a 
conflict, or incommensurability, or at least a multiplicity, of 
ultimate goods - usually, goods which some persons in society 
actually pursue, or might reasonably be expected to pursue. This 
definition obviously passes over numerous issues relevant to a 
philosophical understanding of pluralism, concerning the nature of 
the pluralistic relationship between these goods - in what 
circumstances, for example, pluralistic goods are involved in 
practical conflicts, and whether incommensurability between goods 
is a necessary condition of pluralism. 
5 
On this issue, of the relationship between the pluralisti. c 
goods, it is worth noting that questions of practical policy arise 
even without the more dramatic forms of confrontation envisaged by 
some discussions of the subject. It is quite possible, for 
example, that there may exist in a society (a unitary sovereign 
state, say) a number- of discrete communities each of which 
encapsulates relatively coherent and homogeneous sets of values, 
with little interaction between these communities. In such a case, 
political questions may well arise concerning, for instance, 
funding levels for cultural activities pursued by these different 
groups, without the values themselves coming into direct conflict. 
Of course, the scarcity of public resources itself may give rise 
to conflict, but this is not because of some intrinsic 
incompatibility between the values themselves - rather the 
conflict arises from the contingent fact that groups espousing 
them are in competition for scarce public resources. 
Obviously matters like this require much fuller investigation. 
For the present purposes, the point is that politics can generate 
this possibility Pf conflict, and it is this that gives rise to 
the broader sense of pluralism to be examined in the present 
chapter. On this broader understanding, both the weaker claims of 
pluralism in the more restricted sense explained above, concerning 
the multiplicity of goods, and the stronger claims, concerning 
conflict, are accepted. But the present account differs from 
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neutralist theory in denying that Politics provides a forum within 
which these conflicts can be resolved - rather the very existence 
of politics testifies to their rational insolubility. Accordingly,! 
the broader understanding of pluralism sees the political processý 
as an expression of pluralistic conflict rather than a means oi 
resolving it. The conflict between these rival conceptions is! 
manifested by their engaging in competition for power. There is 
thus no neutralist solution to value-based conflict, as envisagedý 
by neutralist theory. 
To this distinction of forms of pluralism corresponds a furtherý 
distinction, of a methodological nature, drawn by Rawls in his I 
paper 'The Independence of Moral Theory'. There Rawls argues forl 
the philosophical subordination of non-moral and in particularý 
political concerns to moral ones. At least part of the inspiration 
for this claim comes from the thought that pluralism exists 
because persons are diverse in their moral outlooks, and any 
political attempt to impose a particular moral outlook on perso. 
1 
across this diversity is likely to violate their moral autonomy asýi 
agents. As a result, the moral claims of persons are regarded as 
fundamental (Gewirth's rights-based position parallels Rawls iný 
this regard7), and politics can only legitimately operate within, 
these moral constraints. 
In contrast with this methodological claim, the present chapterý 
will argue that there is no justification for this priority, and 
that it threatens to violate the very neutrality which writers 
like Rawls have aimed for in their political theory. For on the 
broader variant of pluralism, the form of consensual value sought 
by Rawls in his efforts to provide a moral framework for politicalý 
institutions either does not exist or else is insufficient to 
yield the political solutions which he wants from his theory. Part 
of what the broader version of pluralism means is that there can 
be no a-priori ordering of this kind, based on subscription to an 
allegedly foundational moral principle. By contrast, it is part of 
the function of political activity to enlighten agents about their 
rational commitments including what they have good reason to 
value. This being so, the present chapter will argue that there 
can be no pre-political ordering of values of the kind Rawls is 
aiming for. 
There is then little reason, when we accept the wider 
understanding of pluralism, to assume that morality must enjoy 
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'lexical' priority over other practical concerns. Pluralism can 
only be combined with this priority ordering if it is taken in its 
narrower sense, as a notion operative only within moral theory: in 
that case, it can be reconciled with the lexical structuring, as 
Rawls' own theory demonstrates. -But once we move to the 
alternative version of pluralism, which questions any a priori 
hierarchy among deliberative concerns, it is hard to see what 
justification there could be for Rawls' claims. Pluralism, on the 
wider definition, just is the rejection of a hierarchy of 
concerns, and the structuring of public institutions by reference 
to it. 
It is of course true that lexical orderings can be a mark of 
incommensurability between goods: one way of indicating this 
relationship is by claiming that no amount of one good will 
compensate for, or balance, any amount of the other. Money and 
love, for example, have sometimes been assumed to be such, though 
the direction in which the lexical ordering is taken in this case 
is doubtless a matter of personal preference. But the significant 
point is that this, as in other cases of incommensurability, 
indicates not so much the possibility of lexical orderings 
between the goods, as that neither may be translatable into the 
currency of the other; this comes out also in the fact that a 
person may accept both as goods without accepting any such 
ordering between them. While incommensurability between goods is, 
as has been suggested above, a mark of pluralism, it does not 
follow that the pluralistic expression of this relationship must 
taken the form of a lexical ordering between the goods nor 
between categories of goods. 
Given at least the possibility of the broader interpretation of 
pluralism, it is hard to see how political neutrality can survive 
if the notion of a deliberative hierarchy is challenged. For in 
the absence of any such ordering of concerns, the rationale 
disappears for thinking that the fundamental political task is to 
arbitrate between different conceptions of the good. That thought 
assumes that these conceptions have value, and are of political 
account, as the ideals of life held by persons. Since persons are 
the supreme bearers of moral worth, all other concerns must be 
subordinated to that of facilitating persons' pursuit of these 
ideals. Neutrality, thent is relativized to a particular 
conception of the supreme good, which itself is non-neutral; in 
III 
other words, neutrality cannot justify its own foundational 
principle. 
The search for a neutral justifi-cation for political decisions 
has dominated much recent liberal theory. One prominent form which 
8 this has taken, in the work of Ackerman, Rawls, and others, has 
been the search for a mode of justifying political arrangements 
whose neutrality is guaranteed by the neutral procedures giving 
rise to them, and specifically by neutral conditions of dialogue 
between participants in the political decisions which determine 
those arrangements. If the conditions in which the protagonists 
confront one another are neutral between their separate 
conceptions of the good, it is claimed, the resulting political 
dispensation must be mutually acceptable to them so long as they 
adhere to rational criteria of justification. 
The neutralist approach thus presents a picture of political 
debate as issuing in rational agreement, at least when conducted 
in ideal conditions. In the next section this position is located 
within the context of the Enlightenment philosophical ideas which 
inform much utilitarian and neo-Kantian thinking, while examining 
instrumentalism's view of political argument. After that I will 
outline an alternative account which questions both the neutralist 
assumptions underlying instrumentalism and, more specifically, the 
psychological premisses on which (as it will be argued) its 
characteristic positions are based. By the end we should have a 
better grasp both of why the instrumentalist project of providing 
neutral grounds for political debate is doomed to failure, and the 
general shape of an alternative view which stresses the rational 
interminability of political argument. 
ii 
We have already seen that the instrumental view of politics 
holds, both in its utilitarian and neo-Kantian versions, that the 
ends of political action are given extra-politically. In the case 
of utilitarianism, this takes the form of aggregating preferences 
for the purposes of public policy, while the Kantian brand of 
instrumentalism assumes, as has been indicated, that political 
agents operate within a system of morality and pursue, at best, 
only contingent objectives of their own. In both cases, the format 
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of public decision-making is held to be isomorphic with that 
undertaken by the individual agent. On neither Kantian nor 
utilitarian theory is there any distinctive contribution made to 
the process by political debate as a collective deliberative 
process: the assumption is that the position of an individual 
agent is paradigmatic for practical reasoning in general, as 
similar structures apply at both the individual and collective 
levels. Instrumentalism, then, maintains that the ends of 
political action are given extra-politically: political processes 
make no independent contribution towards deciding the final goals 
of political action. All that these processes do is to play an 
executive role in deciding how the given ends are best achieved. 
It is helpful, in understanding the implications of 
instrumentalism, to consider the Enlightenment philosophical 
psychology which lies behind much of its thinking. One root of the 
instrumentalist assumption that the ends of politics are given 
extra-politically is to be found in Humean or quasi-Hume. an 
philosophical psychology: on the Humean view, all that 'reason' 
can contribute to practical deliberation is a decision about how 
best to satisfy 'passions' which are themselves regarded as 
incorrigible data of experience: 
a passion is an original existence or, if you will, 
modification of existence, and contains not any 
representative quality, which renders it a copy of any 
other existence or modification. When I am angry, I am 
actually possessed with the passion, and in that emotion. 
have no more a reference to any other object, than when I 
am thirsty, or sick, or more than five feet high. 'Tis 
impossible, therefore, that this passion can be opposed 
by, or be contradictory to truth and reason: since this 
contradiction consists in the disagreement of ideas, 
considered 9 as copies, with those objects, which they represent. 
Hume's position is, then, that only reason, being the faculty 
concerned with the comparison of ideas, can be representational; 
and thus the passions, as brute 'existences' in the world, cannot 
be opposed to reason, since they are incapable of representing 
(and so by the same token of misrepresenting) states of affairs. 
It follows that any attempt to persuade someone on rational 
grounds to abandon a preference which they hold, or to adopt 
another which they do not, must be futile. The notion of rational 
persuasion has no place in Humean philosophical discourse. 
On this view, the ineffectuality of political argument merely 
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results from the claim that ý=t attempt at rational argument must 
be ineffectual, where it involves an effort by the speaker to 
persuade his audience to abandon their preferences. This is not 
necessarily because the Humean is committed to thinking that 
preferences can never change, though the theory leaves it unclear 
how this is supposed to happen. Nor is it that Hume is prevented 
from giving some explanation of. how preferences can be changed 
(there can be a rational account, within Humean theory, of how to 
go about brainwashing somebody, given that this is what, on other 
grounds, one wants to do). Rather the unclarity arises when we ask 
why the Humean would want to go about modifying preferences in the 
first place: since preferences are rationally unfounded, it is 
hard to see on what basis any policy could be formulated with such 
a goal in view, or how the grounds on which such a policy was 
formulated could bear any rational relationship to the grounds on 
which its political proponents set out to persuade an audience of 
its merits. 
To this analysis it could be objected that there are variants 
of modern utilitarian theory which draw on Humean premisses for 
their psychological basis, but allow that preferences may, after 
all, undergo rational modification. Rather than seeing preferences 
as static and given, some more sophisticated brands of 
utilitarianism, such as Regan's, 
10 
allow for the possibility that 
preferences can be modified to meet external changes in an agent's 
decision-making environment. In Regan's cooperative utilitarian 
theory, for example, agents are presented with a schedule of 
possible outcomes and are supposed to adapt their own behaviour to 
maximize utility in the given conditions. 
But this kind of adaptive behaviour does not show that there is 
any rational modification of preferences at work here. All we are 
presented with in Regan's theory is a table of conditional 
outcomes. But even apart from the fact that the outcomes are not 
different preferences, but merely utility numbers, there is no 
ground for inferring that preferences are modifiable, rather than 
just being conditional upon external information. To move to a 
different point in a given schedule of preferences is not the same 
as to regard the schedule itself as rationally negotiable. 
Admittedly, this does raise the question how Humean theory 
copes even with the less dramatic possibility of conditional 
preferences. It is Hume's view that the most which reason can 
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contribute to practical deliberation is the cognitive servicing of 
desires - the latter being, in his description, 'original 
existences'll which -are both incorrigible by reason alone and 
which provide the motivational force required to induce an agent 
to act. All that reason can do is inform the agent of which 
objects to secure in order to satisfy given passions, and how to 
go about securing those objects. Without the impulse to action 
given by desires, agency would be impossible. Thus, as Hume says, 
any deliberative chain must ultimately lead back to some passion 
or desire which cannot be accounted for by reason: 
Ask a man why he uses exercise; he will answer, because 
he desires t; keep his health. If you then enquire, why 
he a-esires health, he will readily reply, because 
sickness is painful . If you push your enquiries farther, 
anT-Te-sire a reason why he hates pain, it is impossible 
he can ever give any. This is an ultimate end, and is 
never referred to any object ... It is impossible there can be a progress in infinitum; and that one thing can always 
be a reason why another is desired. Something must be 
desirable on its own account, and because of its 
immediate ff cord or disaccord with human sentiment and 
affection. 
From this it is clear that Hume thought reason was restricted to 
matters of purely instrumental calculation. In view of this 
restriction, there can be no question of any rational disputes 
over ultimate aims, of the form which may be plausibly thought to 
characterize real-life political conflicts. For, on the Humean- 
inspired instrumentalist view, conflicts of this kind are 
impossible. The only room for disagreement - in principle 
resolvable given accepted procedures for gathering and processing 
information - is over how best to achieve goals which do not 
themselves admit of rational dispute. 
One clear limitation imposed by Humean analysis on the scope of 
political argument is the latter's inability to give any 
convincing account of political persuasion. It is a matter of 
common observation that politicians frequently do draw upon a 
variety of techniques to persuade their opponents, or some wider 
audience, that they should support a proposed policy. The Humean 
gloss on such possibilities has, presumably, to be that these 
efforts are either pointless or else aim to inform their audience 
that the policy in question really is that which best fulfils an 
objective agreed in advance. There are occasions when something 
like this picture is true: there can, for example, be genuine 
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political disagreement over which policy most effectively furthers 
some agreed aim, such as cutting crime or increasing employment. 
But political dispute, where it does not involve conflicts over 
final ends - for example over what form of society we should live 
in, with what productive relationships, and what values that 
society should express or promote - is very often about balancing 
conflicting final objectives, and this, according to the Humean 
view, is a task in which reason can offer us no assistance. 
It is important to bear in mind the impact of Humean 
assumptions on the form as well as the aims of political argument. 
As the passage quoted above from the Treatise indicates, Hume 
explicitly denied that the passions have a representational or 
intentional component: a consequence of this claim is that 
emotional states cannot be seen as rational (or irrational) in 
Hume's view, since to be in such a state is to 'have no more 
reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or 
more than five feet high. 
13 The passions, being non- 
representational, are incapable of truth and falsity, and so 
cannot be modified by rational argument. 
As a result, the role of rhetoric in political argument, which 
familiarly relies in its repertoire of techniques on an appeal to 
the audience's emotions, has been discounted in Humean-inspired 
instrumentalist writings. The emotions are seen, from this 
perspective, as fundamentally non-rational states, and so their 
function in any purportedly rational structure of argument becomes 
obscured. The most that the rhetorician can hope to achieve in the 
way of emotional persuasion is to by-pass the audience's rational 
faculties and appeal directly to their non-rational passions or 
'affections'. 
This is not to say that such appeals will not be successful - 
though, as has already been remarked, it remains unclear in the 
theory how these 'original existences' can be modified. But even 
where it succeeds in its aims, political rhetoric cannot, in its 
nature, conform to the canons of rational argument which apply, 
for example, in philosophical discourse, because its appeal is 
made to a psychological faculty which is essentially non-rational. 
This helps to explain the neglect of rhetoric within political 
persuasion in recent theorizing, and the obloquy in which it is 
held in academic discussion. Whatever there may be to say about 
rhetorical argument as an appeal to the emotions, there can be 
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nothing to say, according to Humean philosophical psychology, 
about it as a rational form of persuasion. 
While it may be- superficially less obvious that Kantianism, 
which the present work has identified as the other main 
inspiration for instrumentalist -theory, leads to similarly 
dismissive consequences for political argument, and an equally 
limited view of the scope of political action, the applications of 
Kantian moral theory in recent political philosophy lead to 
conclusions similar to those already attributed to modern Humean- 
inspired writing. This is to be traced to common features of 
Hume's and Kant's theories, and particularly to shared 
psychological assumptions, the great and evident differences 
between them notwithstanding. It will helpful to trace in more 
detail the common ground between Humean and Kantian theory, and to 
indicate the latter's influence in modern instrumentalist 
writings. 
As has already been argued in the Introduction to this chapte , r, 
Kantianism asserts a rigid priority between categories of reason 
for action. Because of this priority, non-moral categories of 
reasons, including, in Kant's own demarcation, political reasons, 
occupy a necessarily subordinate position with respect to the 
moral category. For Kant, moral reasons must apply categorically 
if they are to apply at all. This means that there can be no 
permissible trade-off between moral and non-moral considerations 
in practical reasoning (or, for that matter, between different 
moral imperatives with conflicting practical consequences). To 
allow the possibility that moral imperatives could be overridden 
in certain circumstances would in Kant's view remove the sole 
basis on which morality can apply, that is, unconditionally. 
The result of Kant's insistence on the categorical status of 
the moral within deliberation is that there is in his theory a 
stark division between the grounds on which moral obligations 
hold, and agents' motivations for acting morally. These cannot, 
except fortuitously, coincide in Kantian theory. To make an 
agent's reasons for acting morally contingent upon his subjective 
motivation for doing so would be to subvert the categorical nature 
of the moral imperatives. For Kant, understanding the character of 
moral reasons for action is precisely to see those reasons as 
holding independently of any agent's subjective inclination to act 
on them. 14 
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In the work of Kant's modern followers, such as Rawls, this 
emphasis on the categorical grounds of moral imperatives emerges 
in the methodological subordination of political to moral theory, 
as already mentioned. In Rawls' work, the priority of the moral is 
seen in his efforts to derive. political institutions from 
supposedly consensual moral notions. These notions are meant to 
structure the processes by which the parties to the Original 
Position deliberate about the ideal form of society and the social 
and political arrangements which result from these deliberations. 
They operate, for example, so as to exclude from the discussion 
any information which could lead the parties to conclusions 
incompatible with the inviolable status of persons, which Rawls 
sees as the prime consensual moral notion held in contemporary 
(western) society. When the deliberations are over, the resulting 
principles of justice and the institutions embodying them are 
intended to express this fundamental moral concern for persons. 
For the present purposes the question raised by Rawls' and 
other neo-Kantian theory is how far either the procedure by which 
the institutions of the just society are determined or the society 
itself allows for the possibility of political dispute, and hence 
for rational persuasion. From the neutralist perspective of Rawls' 
theory, it is unclear that either the process or its outcome 
leaves any room for persistent value-based conflict of the form 
witnessed in actual political argument. Since the theory is meant 
to express shared moral convictions, such conflict can at most 
occur within a framework of given values and aims - to act within 
the values, the priorities between values, embodied in Rawls' two 
principles of justice. 
Thus political action is circumscribed by shared goals, much as 
in Kant's own theory the content of political action is defined 
residually, as what remains when the claims of morality have been 
taken into account. Beyond purely executive matters, such as 
deciding on appropriate allocations of primary goods in accordance 
with the two principles, it is difficult to see what part endemic 
political disagreement can play in Rawls' ideal society. The 
fundamental conflicts of values present in actual political 
argument have been banished by institutionalizing the common 
. 
beliefs thought to underlie these conflicts. 
It might be said in response that there could still be limited 
political disagreement in a Rawlsian society, concerning non- 
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consensual values (i. e. those not relating to moral personality), 
and its limitations imposed by an acceptance that discussion was 
framed by the principles embodying the supreme value. As already 
argued in the Introduction, the primacy of a particular value does 
not preclude incommensurability -between other values. Such 
questions as the indexing of the primary goods could give rise to 
political disagreement over basic values, or at least over the 
practical implications of value in policy-making. Given this 
possibility, it may be said, there is, after all, room for 
political disputes in the well-ordered society, and of a familiar 
kind. 
One problem this answer faces is that it is hard to recover any 
very substantial shared moral content from political dispute as it 
occurs in modern democratic societies. This is not to say that 
such dispute often involves the wholesale repudiation by one side 
-of the values espoused 
by the other: conflicts over. the practical 
weight to be assigned to considerations of freedom as against 
those of equality, for example, seldom take the form of rejection 
by one party of freedom as a value, balanced against the no less 
wholehearted rejection by the other of equality. The lexical 
ordering of the two principles, and the very idea that there must 
be some shared nexus of value in our notion of personhood, is 
difficult to square with the fact that political disagreements, 
and the grounds on which arguments are made in the course of them, 
so often belie any claim that certain values enjoy the supremacy 
which Rawls accords them. The existence of shared values does not 
mean that there is a fixed hierarchy between values, to be 
observed by the participants in political disputes. Rather these 
disputes often concern the relative practical weights to be given 
to these values in concrete questions of policy. 
Rawls' theory faces a further problem in showing how the well- 
ordered society could witness recognizable political conflict, a 
problem shared by other neutralist theories such as Larmorels. 
Rawls and Larmore hope to combine a theory of political 
institutions as encapsulating certain agreed moral values, while 
maintaining a pluralistic theory of value within civil society; 
though in Larmore's theory the state is meant to be less 
expressive of substantial moral notions than its Rawlsian 
counterpart, he still finds himself promulgating the ideal of 
equal respect as being universal or unexceptionable enough to 
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stand as his basic constitutional principle. Similar remarks apply 
to Nozick's minimal state theory. 
15 The problem is that once the 
line has been drawn between the values embodied in public 
institutions and those pursued by private citizens, it is hard to 
see how the conflicts which, on any realistic pluralist theory, 
these private pursuits must generate, can be arbitrated by the 
state without compromising its neutrality. 
It is persuasive, by contrast, to abandon as artificial any 
hard-and-fast division of public from private conceptions of 
value, and assume that political dispute can often take the form 
of confrontation between values which neutralist pluralists like 
Larmore see as irreducibly private. If this is right, it looks as 
though any consistent neutralist theory with a rigid public/ 
private distinction will have to exclude from debate large areas 
of discussion which feature in actual political argument. These 
problems are multiplied if it is acknowledged that debate may 
proceed not only over the private values themselves, but also over 
the empirically necessary conditions for pursuing them. 
These problems arise in Rawls' and Larmore's theories from the 
attempt to combine public neutrality with private pluralism. The 
separation between public and private spheres of action can only 
postpone a decision about where, and more pressingly on what 
grounds, the line is to be drawn. In contrast with his modern-day 
followers, Kant's own political and moral theory has the merit of 
confining all (non-aesthetic)16 value within the realm of 
morality, thereby avoiding the perplexities which beset his 
contemporary disciples in their efforts to describe the 
relationship between public and private values. This at least 
escapes the difficulty already mentioned above, that there is a 
broader interpretation of pluralism according to which there is no 
fixed ordering between classes of reasons for action. Kantian 
theory only achieves this, however, by cutting back still further 
the ground within which politics operates, and leaves it obscure 
how the commitment to different forms of value can inform 
political disputes. While it shares this problem with its 
historical precursor., neo-Kantian theory compounds its 
difficulties by coupling a pluralist account of value with an 
attempt to set once and for all the boundaries within which 
different kinds of value can operate. 
It should now be clearer how, despite large and obvious 
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differences between them, the philosophical psychology of Hume and 
Kant both contribute towards instrumentalism's dismissal of 
political argument. That psychology works, in Kant's as in Hume's 
writings, with a schematic division of. the soul into ratiocinative 
and motivational elements. Just as for Hume reason can provide no 
grounding, as we have seen, for motivation, so in Kant's moral' 
theory the status of the rational agent as noumenon can only be 
preserved by rigorously abstracting from its motivated, and 
therefore phenomenal, characteristics. Looked at in this way, 
Kant's and Hume's moral theories emerge as opposed answers to the 
same question - what is the foundation of value - within a shared 
set of psychological assumptions. 
In both cases the starting-point is this faculty division 
between reason and motivation, and the foundational task is to 
assign the source of evaluation to one or other of these 
faculties. Hume offers a credible account of how we can act from 
moral motivations, but his noncognitivist metaethics leaves 
unexplained the phenomenology of moral experience - in particular, 
the appearance, to those operating within its value-system, as a 
set of categorically binding requirements on conduct. By contrast, 
Kantianism, which offers a rational account of this aspect of the 
moral life, is less able, given its dual-aspect theory of the 
agent, to explain how reflection on the formal attributes of 
morality can motivate agents to act morally. 
This section has tried to indicate the origins of some of 
instrumentalism's characteristic assumptions in Enlightenment 
philosophical psychology. Instrumentalism shows its debt to Kant 
and Hume in its assumption that the concerns present in the 
formation of policy generally are determined by extra-political 
considerations. Neo-Kantianism, particularly in its modern 
neutralist form, places value outside or prior to politics, so 
that the most that political processes can concern themselves with 
is how to work within an external set of values: values which, on 
the neutralist position, negatively define the space within which 
politics can operate, or which condition the objectives which 
politicians may aim at in their actions and the procedures by 
which these may be secured. 
This approach pays little attention to the continuities between 
politics and other human concerns, and tells us little about the 
part which political argument can play in modifying our. perception 
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of our interests. The Humean-inspired utilitarian, on the other 
hand, can readily explain how interests, in the form of 
preferences, may shape the goals of policy, but can offer no 
account of how agents' perception of. their interests can change 
rationally through political persuasion. On either account, there 
is little scope left for politic s to make any independent 
contribution towards setting its ends. What is needed to remedy 
this situation is an alternative to the Enlightenment psychology 
underlying the instrumentalist view and the theories of evaluation 
to which that psychology gives rise. This task is undertaken in 
the next section. 
III 
Instrumentalism thus combines a distinctive philosophical 
psychology with an associated account of evaluation, and it is 
this which the present section aims to question. We have already 
seen that Hume believed moral distinctions to be rationally 
unfounded, since if they were, we could not explain how agents are 
motivated to act morally: for Hume, reason can only represent, and 
as a result can give no explanation of how it can motivate agents 
to act morally. As Williams puts it in his own neo-Humean theory, 
if all that a statement about, for example, moral obligation does 
is to tell us 'one more fact about the universe, one needs some 
further explanation of why one should take any notice of that 
particular fact'. 
17 Any satisfactory non-Humean theory must, then, 
account for the motivational capacity of morality. 
One prominent example of a non-Humean theory, which Williams 
has in his sights in the above quotation, is cognitivism: the 
claim, roughly, that there are moral truths, in the same way as 
(on a realist view) there are, for example, scientific truths 
about the world, and we can come to know these moral truths in a 
way analogous if not identical to that in which we can know facts 
about the physical world. Thus defined, cognitivism opposes the 
Humean view to the extent that it allows reason to play a part in 
discovering truths about morality. Its major advantage is that it 
gives theoretical effect to what looks like a pervasive feature of 
everyday moral thinking, that to be under a moral obligation 
appears to the person concerned to be something more than a 
projection, as some varieties of noncognitivism have claimed, of 
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his subjective or affective states. Morality seems to involve 
something more than the pseudo-objectification of a person's 
feelings of approbation or personal preferences. Cognitivism's 
strength lies in its ability to explain this aspect of the 
phenomenology of moral experience. 
Against this, however, cognitivism suffers from telling 
disadvantages. One problem is that something has to underwrite its 
ontology of moral truths: to pursue the analogy made above, we 
have a fair understanding of what it would be for the world to 
exist, without our existing to represent it in our scientific 
theories, but it is, to say the least, less clear what it would be 
for us never to have existed, but for moral truths relating to 
such matters as promise-keeping, truth-telling, virtues of 
character, and so on, to exist regardless of this fact. Secondly, 
the cognitivist has to give some account of how we come to know 
these truths. Again, in the scientific case, we have a well-formed 
understanding of the role of research programmes in developing 
theoretical models of aspects of the natural world, but it is less 
obvious how one goes about discovering truths about morality - 
particularly how this is achieved by examining aspects of the 
natural world. According to cognitivism, there are moral truths 
waiting to be known, but in disanalogy with the scientific 
example, there is no clear experiential route which leads to these 
truths by a systematic method of investigation. 
18 
For the present purposes, however, the major problem with 
cognitivism is that it fails to provide a satisfactory alternative 
to the Humean position. It works within the bipartite psychology 
of Humean theory, transferring its explanation of the foundation 
of value from the motivational to the ratiocinative faculty. This 
move opens up a gap in explanation which the Humean can readily 
exploit, a gap to be filled by an account of how we are motivated 
to act morally. In developing a non-Humean alternative to 
cognitivism, we should distinguish the claim that there are moral 
truths from the claim that we can arrive at knowledge of these 
truths by ratiocination. The significance of this distinction 
should become clear if we examine another important shared feature 
of cognitivism and Humean theory, the distinction of fact and 
value. 19 
It is fairly obvious how the bipartition of faculties and the 
fact/value distinction are mutually supportive. If there is this 
123 
ontic distinction, it is natural to suppose that there must 
correspond to it some distinction of the faculties by which we 
arrive at factual as opposed to moral judgments: while, on the 
other hand) the distinction of faculties invites a distinction of 
the world into items which can be- represented, and those which 
have the causal power to issue in action. Cognitivism errs in 
accepting the fact/value distinction, thereby encumbering itself 
with the task of explaining the nature of moral facts, and how 
they can be known; it then has also to explain how morality, 
assimilated to the class of facts, can gain any practical hold on 
us as agents. 
Once we reject, however, any rigid distinction between neutral 
facts and non-neutral values, it is easier to see how cognitivism 
could be replaced by a more serviceable alternative to Humean 
moral theory. We need to distinguish between two claims conflated 
within cognitivism: first, that there is an objective realm of 
moral facts; secondly, that these facts can be discovered by 
reason. We have already seen some of the problems encountered by 
the first claim, concerning the status of this realm of moral 
facts and the means by which we are supposed to gain knowledge of 
it. In so far as the second claim presupposes the first, by 
assuming that there is an object of rational discovery, it fares 
no better, but it will be suggested below that if we abandon the 
fact/value dichotomy, it has better prospects of being worked up 
into something more satisfactory. This move aims to avoid the 
problematic ontic claims made by cognitivism, and replace them 
with a general account of evaluation which does not entirely 
exclude reason from the process of forming moral judgments and 
acting upon them. 
It is important to keep in view the wider issues in the 
discussion. Instrumentalism regards political action as being 
confined to purely means-end calculations about how best to 
achieve objectives determined by external considerations. As in 
some accounts of bureaucracy's functioning, in devising optimal 
strategies to secure given policy objectives, the assumption of 
instrumentalism is that political argument is concerned only with 
finding the best means of achieving these goals. The Humean 
account limits practical reasoning to the cognitive servicing of 
given desires; similarly the instrumentalist view of political 
argument, based on this theory, limits the scope for debate to 
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purely informational questions. 
This limitation is only sustainable if there is a tenableý 
distinction between -the acceptable- partisanship of policy, and a',: 
neutral body of facts which can be mobilized by the bureaucracy toý 
inform politicians how policy may best be implemented. This isil 
Wý 
clear from, for example, Regan's cooperative utilitarian theory, 
where all that agents are thought to require is information about! 
other agents' intentions, in deciding how to maximize givew 
utility measures. Again, in Rawls' picture of the well-orderedl 
society, the values embodied in the two principles of justice'! 
determine what can be pursued politically. More generally, it isl 
the supposition of neutralist theory that it is possible to limitý 
political activities to neutral arbitration between competingli 
conceptions of value, where this neutrality consists either in the! 
implementation of policies embodying shared values, such as equall 
respect, or in the total avoidance of value-based commitments iný 
politics. This position leaves political argument, seen as. ai 
confrontation between controversial values, with little work toi, 
do. Value-based conflict is effectively excluded from the!! 
political arena. 
Cognitivism offers little assistance in producing a corrective 
to this picture, since its modelling of morality on scientific, l 
truths commits it to a view of morality as being at least, 
potentially the object of rational agreement. A non-Humean 
alternative to cognitivism would, by contrast, endorse a' 
pluralistic theory of value, but would resist the inference fromý 
this that there can be no rational value-based disputes, in the, ý 
same way as there can be no rational disputes over, say, matters:: 
of taste. Assuming that sets of facts must have the property ofý 
consistency between members of the sets, the Humean is apt to 
conclude that pluralism merely gives further evidence of the non-ý 
factual status of values, and the cognitivist is left having. 
either to jettison pluralism or else withdraw the claim that: 
values have objective factual status. 
What by contrast appears to be a promising suggestion is that 
there can, indeed, contrary to Hume's arguments, be reasons 
advanced for evaluations, but to deny that this means that value, 
must have some ultimate foundation, whether in subjective 
preferences or in facts about the world. There can be rational 
arguments about values even though there is no agreed rational 
125 
procedure for resolving value-based disputes. This anti- 
foundationalist position can be applied to the argument advanced 
by Hume in the passage quoted earlier from the Enquiry, where he 
asserts that a chain of practical reasoning must terminate in a 
reason for action which is not in turn based on any other such 
reason. There are, according to the counter-Humean claim now under 
consideration, indefinitely long chains of reasons which can be 
mobilized in support of values we may hold. But it is a logical 
truth, and not one issuing from differences of kind between reason 
and passion, that these chains must end somewhere. Hume's argument 
in the Enquiry passage shows not that reasons are necessarily 
conditional upon prior motivations, but that chains of reasons for 
action are finite. That a piece of practical reasoning starts from 
some original evaluative judgment does not show that this judgment 
must be a preference of the agent's, only that some such judgment 
must be present in order to avoid an infinite regress in 
explaining action. 
It is important to grasp this logical point because it is 
easily confused with another claim Hume makes, 
21 
and which might 
be thought to be implied by it, that only 'passions' can play any 
causal role in producing action. With this new causal claim, the 
argument from the Enquiry 
, 
ascribes to motivation an originating 
role in practical reasoning because it is only motivations which 
have the causal power to make an agent act. In itself, of course, 
this is a fairly odd claim for Hume to make, in view of his 
reductive attitude towards causation: if statement-s of cause are 
simply (temporally) ordered pairs of classes of natural 
22 
phenomena, there is no obvious reason why rational judgments 
should not feature in the first of the classes. Leaving this 
aside, there is reason to doubt, even without a Humean analysis of 
causation, that we have to refer the causes of action to a 
distinct psychological faculty of motivation. At this point I 
adapt an argument used by Davidson against J. S. Mill's theory of 
causation. 23 
Davidson's point is that a specification of causes need not 
require a full account of the background conditions prevailing 
before a given event occurred. Against Mill, we cannot infer that 
a background condition was the cause of an event merely because 
the event would not have occurred if the condition had not held. 
Davidson makes this point against Mill's claim24 that in order to 
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account causally for an event, such as a man's falling off a 
ladder, we must produce an indefinitely long list of conditions 
relating to the man's weight, his footwear, laws of gravitation, 
and so forth, on the grounds that these conditions were all 
necessary for the event's occurrence.. 
It seems, against Mill's views, that our notion of cause is 
relativized to a set of background conditions which may also vary 
in its composition from one case to another. For example, a 
machine can be in one of two (equiprobable) states, I and 2, and I 
can pull one of two levers, A and B. If I pull A and the machine 
is in state 1, it delivers a reward, but if I pull B while it is 
in this state it gives me an electric shock; but if it is state 2, 
pulling A produces the shock and B the reward. As a result, if I 
pull A and get the reward, the machine being in state 1, my 
pulling is the cause of my getting the reward, even though with 
different background conditions (the machine's being in state 2), 
this action would have caused me to receive the shock. My action 
causes the event which follows it even though, with different 
background conditions, the same action (under the description 
pulling A) would have been followed by a different event. 
This suggests that our understanding of the notion of an event 
Els cause is something like the following: an event sufficient to 
bring about E. given the prevailing conditions (the causal 
background). In the case under examination, of agent -motivation, 
this means that we can give a causal explanation of an agent's 
action if we can specify an event which, relative to a description 
of the causal background, was sufficient to produce the action. On 
this account there need be no attempt at providing a complete 
description of all the conditions which had to obtain in order to 
produce the consequence. We can identify the cause of an agent's 
action in a statement about his reasons for acting even though 
this presupposes that some set of background conditions holds. 
The fact that in certain cases, as in the machine example, the 
cause may only be operative relative to a contingent or variable 
background, does not refute the causal statement. Suppose a person 
runs away from an object which he believes to be an unexploded 
bomb. If someone inquires about the cause of this person's action, 
it is enough to be told that there was this immediate danger; or 
at least that the person believed, mistakenly as it happened, that 
there was. In this case we rest content with a statement providing 
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a sufficient explanation -a causal explanation - of the action. 
The fact that the knowledge that there was a bomb would not have 
provoked the same reaction in someone else, does not mean that we 
have to include in every causal account of the first person's 
action his state of fear or timorous disposition or whatever. 
similarly, we can say, if there was a bomb, that this caused the 
person to run away, even though the statement that there was a 
bomb could not provide a causal explanation of the person's action 
if it turned out that what he took to be a bomb was some other, 
harmless, object. The statement that the bomb caused the person to 
run away even when the same action would have occurred in 
different circumstances (there being no bomb); and, conversely, 
the bomb still counts as causing the action of running away, even 
though the presence of a bomb might not have caused a person 
unaware of its presence, or less fearful, to run away. 
This argument, if it is right, provides some leverage against 
the Humean claim that there must be a distinct psychological 
faculty, that of motivation, which is causally required for an 
agent to act. The Humean claim seems less compelling if there is 
not, in general, any single description of a given event which we 
can isolate as the cause of a given event or action. There can be 
a full statement of cause in accounting for a person's action even 
though such a statement tacitly presupposes that certain necessary 
background conditions hold. And there seems no grounds, other than 
a dogmatic adherence to the psychology of bipartition, not to 
claim that the causes of actions may be the reasons which also 
explain them - reasons which can be cited in the causal statement 
as the agent's (relevant) beliefs. 
If this is right, then 'reason' in the form of beliefs, such as 
a belief about the presence of a bomb, can cause a person's action 
- we receive a full answer to the question what caused a person to 
run away if we are told that he believed there was a bomb (whether 
or not this belief was true). We do not need to invoke any 
distinct psychological category in explaining the causes of 
action, supposedly distinguished from that of 'reason' on the 
grounds of its causal efficacy. Reason, in the form of beliefs, 
for example, can figure in statements about actions' causes, and 
in no more elliptical a sense (appropriate desires or motivations 
here forming part of the background) than that in which causal 
statements referring to agents' motivations are elliptical in that 
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they presuppose relevant beliefs. 
Much more could of course be said on this matter, particularly 
on matters such as causal overdetermination and deviant causal 
chains, a more thorough analysis of the notion of a background 
condition, and so on. 
25 For the present purposes the important 
point is that if it is acceptable in general to maintain that a 
satisfactory singular statement of cause in any given case need 
not include a specification of all those conditions are required 
for a given effect to result, then we need not identify a purpose- 
built psychological category, that of motivation, as the locus of 
causal explanation for action. 
A full statement of an action's cause need include no reference 
to any motivation - though a motivation in such cases will form 
part of the background. In the circumstances (which here includes 
affective states of the agent) the man's belief that there was a 
bomb caused him to run away, even though he would not have done so 
if he had had no desire to avoid injury; equally, this desi " re 
caused him to run off, even though, with this desire, he would not 
have done so if he had not believed there was a bomb. This is not 
a case of causal overdetermination, but merely different 
descriptions of the action's cause relative to different 
specifications of the background. It shows the logical truth that 
a cause which is sufficient to bring about an event given an 
accompanying set of necessary conditions, can itself become 
embedded in such a set with respect to a different cause of the 
same event. 
If this argument is right, there cannot be any rigid 
distinction between classes of reasons for action based on a 
criterion of causal efficacy. Beliefs can figure among a person's 
reasons'for acting - in particular, beliefs embodying evaluations. 
The Humean objection to cognitivism, that it cannot account for 
the motivational capacity of moral values, is answerable if we 
reject the cognitivist assumption that there is this rigid 
dichotomy between reason, as a cognitive or representative 
faculty, and motivation, as the faculty which causes agents to 
act. 
Thus the Humean objection to cognitivism raised by Williams in 
the quotation above, that we need some explanation of how moral 
facts can make any claims on our agency, does not apply to the 
present account of evaluation. The cognitivist conceded that there 
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was a realm of facts, and sought to assimilate morality to this 
realm - thereby assuming the burden both of justifying this 
assimilation, and explaining how morality, so construed, can ever 
have any relevance to agency. The rival account, rejecting as it 
does any blank distinction of 'fact' from 'value', makes no 
ontological commitments about the status of moral obligations or 
judgments referring to them, and holds that the notion of 
evaluation is aplicable across the Humean psychological 
categories. On this view, to make an evaluation is not to report 
on some external state of affairs, but neither is it merely to 
report on, or express, some internal subjective state. 
26 
Williams' objection seems to be that we need to add something 
to a statement that an agent entertains a certain (moral) belief 
in order to impel him into acting - that something being a 
motivation. But if this is just a causal claim to the effect that 
a belief by itself is insufficient to cause any action, the same 
is equally true of motivation. Nor is it the case, given (tru , e) 
statements about an agent's motivation and his beliefs about how 
best to satisfy this motivation, that an appropriate action must 
ensue as an infallible causal consequence. This is not necessarily 
because of 
, 
akrasia, though that is one obvious possibility, and 
difficult to account for in the Humean scheme. 
27 but also because 
agents can often have reason to do that which they have other and 
better reason not to do. 
On the present account, then, the notion of an evaluation cuts 
across the Humean psychological categories, and cannot be 
allocated, as both the Humean and the cognitivist suppose, to 
either one of them exclusively. Reason, in the form of beliefs, 
can play a causal role in the explanation of agents' actions, and 
one of the ways (not the only one) in which it can do this is by 
making evaluative judgments which figure in a causal account of 
why an agent acted as he did. To this claim it may be objected 
that we need some explanation of how an agent reaches a belief of 
this sort. A Humean might further draw attention to the problem, 
already mentioned, which the cognitivist faces, concerning the 
apparent difference between the methodology of the natural 
sciences and the means by which we are meant, according to 
cognitivism, to discover moral truths: does not this alternative 
theory run into the same problem, that we have little idea of how 
to go about establishing moral truths? Unless this problem can be 
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solved, it may be said, we are left with a sharp difference 
between scientific and moral epistemology, a difference plausibly 
explained by a distinction of the form. drawn by Humean theory 
between facts and values as separate. ontic categories. 
There is little point in representing natural science and 
morality as sharing a common method of inquiry: but this does not 
show, even on a realist view of science, that the Humean 
psychological categories are necessarily beyond dispute. The claim 
that there is an independent physical world which scientific 
theory attempts to represent in its theorizing, even when coupled 
with the belief that the objects of moral evaluations are not, in 
this sense, independent, does not mean that the Humean categories 
must apply. For nothing has yet been said in this argument to 
suggest that there must correspond to the moral evaluations a 
specifically motivational psychological category. It is possible 
to accept that there is no independently existing realm of moral 
facts as conceived by cognitivism, while denying that we must see 
moral judgments as being produced by, or as expressing, 
motivations. 
The Humean needs this further claim in order to explain how, in 
his general scheme, morality can motivate agents to act. But if we 
reject this scheme, there need be no perplexity about how agents 
can be impelled to act morally: this perplexity need only arise if 
we conclude from the lack of any external moral realm which is the 
object of our cognitive representations that there must instead be 
subjective, and specifically motivational states which explain our 
moral judgments and their part in action. On the anti- 
foundationalist position outlined above, this conclusion does not 
follow. We can deny that there is any external moral realm while 
allowing moral beliefs that is, propositional attitudes 
embodying moral judgments to play an essential role in the 
causal explanation of action. 
The argument of this section so far has been that the Humean 
reason/motivation dichotomy needs to be replaced by an account of 
evaluation which cuts across these categories. One area in which 
the need for an alternative to Humean theory is particularly 
noticeable is its analysis of emotional states. As the passage 
quoted above from the Treatise 
, 
makes plain, Hume saw the emotions 
or tpassions' as 'original existences', which as such do not have 
'any representative quality, which renders [them] a copy of. any 
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other existence or modification'. It follows that there can be no 
question of emotions' being rational or irrational, since in 
Hume's view to experience an emotion-is to be in a state analogous 
or identical to a physiological condition such as thirst or 
sickness, and because the latter have no 'reference to any other 
object', the emotions, likewise, cannot be said to conform or fail 
to conform to reason. 
It is fair to say that this picture of the emotions has been an 
important factor in the dismissive attitude of instrumentalism 
towards political argument. It is this which, as much as anything, 
explains the neglect of rhetoric as a persuasive device in 
political dispute, and its academic neglect: any argument which 
makes use of rhetoric must be non-rational, because the 
rhetorician's appeal is directed at the emotions, and the emotions 
are by their nature non-rational. For this reason rhetoric is 
subjected to much the same opprobium as is suffered by emotivism 
as an ethical theory. 
28 
The latter is often attacked on the grounds that it is 
irrationalist, maintaining as it does that the meanings of our 
moral vocabulary, or the rules governing our use of moral 
utterances, are essentially statements or expressions of emotion - 
that a moral term actually expresses the emotions of the speaker, 
or else that the criterion by which we decide whether a given 
moral utterance has been made is whether it has mentioned or 
expressed an emotion of the speaker. But if it turns out that the 
emotions are rationally founded, contrary to the Humean claim, it 
is no longer possible to pin the charge of irrationalism on the 
emotivist: it will then be possible to accept one version or other 
of the emotivist thesis, while denying that this commits us to 
thinking of moral judgments as non-rational or irrational. 
Similarly, a non-Humean view of the emotions can deflect the 
charge made against both rhetoric and other forms of emotional 
appeal embodied in political argument, that they must be 
fundamentally non-rational methods of persuasion. If reason does 
play a part in the formation of emotional states, it becomes 
possible to claim both that political argument is rational, and 
that it includes rhetorical appeals in its armoury of persuasive 
techniques. 
In what follows I will sketch an alternative, non-Humean view 
of the emotions as affective states including an irreducible 
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cognitive component. The purpose of this will be heuristic, in the 
sense that the analysis is not intended to provide anything 
approaching a full theory of the emotions Instead the aim is to 
provide a basis from which to develop a reformulated version of 
emotivism free of the Humean assumptions informing traditional 
versions of emotivist theory. Once we have a clearer view of this 
alternative theory, it should be possible to give some account of 
the rationally persuasive character of political argument. 
It is undeniable that we do not, in ordinary language, 
predicate truth and falsity of emotions, as we do of beliefs. The 
Humean position obviously goes well beyond this, however, to deny 
that we can identify any rational component in the overall 
structure of an emotional state. Indeed, the Humean position as 
quoted above seems to deny even that emotions are intentional 
states - that they are directed towards some object - let alone 
the claim that emotions require the formation of some judgment in 
respect of the object. It is, despite this, a fact of language 
that we do speak of emotions as being object-directed in this 
way, 
29 that we talk of people as being angry at someone's 
betrayal, proud of their achievements, fearful of the 
consequences, and so on, in expressions for which the occurrence 
of the emotion-words sans phrase can be taken as convenient 
shorthand. Even where the object of the emotion is not given 
explicitly, it'would be odd to ascribe an emotion to someone while 
also admitting that there is no object whatsoever towards which 
the emotion is directed. We can, ambiguously, say of a person that 
he is frightened of, angry about, nothing. But on one reading, 
this statement ascribes a non-rational emotion to the person, 
while on the other, it ascribes no emotion at all - on one 
possible reading, to say of a person that she is frightened of 
nothing is to say that she is not frightened. 
It may be said that there are cases where an emotion is 
ascribed to a person in the absence, even implicitly, of any 
object towards which the emotion is directed. In response to the 
question why he is sad, a person may say that he is just sad, 
without being able to cite any reason - as Antonio remarks, for 
example, at the start of The Merchant of Venice30. And this seems 
to be a quite intelligible statement. In this form, however, the 
statement looks more inviting than an amplified version of it in 
which the person acknowledges that there is no object of his 
133 
sadness - that there is nothing he is sad about, or (still less 
invitingly) that he is sad about nothing, a claim which displays 
the same ambiguity as that considered in the previous paragraph. 
But perhaps sadness is peculiar in this respect, that it may in 
some cases resist explication of this form. It is, however, less 
plausible to think that this is true of a wide range of other 
emotions - fear, love, hatred, shame, envy, pride, contempt being 
some of the examples - where we would doubt the sincerity of 
rationality of a person who claimed to be under their influence 
while acknowledging that there was no object whatsoever towards 
which the emotion in question was directed. 
Both possibilities identified above may of course be 
(separately) realized: a person may be afraid of nothing either in 
the sense that he feels no fear, or that he fears without (good) 
cause. It is significant that our language of emotions admits of 
this ambiguity, and that both possibilities can be seen as cases 
of inappropriate or even, in extreme cases, irrational emotional 
responses. The division of possibilities suggests a composite 
structure for the emotions, in contrast with Hume's monadic 
theory. Stated in its crudest form, this composite theory would 
claim that emotions comprise a cognitive, object-directed 
component, together with an evaluation or attitude. It is a 
further question whether the object-directed component in all 
emotional states must take the form of full-blown beliefs; it 
might be said that we ascribe certain emotions, such as fear, to 
animals, without our thinking that they must therefore be capable 
of holding propositional attitudes about the object of their fear. 
In these cases, however, there is certainly an object of fear 
towards which the emotion is directed. 
In at least occurrent, as opposed to dispositional, examples 
of human emotion, indeed, there is reason to go further, and claim 
that these emotional states do include beliefs about their object. 
In the bomb case., for example, it is very odd to say that the 
person entertains no belief whatsoever about the object, and in 
effect impossible to rationalize his action of running away as the 
act of a frightened man without imputing quite specific beliefs to 
him in respect of this object. Examples like this suggest that one 
of our reasons for ascribing beliefs to persons experiencing 
emotions such as fear is the explanatory value of such ascriptions 
- assuming that the person holds a given belief is sometimes the 
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only means of rationalizing their behaviour. 
This is particularly clear in cases where the object of the 
emotion does not in fact exist. If there is no bomb, it is hard to 
make sense of the man's running away without imputing to him some 
such belief. Of course, it may be said that in such cases we need 
some independent means of deciding whether the action in question 
really is caused by fear or has some entirely different 
explanation (in which case we may well be obliged to redescribe 
the action itself). There is an evident danger of interpretative 
circularity in problematic cases like these: the action of running 
away may only be identifiable as such given the emotional 
explanation, while on the other hand we are only able to identify 
the emotion of fear through knowing that the person ran away. But 
whatever the success of efforts to break this circle, it is 
clearly intelligible that a person should act on a belief, true or 
false, which features as an essential component of the person's 
emotional state. And, as was argued above, in such cases the 
belief can be cited as the cause of the person's action. 
This does not of course pretend to be a complete account of the 
emotions, only to provide some idea of how reason, in the form of 
beliefs, can bring about emotional states. More would need to be 
said, for example, about the different ways in which emotions can 
be irrational, through false belief, through the inappropriateness 
of a (true) belief to the emotion, or the disproportion between 
the belief or its object, and the emotion. 
31 These cases provide 
further grounds for not identifying emotions with beliefs, since 
not all of them are instances where the irrationality of the 
emotion is to be attributed to false belief. A man may falsely 
believe that there is a bomb; but he may also be too frightened, 
or not enough, by some object. 
I These are questions concerning the relationship between the 
agent's belief and his emotional response. What is required is 
some general account of appropriateness: of how well, in other 
words, an agent's emotional responses accord with his beliefs. 
But, again, we should not assume that these possibilities call for 
some fuller causal account of the relationship between beliefs and 
emotional states. For it may be in the nature of the inappropriate 
responses that no rational account can be given: the criterion of 
a rational response may, reductively, be whether it can be 
causally explained by beliefs known to be, or plausibly thought to 
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be, held by the agent. With regard to the emotions, agents' 
actions are rational to whatever degree we are able to explain 
them as the causal product of (rational) beliefs. 
So far, then, this section has argued for the following claims: 
first, that beliefs, contrary to Hume's arguments, can operate as 
the causes of action, to the extent that the question what caused 
an agent to act in a certain way can intelligibly be answered by 
reference to a belief of the agent's; second, again contrary to 
Hume, that beliefs, qua representative cognitive states, are an 
essential component of emotional states, and our criteria in 
assessing the rationality or appropriateness of emotional 
responses include a consideration of the agent's beliefs. 
If these arguments are right, there is no force in the Humean 
claim that cognitive states necessarily lack motivational force, 
and reason can after all cause persons to act. This is not to 
point back towards a full-scale cognitivist theory of evaluation. 
But it does suggest how a set of shared evaluations can make 
interpretative sense of agents' behaviour. It need not, of course, 
be the case that evaluations are themselves the objects of the 
beliefs which form part of the emotional states: as in the bomb 
example, evaluation comes in at a different point, in our 
understanding of the relevance of a given belief to explaining the 
person's action. It is the existence of this shared context of 
evaluation which, as with other forms of social explanations, 
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makes. the action intelligible. 
Once it is recognized that evaluation comes in at this point, 
in determining criteria of relevance, the problem faced by 
cognitivism, that value has to be ontologized as part of the world 
in order to be knowable, no longer looks so threatening. We do not 
have to suppose that value is in any sense part of the ultimate 
fabric of the universe in order to account for evaluations of the 
sort present in emotional responses. At the same time, beliefs are 
not, as in Humean theory, entirely excluded from the analysis of 
such responses, since they are necessarily implicated in 
explaining persons' responses to objects (events, situations) in 
the external world. 
The significance of this analysis of the emotions for our 
concerns in this chapter is twofold. First, and more immediately, 
it provides an alternative to the Humean account of the passions 
by suggesting how emotional states can be rational or irrational. 
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As a result, rhetoric, as a mode of persuasion based partly on an 
appeal to the audience's emotions, can to this extent be a 
rational argumentative process, contrary to the assumptions 
underlying instrumentalist writings. in political theory. Second, 
this partially cognitive analysis of the emotions offers a more 
general challenge to the metaphysical assumptions behind 
instrumentalism. If it turns out that evaluations are not merely 
the projections of internal subjective states, but belong to a 
public context of evaluation, it is less easy to depict political 
argument as merely being a darkling plain where ignorant armies 
clash by night. The existence of shared standards of evaluation 
opens at least the possibility that argument can proceed 
rationally, rather than merely involving the exchange of 
incommensurable subjective values. 
This does not of course mean that the norms of rational 
interchange envisaged by, for example, Rawls, Ackerman or Habermas 
must therefore adequately model, even in an idealized form, the 
value-based disputes characteristic of political argument. 33 For 
one thing, nothing has been said so far to support the assumption 
made by these theorists that argument can only be rational if it 
is conducted within a set of procedures capable in principle of 
eliciting agreement. A counter-example to this model of rational 
discourse need not invoke the possibility that two wholly alien 
cultures may confront one another in some situation of conflict 
while each remains true to its own canons of rationality. It may 
simply be, within a unitary culture, that there is more than one 
rationally arguable position in some cases of political or moral 
disagreement, and no method agreed by the disputants for achieving 
consensus. 
This response to the discursive model of rationality only holds 
up, of course, if there is no rational requirement to reach 
consensus in (practical, political, moral, etc. ) judgments. It 
might be thought, however, that the foregoing argument was based 
precisely on this possibility, that consensus in evaluations is a 
condition of rational intelligibility in understanding, for 
example, others' emotional responses. If so, it may be said, 
something like the Ackerman/ Habermas model of discursive 
rationality must underlie this account, since otherwise there 
would be nothing to guarantee the rational acceptability of some 
patterns of emotional response rather than others. 
137 
But it does not follow from the fact that there are consensual 
patterns of evaluation which render emotional responses rationally 
intelligible, that as a condition of. rational discourse there must 
be standards of argument which necessarily produce agreement among 
the participants. For, to adopt. a Wittgensteinian form of 
argument, it may be that there are certain general conditions on 
intelligibility - Wittgenstein's agreement in judgments - within 
which discussion (either within a specific culture or in human 
discourse generally) must proceed. Given these general conditions, 
however, there may be disagreement within the consensual 
parameters. In the case of moral judgments, there may be certain 
general features which any utterance must display in order to 
count as such a judgment, even though this leaves wide scope for 
disagreement over its content. Similarly, with emotional responses 
there may be some general characteristics which we can identify as 
comprising such responses, without there being any means of 
adjudicating between two conflicting assessments of a person's 
response to a given situation. In such cases, it is familiar that 
there can be this divergence, with each side able to offer some 
reason by way of accounting for their judgment, but unable to 
invalidate the other's judgment. 
As a means of clarifying the thesis for which this chapter is 
arguing, it is helpful to compare Aristotle's observations on the 
role of 'o , pinion' (endoxa) in rhetorical practical syllogisms, to 
which the present argument is indebted. 34 Aristotle focuses on the 
incomplete syllogism or enthymeme, as a typical argumentative 
structure deployed in political rhetoric: the enthymeme differs 
from the full syllogism in that one of its premisses is not 
explicitly stated, but remains implicit, as an opinion which, 
though not apodeictically certain, is presumptively true. For 
example, Aristotle says35 that to show that someone was victor in 
a contest in which the prize was a crown, it is enough to say that 
he won a victory at the Olympic games, as everyone knows that the 
prize at the games is a crown, the remaining information being 
filled in by the audience. 
Political arguments, analogously, can make appeals to the 
emotions while presupposing evaluations which remain implicit. 
Here the assumption is that there is some community of evaluation 
which makes implicit assumptions about value in interpreting 
political arguments. This may, of course, go well beyond arousing 
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an audience to feel a particular emotion, though it covers thatý 
possibility: for example, to make an argument against a proposedl 
policy, it is often-enough to assert that it has a consequencel 
which can immediately be recognized as undesirable, without the'!, 
need to say so explicitly. To claim that a policy of raisingý 
interest rates will discourage investment presupposes, and needý i 
not state directly, that discouraging investment is undesirable. ý, 
In the same way a rhetorician may be able to induce a certainý 
emotional response in an audience merely by getting them to accepti, 
a particular belief, leaving the underlying evaluation implicit., 
For example, it may be enough, in order to move an audience to 
feel anger or contempt towards a person, to give them evidence 
that he has betrayed them. The speaker's task is to persuade them 
that this is so, not to make them accept the underlying evaluation'ý 
that traitors should be the object of such emotions. 
We can, then, regard political argument as aiming in part to 
induce an audience to form emotional attitudes towards policies. or 
persons, by persuading them to form judgments or beliefs. The 
elliptical nature of much political argument presupposes thati, 
there are to a considerable degree shared evaluations to which a 
speaker tries to appeal in making an argument. This clearly goes 
beyond the Humean-inspired instrumentalist claim that there is 
nothing to be said about rational persuasion in political 
argument: the possibilities mentioned above concern a speaker's 
efforts to persuade an audience to accept some judgment or belief. ', 
The faculty-division of Humean psychology seems to preclude such 
possibilities. 
At the same time, there is little prospect that we will be able 
to provide some form of ultimate rational foundation for political 
(or any other) argument, as a means of persuasion. To argue as 
this chapter has that. we can identify rational techniques of 
persuasion is not to claim that it is possible to produce a set of 
neutral procedures, which could tell us what judgments to induce 
in an audience in any given circumstances, and how to achieve 
this. The Humean is at least right to this extent, that there can 
be no ultimate rational foundations of this kind for argument. But 
this does not mean that there is nothing at all to say about 
rational persuasion in politics. As Skinner and others have 
36 
argued, there are forms of argument which it is rational for a 
speaker to use given, for example, pre-existing linguistic 
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conventions governing what can or must be said to elicit a certain 
response from an audience. While the judgments which, on Skinner's 
neo-Wittgensteinian view, are implicit in. the possibility of -such 
communication cannot be given any ultimate foundation, there can 
still be rational argument within the conventions, a point 
neglected by the reductive views Sk inner attacks, which regard 
principled arguments as irrelevant to the real business of 
politics. 
To accept the existence of this shared evaluative background is 
not, however, to abandon the pluralistic view of value which has 
already been advanced. The claim that there are these implicit 
evaluations does not require a unitary theory of value in general. 
For it does not follow from the fact that there are shared 
evaluations embodied in a normative vocabulary or, more broadly, 
underlying emotional responses, that these evaluations must be 
reducible to some single dimension of value, nor that certain 
values enjoy absolute priority over others. It is quite compatible 
with the Skinnerian position to claim that values conflict with 
each other in practical action, or that their translation into 
action may be practically ambiguous. Political decision-making is 
not merely a matter of deciding which values are of practical 
relevance in relation to a particular issue of policy, and then 
proceeding to implement the favoured policy. This is the 
supposition of instrumentalism, but there is no reason to assume, 
even in the presence of unitary values, that the translation from 
value to policy must be straightforward. 
It is in this area, if anywhere, the gap between policy and 
value, that political argument is located. Treatments of political 
conflict have perhaps concentrated excessively on the grander 
cases of confrontation between opposed values, neglecting the more 
humdrum possibility that this conflict may take place not between 
absolutely opposed values, but between opposed ideas about how 
values translate into policy, or about how different values have 
to be weighed against one another in a given question of policy. 
This is not to deny that there are, in democratic political 
cultures, deep and value-based differences between for example the 
ideologies of socialist egalitarianism and free-market 
individualism, though even here it is important to remember that 
there are certain institutional features of these cultures which 
accentuate conflict. But accepting that dispute at this level may 
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be irreducible to any common values does not explain the 
phenomenology of political conflict. As Skinner has persistently 
argued, we still need-some explanation, accepting these aspects of 
conflict, of how politicians can,. in the face of these 
differences, engage in argument and commend policies to their 
audience as most successfully promoting accepted values. 
Instrumentalism, by contrast, is inclined to regard political 
disputes as characterized by differences of tactics in the 
presence of an agreed strategy. On this view, the existence of 
endemic political conflict merely shows that there are thought to 
be different routes to an agreed destination, for example 
maximizing welfare. But the fact that politicians of different 
parties may claim to pursue similar (macro-economic, etc. ) 
objectives does not show that all political disagreement is about 
what means to adopt in pursuance of agreed ends. There is the 
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point, due to Wiggins, that in deliberation generally practical 
reasoning can deal not only with the best causal means to secure 'a 
fixed end, but also, given some desired objective, what best 
counts as fulfilling the objective. 
While there may be some procedure for rationally resolving 
disputes of the first kind, at least where there are agreed 
methods of balancing out the costs of implementation, there is 
little reason to think that this carries over to disputes of the 
second kind. Within a shared commitment to the value of liberty, 
for example, a conservative may argue that a proposed measure 
regulating the workings of trade unions promotes freedom, while a 
socialist argues no less vigorously that the measure diminishes 
freedom. In the senses in which the protagonists intend their 
respective claims, of course, it may do both, but the significant 
point is that the policy cannot, in the light of this, merely be 
seen as offering one causal route to an end which is practically 
agreed. Consensus at the level of value can mask radical and often 
irreconcilable disputes about the practical implications of value. 
The reductivism of the means-end view of political dispute becomes 
all the more plain when the perspective is widened to include 
disputes over how different and mutually irreducible values may 
bear upon an issue of policy. Here, a fortiori, a nominally shared 
commitment to a set of values may remain even though different 
political groupings have implacably opposed views on the practical 
policies sanctioned by those values. 
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The claim that political argument requires shared evaluations 
does not then preclude a pluralistic theory of value. It is 
possible to maintain that the forms of argument deployed by 
politicians presuppose, if they are to be intelligible, values 
which are in some sense shared with their audience, while also 
acknowledging that there need be no single course of policy which 
is clearly dictated by considerations of value. Whether or not 
policy disagreements take the form of a conflict between opposed 
values, or the differing practical conclusions drawn from a single 
value by those involved in the dispute, there is no reason to 
think that, at the level of practical agency, there must be some 
agreed procedure for resolving the dispute. 
Instrumentalism falsely claims that all such disputes must be 
rationally terminable by reference to ends which are themselves 
non-rationally given. On the present view, by contrast, political 
. 
dispute is characteristically not open to rational resolution in 
the light of agreed ends: there is often no single demonstrably 
correct answer to questions of policy. An understanding of the 
complex relationship between political argument and the values to 
which its protagonists appeal means accepting that pluralism is an 
inevitable feature of political debate and that one of its most 
characteristic manifestations is in political conflict -a truth 
which is most clearly attested by the absence of any agreed 
solution to problems of policy, and the invocation by each side of 
values which they claim to support or be furthered by their 
favoured policy. 
It is, however, important to remember that value-pluralism in 
political conflict is not necessarily to be taken as an indication 
that there is no room for rational argument in politics. The fact 
that there are conflicting policies in some matter of public 
concern, with no means of reducing their supporters to rational 
agreement over which should be adopted, does not mean that no 
rational claims whatsoever can be advanced by the parties to the 
debate in arguing their case. It would, indeed, be strange if this 
were so, since it would leave political argument inexplicable: the 
gap cannot be wide, in general, between the forms of (ostensible) 
rationalizations which the parties make of their policy proposals 
and, on the other hand, the forms of explanation which an observer 
could offer to reconstruct the rational grounds on which these 
arguments were made. Only if there is this possibility of giving a 
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rational explanation of why a person made the argument he did can i 
we begin to make sense of political argument - which is not to say! 
that we have to think-that the real rationale for such an argument! 
is the same as its purported rationale. 
This point about understanding holds even though there is noý 
final rational method for assessing th e arguments presented in theiý 
course of a political debate. But this does not mean thatý, 
political decision-making is wholly arbitrary. One reason for thisýý 
is implicit in what has already been said about the constraintsý 
within which politicians operate in making their arguments, ofý 
rational comprehensibility. If the appeals made by politicall 
arguments are directed towards interests or evaluations which the 
audience is intended to recognize, it is unlikely that someone 
deciding between the arguments for competing policies will regard 
it as merely arbitrary which to accept. This is due to the point, 
38 
made by Raz, that even where an agent is confronted with a 
choice between alternatives, such as two different careers, 
neither of which is clearly preferable to the other, it does not 
therefore become a matter of indifference which career is chosen, 1 
as it would with a choice between two identical quantities of theý 
same good, or goods with uniform relative weightings. Indecisioni 
between a pair of practical alternatives may be a sign not of 
indifference but precisely of the importance attached to them. 
Utilitarianism notably fails to account for this distinction, 
regarding such cases as merely involving similiar quantities of a, 
single, homogeneous good. But it does not follow from the factý 
that a person prefers neither of pair of goods to the other that, ' 
it must be a matter of complete indifference to him which of theý 
two he has. The lack of a decisive preference may be evidence of' 
indifference, in the utilitarian's sense; but it may indicate' 
instead that there is no single scale on which to measure the!, 
claims to be made on behalf of each of the goods. They may be so, 
disparate as to preclude this sort of comparison. They are each,!, 
nonetheless, goods, and an agent may be rationally concerned aboutýý 
which should be chosen. 
Rational concern may as often emerge in an inability to decideý 
between alternatives. There may be no solution through the 
application of some uniform calculative method, such as 
utilitarianism purportedly offers, to decision-making. The way 
from indecision to action lies not through the discovery of such a 
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rational explanation of why a person made the argument he did can 
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method, but through recognizing that one is faced with a decision 
between values, or between interpretations of value. But t', 
i little reason to think that any definitive rational procedure canj 
be laid down for this decision. An agent's conception of rational! 
choice may itself depend on which 
. 
of. a set of competing values hel 
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chooses, as Kierkegaard, for example, makes clear in Either/ Or. i i 
To this extent, any choice involving fundamental values, politicali I 
decisions among them, is a matter of deciding which values tol 
follow and how to apply them in practice. 
IV 
As commentators have pointed out, the absence of any rigid'i, 
rule-governed procedure for practical deliberation does not showý 
that there can be no distinction at all between acceptable andl 
unacceptable forms of argument. We may, even in cases of radical:, 
indecision, be able to dismiss certain practical proposals -as! 
being clearly out of the question, though this may not come aDout:, 
as the result of deliberation - an obvious way in which a 
possibility can be rejected is by its never being entertained. 
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Here we should certainly regard anyone who did seriously consider 
such a possibility as having gone wrong in some way, or as failing, 
to understand the limits within which deliberation takes place. 
But these limits are not to be seen, as in utilitarianism, as 
set ends to which all deliberation must be understood as devising 
means, nor, as in the Kantian brand of instrumentalism, as having 
been dictated by a class of reasons which have categorical weight 
in practical deliberation. A more adequate understanding of 
practical deliberation, whether public or private, than that 
offered by instrumentalism accepts that there is more room for 
deliberative manoeuvre than any hierarchical or means-end view of 
practical reasoning acknowledges and that such constraints as do 
bear upon reasoning may apply without either remaining static or 
being precise in their scope. 
It should be noted that none of the above analysis relies on 
the assumption that there is any structural difference between 
individual and collective practical reasoning. All the arguments 
so far could still be true even if it were the case., as 
instrumentalism assumes, that the structures of practical 
reasoning which apply at the level of individual deliberation are 
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applicable also to collective deliberation. Kantianism most 
clearly takes this course, by regarding the circumstances of 
political action as -not merely analogous to, but identical with, 
the situation of the individual agent: the conditions in which 
politicians take their decisions, - for Kant, must conform to z: 
universal rational pattern. While the utilitarian is not aE 
explicit as this about the reduction of all practical agency tc 
the level of the individual, the same aggregative procedures, of 
assessing the relative intensity of preferences, apply in each 
case. 
While it is true that utilitarianism in, for example, the 
theories of Parfit and Regan has addressed itself to problems of 
coordinating individuals' actions so as to achieve the best 
overall outcome, both these treatments take individual preferences 
themselves as fixed (albeit idealized in certain respects), and 
see the role of public policy as limited to deciding, given these 
preferences, how best to satisfy them. Though this is not the same 
as modelling collective decision procedures on individual 
deliberation (the individual agent need not go through the process 
of weighing relative intensities of preferences against one 
another), the persuasive aspect of political debate disappears, 
and with it the possibility that a new understanding of public 
action can emerge through debate. 
This chapter has tried to indicate some ways in which practical 
reasoning, even at the individual level, goes beyond the limits 
imposed on it by instrumentalism, and to draw some conclusions for 
our understanding of politics. The starting-point for an 
alternative to instrumentalism lies in questioning the 
Enlightenment philosophical psychology underlying much of its 
thinking. This means abandoning any rigid distinction of 'reason, 
and 'passion' as presupposed, in their different ways, by botl 
Humean and Kantian theory. 
In its place, we should adopt a notion of evaluation which cuts 
across the Enlightenment psychological categories. While this 
alternative notion would not pretend to provide a general theory 
of rational action from which the content of morality could be 
inferred, it would make possible a better understanding of moral 
and other concerns as they feature in political debate. If we 
abandon the Kantian notion of a deliberative hierarchy, it becomes 
clearer that political rationality may consist not merely ir 
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conformity to categorical norms of action, but in a recognition 
that moral considerations do not always enjoy absolute priority in 
political decision-making. It is-.. the mark of rationality to 
recognize that there is no decision- theoretic formula which can 
dissolve political conflict in the way Kant and his followers have 
supposed. 
Whether or not there are formal differences marking off moral 
from non-moral reasons for action, pluralism (in the broader sense 
distinguished above) holds that there can be no absolute priority 
among classes of reasons for action. If Kantianism is abandoned, 
and we take the view that there are no categorically binding moral 
reasons for action, we remove one justification for political 
neutrality as proposed, for example, by Larmore - that the limits 
of the political are marked by a principle of equal respect, which 
applies generally, and demarcates the legitimate area of public 
intrusion on individuals' pursuit of their conception of value. 
Without this reliance on the categorical status of certain moral 
obligations, it is hard to see what compelling reason there is for 
the separation of public from private fields of action, 
particularly in a theory such as Larmore's which, unlike Kant's, 
operates with a wide-ranging form of pluralism in civil society. 
A full commitment to pluralism requires the rejection of 
neutralist theories such as Rawls' and Larmorels, which confine 
the role of public policy to implementing or working within agreed 
conceptions of value. The two-level pluralism distinguished 
earlier precludes any such rigid division of public from private 
realms: pluralism at the level of value itself, where there may be 
no single scale on which to compare different values, and at the 
level of action, where even within a single value it may be 
indeterminate what practical action the value sanctions or 
requires. Looked at like this, pluralism can manifest itself in 
uncertainty over what forms of practical policy are favoured by 
neutrality, unless the Larmorean liberal can show that the 
commitment to neutrality is itself value-neutral. As should be 
clearby now, the problem in showing this is that different value- 
based commitments give rise to differing perceptions of what areas 
are neutral, and how the terms of competition between value-free 
and value-based concerns are to be set. A consequence. of the 
diversity of value is that there can be conflicting attitudes 
towards politics and the scope of its operations. Neutrality is 
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breached if the political order institutionalizes one conception 
of this scope over others. 
In rejecting neutrality, we are not forced to stipulate some 
other, presumably wider, scope for legitimate political 
intervention in citizens' personal lives. It is Larmore's 
complaint that previous liberal theory has adopted an 
lexpressivist' theory of the state, 
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according to which, as in 
Rawls' theory, the political arrangements of a society embody 
substantial moral ideals: such ideals, in Larmore's view, ought to 
be confined to civil society. But Larmore ends by producing an 
expressivist theory of his own, as the basis for neutrality itself 
proves to be a moral ideal. The significant point, however, is 
that we need not react to the problems in Larmore's account by 
substituting an alternative, avowedly anti-neutral theory of the 
relationship between state and civil society, endowing the state 
with a rich array of moral attributes. Instead, we should 
recognize that an acceptance of the full pluralism outlined above 
leaves it indeterminate how the relationship of state to civil 
society is to be conceived, and what part, if any, moral ideals 
can play in mediating this relationship. The same considerations 
of value-based indeterminacy apply equally to the wider question - 
which must always itself be political - of the role of politics in 
wider human concerns. 
On this view there can be no final philosophical account, as 
recent works of neutralist theory have aimed to provide, of the 
legitimate bounds of political action. This is not to claim that 
we cannot draw any effective distinction between the categories of 
public and private, nor that it is impossible to provide any 
philosophical theory of what counts, at any given time, as the 
political - though it is implied by the arguments of this chapter 
that we could not identify certain concerns as intrinsically 
political, except at an unhelpfully general level. our notion of 
the political is closely involved at any time with what goods we 
value and how far we think political processes capable of securing 
them. To make more sense of this notion than instrumentalism does, 
we need to recognize that politics cannot merely occupy the 
negative space left by (suitably mediated) private conceptions of 
value. Our understanding of value and its practical ramifications 
in part results from involvement in political argument. And that 
means that argument in politics is a rational process - 
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enlightening us about our commitments and about what, given these 
commitments, we have good reason to value. 
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Chapter Five 
Rationality and Politics 
Political Rationality 
I 
In the last chapter I examined the Enlightenment doctrines 
forming the basis of instrumentalism and questioned the rigid 
distinction between cognition and motivation. Enlightenment 
philosophical psychology, as it has featured in modern 
instrumentalist writings, has invoked this distinction in 
depicting political life as being minimally subject to rational 
correction: the concerns of politics are, on this view, exhausted 
by means-end calculations, of how best to promote objectives which 
are themselves taken as given. The link between such apparently 
diverse theories as utilitarianism and Kantianism lies in their 
common assumption that there can be no rational debate over ends 
in politics. Whatever ends political agents may promote are 
subject in Kant's view to the veto of morality, and conditioned, 
both in Kantianism and utilitarianism, by motivations which are 
definitionally non-rational. 
This Enlightenment style of thinking has left a profound mark 
on modern liberal philosophy. But it has also left liberalism with 
a large problem. If we accept that the final ends of political 
action are determined by extra-political considerations - by, for 
example, the 'conceptions -of the good' held by individuals or 
groups in civil society - we have to face the fact that 
irreducibly different and incompatible conceptions of value are 
competing for statutory advantage or public funding. Given this 
fact, how is the post-Enlightenment liberal to retain the view of 
politics as concerned solely with instrumental calculation, as 
there are a number of mutually inconsistent final ends which it is 
politically possible to promote? It is not merely that public 
resources are finite, that some must prosper at others' expense. 
Rather, in some cases, there could be no rapprochement between the 
values held by different groups within civil society, as they 
logically exclude one another. In questions of public censorship, 
for example, there is no means of reconciling the wishes of those 
favouring license with those favouring restriction. 
This liberal quandary springs directly from the attempt to 
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combine instrumentalism with a belief in the plurality of value. 
The work of Rawls and Dworkin' can be seen as liberal efforts to 
resolve this problem. On the face of it, the gap can be narrowed 
from either direction - either by denying that pluralism leads tc 
unresolvable conflicts of value, or by limiting the scope within 
which politics can operate, leaving a pluralistic civil society in 
the space which it vacates. These varieties of response are 
versions of neutrality, the claim that political institutions and 
policy should, as far as possible, remain impartial between 
competing conceptions of value, with more or les's optimism about 
the prospects of reconciliation between conflicting values. 
As has already been argued, we should be sceptical about both 
of these forms of neutralist claim. In Rawls' theory, it is 
doubtful whether the 'construction'2 which he now prefers as a 
method of modelling moral consensus will produce a set of 
political institutions embodying shared values or policies 
commanding universal assent. Similarly, the neutralist attempt. to 
resolve the problem, by portraying the public realm as a minimal 
residuum left over when private conceptions of value have been 
accounted for, fails to recognize that the clash between values 
may emerge through rival views of where political action is 
appropriate or justifiable. The means of arbitration between 
values sought by the neutralist appears to be unavailable. 
Towards the end of the last chapter I sketched an alternative 
method for understanding value and its relationship to politics to 
that offered by Enlightenment-influenced liberalism. This 
alternative would dispense with any sharp psychological or 
ontological division between -reason and motivation of the forlr- 
presupposed by both Humean and Kantian theory. If we reject this 
dichotomy several consequences follow. First, we should not think 
in terms of any hard ontic distinction of 'fact' and 'value', the 
former representing external states of affairs in the world and 
the latter internal affective states of agents. Second, we should 
abandon the idea that philosophical reflection on morality must 
divide itself into theories construing morality as representing 
states of affairs, and on the other hand theories reducing 
morality to purported objectifications of agents' internal states. 
Third, there is no warrant, once the distinction is questioned, 
for supposing that there is a basis for the psychological faculty- 
division of reason and motivation in the latter's alleged causal 
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role in action. 
It is worth pausing to consider some of the consequences of 
these remarks. Most obviously, it becomes doubtful whether 
practical reasoning in general, and its political aspect in 
particular, can be dealt with satisfactorily by the purely 
executive account of rational agency offered both by Hume and 
3 Kant. We cannot regard practical rationality as involving only 
the calculation, from given motivations, of the best means to 
satisfy them. As has already been observed, one of the problems 
faced by neutralist liberalism is that it gives little guidance as 
to how we should deal with political decisions where there are 
different and inconsistent objectives which can be promoted 
through policy. Without any neutral procedure for deciding between 
them, there is not much to show how the instrumental view of 
practical reasoning can account for the fact that political action 
often involves choices between competing ends. 
These comments apply quite generally to the Enlightenment 
theories of rationality under discussion, not only to political 
action - the theories have the same problem in coping with the 
idea that an individual agent may be faced with choices between 
final ends. A further assumption made by instrumentalism is that 
collective action can be seen as a vector product of the desires 
of individual members of the society. Given this reducibility, 
political action becomes a collective analogue of the processes 
followed by individuals in arriving at a practical decision. The 
same procedures, of selecting those motivations which present 
themselves as strongest, and devising means of satisfying them, 
are applicable, on this view, to both individual and collective 
decision-making. This reducibility produces a view of political 
action as only rational to the extent that it devises the best 
means of achieving ends given in advance, and determined wholly by 
individuals' motivations or preferences. 
This account of political deliberation is supported by the 
fact/value distinction. Individuals' preferences are taken as 
fixed data which have to be serviced by those who take political 
decisions: the politician's role is reduced, on this basis, to 
providing relevant information about how to achieve determinate 
ends. The evaluative side of political argument can only be 
explained in these terms as the expression by politicians of 
individuals' fundamentally non-rational preferences. This leaves 
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it unclear how liberal theorists can produce any conclusive 
argument, by their own standards of rationality, for belief in 
neutrality as the supreme political value; or how to support the 
pluralistic doctrines which liberals have traditionally professed 
when pluralism is presumably to be seen as merely another non- 
rational preference. 
A further consequence of the Enlightenment schematism, which 
again unites the seemingly disparate theories of Kantianism and 
utilitarianism, is their common denial that there is any insoluble 
conflict between morality and the values promoted by political 
action. Kant's remarks on the difference between the 'political 
moralist' and the 'moral politician, 
4 
make it clear that politics 
plays only a subservient or residual role in action. Similarly, 
utilitarian theory regards actions as either morally required or 
proscribed - either a given course of action maximizes utility 
(however explicated, and relative to context) or not, and there is 
no sense in the idea that political action may run afoul of moral 
requirements. This again tells against one version of pluralism, 
that value is sufficiently diverse to leave us uncertain in some 
situations as to how best we should go about acting in accordance 
with our ideas of value. 
This chapter aims to set out an alternative basis for 
understanding politics and its relationship with value, beginning 
from the critique of the Enlightenment theories offered in the 
last chapter. The next section will prepare some of the ground by 
providing a theoretical account of evaluative judgments which 
tries to retain standards of judgmental correctness while stopping 
short of full-blown cognitivism. This will not mean abandoning 
pluralism entirely, for reasons which will be given in the next 
section. But it will signal the end of the neutralist hope for a 
state which can arbitrate impartially between competing ideals of 
value. 
This will not however be a restatement, as might be thought 
from this brief description, of classical Millian liberalism, 
favouring a form of pluralism within a quite definite conception 
of the desirable society - one with the maximum possible 
individuality, creative living, free expression and so forth. The 
point is not that these are not goods in themselves, but that 
there may be other goods with which the pursuit of such a society 
conflicts. A full commitment to pluralism acknowledges that there 
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is no single dominant set of values which society should promote, 
and no way of structuring political institutions from 
considerations of value, as Rawls aims to do: that is, the 
institutions are designed to conform to a conception of justice, 
and this is held to be the supreme social and political value. 
Pluralism subverts the aim, which in political philosophy dates 
back at least as far as Plato, of institutionalizing morality 
5 through political structures. In place of this, there can only be 
the acceptance that these structures themselves play an important 
role in deciding what conceptions of value are current within a 
society and how far it is possible to live in accordance with 
them. 
This account obviously requires a realignment of the state- 
civil society relationship offered by neutrality. Some remarks 
towards this end will be offered later in the chapter. But first 
we need to establish a more solid foundation for pluralism while 
retaining standards of relevance and appropriateness in judgments. 
The next section will attempt to achieve this by developing a 
projectivist account of value. 
ii 
As the last chapter argued, we should reject the idea that 
philosophical reflection on value divides into two jointly 
exhaustive positions, cognitivism and noncognitivism. If we accept 
the fact/value gap, the noncognitivist criticism goes through, 
that the cognitivist has no explanation of how moral beliefs can 
motivate agents to act. But this criticism has less force if we 
reject the distinction in favour of a more holistic pattern of 
explanation, according to which we should not assign the causal 
antecedents of action to a distinct psychological faculty, such as 
that (in Humean theory) of motivation, but rather think of 
6 
causation in Davidsonian terms, as making sense only in relation 
to a specification of background conditions. Thus we should see 
action as consisting not in the conjunction of a causal statement 
about an agent's belief coupled with a further statement about his 
motivation, but in the applicability to the agent of an overall 
explanatory schema which includes essential reference to his 
beliefs and desires. In saying this, we do not reject the Humean 
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view that action is to be regarded as the outcome of beliefs and 
desires of the agent; but claim that the differences between 
beliefs and desires- as factors in action does not consist in 
causal properties supposedly peculiar to desires. 
This altered view of agency breaks down the instrumentalist 
assumption that there is a radical difference of type between 
cognition and motivation. On the instrumentalist view of agency, 
motivation is a brute fact in the world, beyond rational 
correction, while beliefs can only signify states of affairs in 
the world. 7 If motivation had any cognitive component, it would no 
longer be capable of producing states of affairs in the world, 
because it would merely record them. There is then in Humean 
theory no possibility that desires can undergo rational 
correction. All that can happen is that an agent's motivational 
set alters for some non-rational (eg psychological) reason. One of 
the consequences of this is that political persuasion, understood 
as a method of rationally inducing agents to alter their desires 
(as opposed to the means of satisfying them), is impossible 
because it is in the nature of desires to be unalterable. Thus 
instrumentalism rejects rhetorical persuasion as either 
ineffectual, since aimed at changing the unalterable, or else non- 
rational. Either way, rhetoric is dismissed as an essentially 
disreputable form of argument. 
But if we reject the Humean bipartition between reason and 
passion there is less warrant for this dismissal, or for the 
thought that rational persuasion is alien to political (or other 
forms of) argument. In developing an alternative to 
instrumentalism on non-Humean foundations, it is important to 
appreciate that what has been said does nothing to overturn an 
emotivist account of value along the lines Hume is often thought 
to have proposed, though it does require a different picture of 
the structure of emotions to Hume's own. 
This different picture does indeed demand an account of the 
relationship between value and the emotions which differs from 
that offered by standard emotivist theory, since these have 
usually rested more or less explicitly on a Humean view of the 
emotions. On the most basic version of the theory, for example, a 
statement of value was straightforwardly reducible to a first- 
personal statement expressive or descriptive of some emotion of 
the speaker, construed as a qualitative internal state. Thus in 
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Stevenson's theory, 8 'This is good' means something like 11 ! 
approve of this coupled with a prescription that others also 
feel approval. 
This gloss on moral judgments, combining as it does an attempt 
to explain both the speaker's attitude and his attempt to 
prescribe to others what attitudes they should feel towards the 
object, faces insuperable problems when coupled with a Humean view, 
of such attitudes as incorrigible psychological states. If. as, 
Hume states, 'passions' are 'original existences', 
9 
without any 
reference to external objects, as beliefs have, it is hard to seeý 
how the Humean account of valuation can be sustained with the 
alleged prescriptivity of moral judgments. There is no reason to 
think that one person's subjective valuation of an object can beý 
altered by another's prescriptions concerning that object. Humeaný; 
philosophical psychology reduces a Stevensonian view of the 
meaning of moral statements to the conclusion that these 
statements are, most of the time, entirely ineffectual. 
Something like the Stevensonian account becomes more plausible, 
however, if we abandon the Humean assumption that psychological 
states such as those involved in this form of valuation must 
exclude a cognitive component. If it is possible that these statesi. 
embody cognitive judgments about objects, a Stevensonian account 
of the nature of evaluative judgments looks more inviting. It tnený 
becomes possible to explain the prescriptive element in a moral orl, 
other evaluative judgment as not merely stating some subjectivelý 
personal preference, but as embodying rational judgments. Thereýý 
need be no answer to the question whether these rational judgmentslý 
are made concerning some external realm of facts as traditionallyý; 
interpreted by moral realism. Instead, this revised form of! 
emotivist account of value would assign to emotional states a non-ý 
contingent role in the formation of moral judgments, but would'I 
link the rationality of such judgments to beliefs involved in such! 
states. 
On the revised version of emotivism, then, there would be noý 
suggestion that moral judgments were merely statements of 
subjective preference, as on standard Humean emotivist theory. 
Indeed., the subjectivity of the emotions themselves would to someý 
extent be compromised on the revised account. It would still of 
course be true that emotions were ascribed to specific persons. 
But the ascription of an emotion to an agent would occur within a 
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broader interpretative context which serves to rationalize and 
explain the emotion. To rationalize an emotion in this sense is to 
provide a reason or set of reasons for the emotion's having 
occurred, and these reasons depend on the agent's beliefs - that 
is, the explanatory value of these reasons is conditional upon 
their referring at least tacitly to the agent's beliefs. In this 
sense there is only reason to impute an emotional state to an 
agent if there is an appropriate public context for doing so, 
which rationalizes the emotion by interpreting actions in terms of 
beliefs the agent has or may for independent reasons be assumed to 
have. 
This form of interpretation, ascribing beliefs to agents as a 
means of understanding their emotional states, is clearly only 
possible if there are agreed norms of behaviour on the basis of 
which we can interpret actions arising from emotions. The 
rationality of emotional states consists in our being able to 
ascribe to persons emotions which are explicable given beliefs 
they are known to hold or could reasonably be expected to hold. 
This need not result in behaviourism, since it is not always the 
case that the grounds on which the relevant belief is imputed to 
the agent is the fact of his being in the emotional state itself. 
Our best reasons for holding agents to be in emotional states is 
the adequacy of the explanatory schemata which claim that such 
states exist and explain certain forms of behaviour. 
Traditional forms of emotivist theory sought to establish a 
relationship between moral utterances and the rules for expressing 
emotions in language. These attemps attracted a good deal of 
criticism on the grounds that no general rules exist to compel a 
speaker to express some emotion whenever he is making a moral 
judgment. 10 As far as this goes, the criticism is certainly 
justified: there are no general rules which require a speaker to 
express emotion in making such a judgment (which is not to deny 
that in some cases it may be impossible to grasp the sense of a 
moral utterance without recognizing in it certain locutions 
expressive of emotion). If we abandon the project of finding any 
such general linguistic relationship between morality and the 
emotions, however, it still seems plausible to suppose that 
emotional states play an important role both in persons' 
dispositions to moral judgment and in their moral actions. 
Thus the claim is not that it is a condition of making any 
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intelligible moral utterance that it uses terms expressive of 
emotion. It is only too obvious that there are moral judgments 
whose expression need make no use whatever of terms directly 
indicating the speaker's emotions. At the same time, however, it 
is plain that terms which do play an essential part in the making 
of moral judgments may themselves require for their correct use 
that the speaker feels a certain emotional attitude towards the 
subject of moral appraisal. In this case, it would be claimed that 
at least some moral expressions demand in order to be understood 
that the speaker is taken to feel and express a certain emotion. 
This would not make some ultimate reductive claim, as was made by 
old-style emotivism, that there is nothing more to the making of 
moral statements than expressing emotions, or that the criterion 
by which we decide whether a moral utterance has been made is 
whether an expression of emotion has been used. But this revised 
emotivist position would hold that there are cases where the 
expression of emotion does enter, and not contingently, into the 
making of a moral utterance. 
There are some moral expressions which can be understood only 
as expressions of emotion. The semantics of the moral terms 
themselves are such that a speaker who used them without feeling 
the appropriate emotion would have made an incorrect or insincere 
statement. This possibility of insincerity is important because it 
shows that the conventional meaning of the terms in question is 
such that an utterance of them can only be made by getting the 
hearer to recognize an intention to express the relevant emotion. 
This possibility of insincere usage does not, then, undermine the 
general emotivist thesis, but on the contrary reinforces it, as 
uttering an evaluative expression while not feeling the 
appropriate emotion would show that a moral judgment had not, 
contrary to appearances, been made. 
As an example of this general thesis, we may consider a term 
like 'coward',, as it occurs in moral utterances. It is clear that 
the term is standardly used only when the speaker feels certain 
emotions, such as contempt, about the person so described. This 
emotional response appears, moreover, to be an integral part of 
the (negative) moral evaluation: it is not clear that this 
evaluation is equally well expressed by some other formulation 
which makes no merition of cowardice, and passes the same moral 
verdict in terms lacking the emotional force of 'coward'. 
" There 
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may be non-standard cases, where the speaker is prepared to 
identify someone's behaviour in these terms, without disapproving 
of the conduct in- question (and perhaps feeling a certain 
admiration for it). But this does not break the link between 
emotional reaction and moral assessment in the standard case. The 
fact that a speaker may admire a coward's behaviour (as such) does 
not show that the term, where it does pass a negative moral 
verdict, can sincerely be used without expressing emotion. In such 
cases, then, we are not to regard the making of moral judgments as 
involving two separable components, the first an evaluative 
verdict and the second an emotional addition to it; the best 
account of the person's behaviour may be that it is contemptible, 
and no reformulation not expressive of emotion can capture this 
moral assessment. 
One way in which the emotivist thesis may be justified, then, 
is that evaluative terms may express emotion as an essential 
feature of certain moral judgments. As a consequence of this, it 
is reasonable to suppose that there are at least some moral 
notions which are fully intelligible only given a grasp of their 
emotive content. According to this view, the sense of the relevant 
moral notions would depend upon the expression of emotion, and it 
would usually be a condition of learning the use of such moral 
expressions that the language-user grasped paradigmatic cases as 
involving a certain emotion. On this account, the circumstances 
for learning and using the evaluative expression would be ones 
where a certain (specifiable) emotion was expressed. Recognizing 
and intending to express the emotion would then enter into the 
semantic rules for using the term. 
From this position it is easier to see how a modified form of 
emotivism could explain how the emotions can play a part in moral 
thinking, without becoming impaled on either horn of the dilemma 
discussed earlier. We can understand moral thinking as rational 
without falling into cognitivism. On this account, rationality 
consists not in the supposed correspondence of moral statements 
with some independent realm of facts about the world, but in the 
conformity of moral judgments to accepted patterns of evaluation: 
it isýthe intelligibility of moral judgments founded on emotions 
which sanctions their rationality. 
This is not to say that there is some algorithm which could in 
principle determine the rationality or otherwise of a given moral 
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judgment. Dispute can enter at several points. To take the 
cowardice example, while the conceptual link between sentiments of 
disapproval and acts- of cowardice is well-established, there is 
room for disagreement over whether .. a particular action counts as 
cowardly; a fictional example is Garcin's agonizing in Sartre's 
play Huis Clos over whether he has upheld his pacifist principles 
or, less admirably, run away in the face of the enemy. Clearly the 
moral evaluations and their associated emotional responses will 
differ depending on which is true. At a criteriological level, it 
might be disputed whether a certain kind of action was cowardly. 
It might be debated, for example, whether conscientious objection 
to conscription could be described in these terms. It is possible 
to imagine arguments being offered in these disputes, particularly 
in the first case. At the same time, there is no need to think 
that this discussion must be rationally terminable, or that there 
are quasi-forensic rules which can mediate disputes even of the 
first kind. Beyond this, disagreement may arise over the level. of 
emotional response deemed appropriate. Here again, it is clear 
that there is some link between the level of this response and its 
associated moral evaluation - in the cowardice example, it is 
plausible to think that the degree of contempt aroused in an 
observer by the action in question will be reflected in his moral 
assessment of it. 
Given that the possibility of such disagreements about 
emotional responses, it might be asked whether there is anything 
which can set standards of correctness or appropriateness in such 
responses, in the absence of a systematic procedure for 
determining their nature and level. It might be thought, in view 
of the forms of indeterminacy distinguished above, that the 
supposed rationality of emotionally-based evaluations was 
illusory. And this could be taken as confirming the fundamentally 
non-rational nature of evaluations; since these are founded on 
non-representational 'passions', there is no reason to expect that 
they will concur. 
A partial reply to this is to repeat the point made in the last 
chapter that, whatever their evaluative role, emotional states 
undeniably incorporate cognitive judgments about their objects. 12 
To this extent they cannot merely be seen as non-rational and 
hence non-representational states, at least in their occurrent 
13 forms. As was argued before, it is reasonable to suppose that 
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these object-directed attitudes are beliefs: the warrant for this 
step being, again, the explanatory value of imputing object- 
directed beliefs to -agents in emotional states: for example, it 
was sufficient to explain why someone was in a state of fear to 
point out the agent's belief that some danger was present. Often, 
of course, the relevant belief is not mentioned directly (though 
it has to be if the object is not in fact present), but understood 
elliptically. It is plain that this elliptical form of explanation 
would be impossible if there were no uniformity in agents' 
evaluations in such situations. It is this evaluative convergence 
which makes it possible to understand their emotional reactions. 
The question is whether there are any criteria of rational 
adequacy in the cases where this sort of convergence does not 
exist. These, notoriously, are cases where observers may arrive at 
different or even wholly opposed evaluations of some situation. 
Part of the answer is to be found by considering what claims can 
intelligibly be made regarding a proposed reaction to some moral 
or political decision. It is a condition of rational adequacy in 
some cases of evaluative conflict that the disputants are capable 
of making out comprehensible claims for the reactions they favour. 
It is important to appreciate how much this already excludes from 
argument, and to recognize here an instance of the point already 
made, that deliberative priorities are often most obvious in the 
omission of certain concerns from practical consideration. 
Obviously there can 
, 
be debates about such priorities, but tacit 
evaluations are also evident in what is excluded from discussion. 
One prominent example in political debate is in the means 
considered appropriate to promote (commonly agreed) ends. While 
there may be disagreements over how best to realize certain ends, 
there may also be other possible courses of action which are 
dismissed by never being considered, even within a political 
culture prizing executive values of effectiveness. 
Divergent political evaluations may be the result of factual 
disagreements, but it is also clear that they may well not be. 
There is also the possibility that different criteria of factual 
relevanc e will be mobilized in support of the competing 
evaluations -a consideration which is enough by itself to cast 
doubt on any rigid distinction of neutral 'facts' from non-neutral 
'values'. Thus the disputants may fail to agree on what counts as 
a relevant consideration, or how a certain item of information 
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bears upon the issue under discussion. These possibilities need 
not raise the spectre of some grand conflict between ultimate 
values. They may involve instead different conceptions of the 
relationship between values and practical action: for example, 
disagreement may arise over which policy or course of action 
promotes some value such as equality, or liberty (the chances of 
disagreement appreciate, of course, where there is the possibility 
of conflict between values). 
There seems little hope of reviving the Enlightenment project 
of providing rational foundations for morality - if, at least, 
this is taken to mean a procedure for reaching definitive moral 
conclusions from agreed initial premises. In so far as liberal 
neutrality is premised on the success of such a project, it 
miscarries. Similarly, Kant ian-inf luenced theories of discursive 
rationality such as Habermas's seem to hold out no prospect of 
final agreement on values. Even when the inequalities of wealth 
and power which Habermas holds responsible for the distort. ed 
communication between groups in capitalist societies are 
notionally absent, it is hard to see why disagreement over values 
must disappear. Those enjoying unequal political or social 
advantages may subscribe to different values. But conflicts of 
values may persist when these inequalities are removed. In Rawls' 
Original Position thought-experiment, for example, the absence of 
racial, sexual and class distinctions between the parties need not 
preclude, as Rawls himself makes clear, a confrontation between 
values (at the same time, Rawls adheres in the construction of his 
theory to a discursive model of rationality in which fundamental 
disagreement about certain values, such as that of justice, seems 
to be regarded as pathological). 
This restates the point already made, that there is a fairly 
poor fit between pluralism and neutrality. In summary, the problem 
is that the neutrality of procedures for resolving conflict is 
likely to be disrupted once pluralism is allowed into the 
reckoning. For pluralism, on one natural understanding of the 
notion, just means that there is no procedure capable of resolving 
all conflicts of values. If the values are discrete and embodied 
in ýdifferent groups or sub-cultures, pluralism may surface in 
radically different conceptions of procedural neutrality - or, 
indeed, of its desirability. Even without this fragmentation, 
there may be no means of settling conflicts which occur within 
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sets of values shared by the community as a whole: for example, if 
the community values effectiveness in public life, it may face 
conflicts with the moral demands it imposes on politicians as 
professional operators. It is at best doubtful whether these 
considerations can merely be offset against one another on some 
ultimate balance-sheet. If there is a genuine plurality of values 
in society, there will be no means of projecting them all onto 
some single scale as a means of reconciling any conflicts which 
may arise between them. Unless neutrality is construed as 
permitting a free-for-all in which civil society disputes are 
allowed to take their course without political intervention, this 
possibility of conflict is likely to produce a number of competing 
political solutions. 
Procedural neutrality seems to be ruled out-once we abandon the 
Enlightenment foundationalist project. It is natural to suppose 
that if the rational foundations exist, then there should be some 
mechanism for resolving (apparent) moral conflicts. But ' 
if 
pluralism is true then either these foundations do not exist or 
else their existence is not inconsistent with rationally 
interminable moral conflict. It may be asked at this point what is 
left of the project of rationalizing moral evaluation when the 
stronger, conflict-resolving form of foundationalism is abandoned. 
One of the unsatisfactory aspects of noncognitivist accounts of 
value, as Wiggins has noted, 
14 is that they seem not to do justice 
to the phenomenology of moral judgments - that they appear, to the 
persons making them, to be something more than mere subjective 
expressions of preference. Moral judgments reach out, as it were, 
to a realm of value beyond the individual who makes them. Even if 
moral realism is rejected, we still need some explanation of how 
the moral life could appear to have this character. One 
possibility is that foundationalism fails, but we can still 
provide partial rationalizations of moral judgments - though not 
the full disput e-re solving form of moral justification sought by 
foundationalism. Moral realism, on this account, remains at best 
an unproven dogma: our moral rationalizations cannot be reduced to 
consistency, so it must remain a moot point whether or not there 
is Lsome ultimate standard to which moral judgments appeal. As 
Wittgenstein wrote, 
When I have exhausted the justifications I have reached 
bedrock, and my spade is turned; Týen I am inclined to 
say: 'This is simply what we do . 
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The shift from the first person singular to first person plural 
in this quote is presumably meant to indicate a standar 
judgment beyond the purely subjective. Although collectively weý 
can produce some reasons for our intersub j ec tively-a greed moral! 
judgments, these fall short of the. ultimate justification soughtl 
by foundationalism. How cohesive an answer this gives, and how! 
resistant it is to challenge, depends heavily on the extension of', 
the 'we' in the final sentence. Clearly, and trivially, its limitsi 
can be set so as to embrace only those who happen to agree on aý 
set of moral beliefs (with, as Wittgenstein would have insisted,, 
their associated practices or 'forms of life'). If, however, itsi 
limits are extended beyond this, the possibility arises that morall 
conflict may be end6mic in certain cultures, such as our own. The 
price exacted for this greater authenticity is a corresponding 
diminution in our powers of moral justification, even in internal 
disputes within the culture. There may be ample ground still to be 
cut away between the disputants at the point when the spade turns. 
The intelligibility of rival moral justifications depends, as 
already noted, on shared patterns of judgment, even in the face of 
substantive disagreement: dispute can only occur within a form of 
life if these patterns make allowance for it. (Wittgenstein would, 
perhaps have claimed that it was constitutive of mathematics, for'ý 
example, as a human practice that it makes no such allowance. ), 
Thus in the case of certain so-called Ithick'16 ethical notions, 
such as that of cowardice, or lying, it is true that there arel 
certain"* 
- agreed criteria for the application of the terms which! 
denote them; at the same time, their correct use involves the! 
making of certain evaluations, and their being accompanied by 
certain emotional responses. Dispute, when it occurs, is notl 
(except in the context of philosophical discussion about the 
meaning of the terms) merely criteriological. What is open to 
dispute is whether the terms' criteria of application are 
satisfied or not. If they are not, it is clearly inappropriate toýý 
feel the accompanying emotional response; but if they are, the 
terms cannot correctly be used without feeling the emotion. It is 
in this sense that their use is embedded in a 'form of life'. 
This is important in contributing towards the sense which 
Wiggins identifies, that moral thinking is something more than a 
roundabout statement of subjective internal states. Moral 
responses can be seen as examples of projection: the ascription to 
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objects (including states of affairs) of certain evaluative 
properties. It is of course true that projection of this kind 
demands that we come - to view the object or action concerned in a 
certain light, and there is no notion that the object 'really' 
possesses the relevant properties in any sense of 'really' which 
does not refer to the projection itself. This would perhaps not 
satisfy Wiggins, who might reply that once we have acknowledged 
that this projection is going on, we cannot retain any belief in 
the objectivity of moral judgments which morality requires to 
secure any hold on us as agents. But there is no reason to think 
that the motivational grip of concepts which occur in the agent's 
evaluations is in any way lessened by the acknowledgment that the 
attribution of these concepts is only a matter of externalization 
by the agent. Wiggins leaves it unexplained how moral judgments 
secure their motivational hold. 
The arguments of the present section have been designed to 
suggest that we need not conclude that moral thinking is either 
motiveless or meaningless. The belief that such a dilemma exists 
is partly the legacy of Enlightenment styles of philosophical 
thinking which partition the world between fact and value or 
between cognition and motivation. Once we abandon these habits of 
thinking, it becomes easier to see how we can reach an 
understanding of moral (and other) evaluation which is both 
rational and, contrary to assumptions about rational requirements 
of coherence in morality, which allows for pluralism. 
On the account of value presented in this section, pluralism is 
compatible with the claim that there are rational criteria by 
which evaluations can be assessed - though there need not be a 
single method of rational assessment, nor need there be an answer 
to all evaluative questions. Intelligibility places constraints on 
the reasons which may be produced in support of a given moral 
assessment, even though there may be no means, in many cases, of 
arbitration when these reasons conflict. But this need not reduce 
moral argument to rationally unstructured conversational 
manoeuvring. Nor need the claim be that the discussion creates 
wholly internal standards of rational acceptability, as Rorty 
sometimes seems to maintain. 
17 Even without the prospect of 
rational terminability envisaged by some models of neutral 
dialogue, moral argument can still be guided by rational 
considerations other than the residual constraints of Rorty's 
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tgreat conversation of mankind'. 18 
These thoughts are admittedly very partial and inadequate. This 
section has however tried to make it clear that there is a tension 
between neutrality and pluralism as political ideals, which recent 
liberal theorists have largely failed to reckon with. To accept 
pluralism is to question the neutralist aim of arbitrating between 
different conceptions of value. This is not to say that pluralism 
entails any necessary conflict between the values in question. But 
where different groups or the ideals they support are in 
competition for public benefits such as funding, there is always 
the possibility of conflict - not necessarily because the values 
themselves are at odds, as might be the case, for example, with 
ideals of equality and natural aristocracy, but because public 
support of this form cannot be administered even-handedly. 
Pluralism, and in particular the possibility of the more 
radical forms of value-based conflict, seems to pose the Rortian 
threat of purely self-rationalizing unstructured discourse. It may 
seem, moreover, that the only defence against this threat is a 
procedural conception of rationality of the form favoured by 
liberal neutralists like Ackerman. 
19 But, as the present section 
has argued, we can dissolve this apparent dilemma if it is 
coherent to think of evaluative discourse not as proceeding 
according to fixed rules, but as rationally structured by 
considerations of intelligibility. It is because we can situate 
evaluations in an overall setting which makes persons' actions 
understandable that we can describe them as rational; the converse 
also holds, that irrationality in this connection just consists in 
the contextual unintelligibility of persons' evaluative 
utterances. This leaves, and is intended to leave, considerable 
scope for disagreement within the bounds of intelligibility. But 
it is not by reference to some (internal or external) semantic 
model that we determine whether a given evaluative utterance is 
rationally acceptable. The mistake is to look beyond the shared 
language for some ultimate guarantor or arbiter of acceptability 
in evaluative judgments. 
In On Certainty Wittgenstein addressed these issues in the 
following terms. 
Giving grounds, justifying the evidence, comes to an 
end; - but the end is not ce , 
rtain propositions' striking 
us immediately as true, i. e. it is not a kind of seeing 
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on our part; it is ouE acting, which lies at the bottom 
of the language-game. 
The foundations of the language-game cannot themselves be 
described as being true or false, since they decide what is to 
count as true or false. The point is'not, presumably, that action 
merely replaces propositional foundations for moral or other forms 
of discourse. In the next section the focus will turn to political 
activity as an illustration of the Wittgensteinian arguments 
presented so far: the aim will be to discover how cohesive a 
notion of political rationality remains once the foundationalist 
project is abandoned, and to what extent a praxis-based 
epistemology can replace more orthodox categories of understanding 
political action. This should help towards recovering a non- 
instrumentalist view of politics in which there is a more dynamic 
relationship between agents and reasons for action than in much 
modern liberal writing. 
III 
In some ways the account of practical reasoning and action to 
be developed in this section resembles Habermas's theory of 
'communicative action'. 
21 Both share an emphasis on the importance 
of action in rational communication. Habermas's theory, however, 
centrally claims that the process of reaching ideally undistorted 
communication is essentially a matter of generating agreement 
between the participants. It should be clear from the foregoing 
why the present account rejects Habermas's approach, with its 
strongly Kantian assumptions about rationality. By contrast, this 
section will argue that there is no effective (i. e. practically 
operable) notion of undistorted communication, with its assumption 
that all imbalances of power have been eliminated. What is left is 
a model of rationality in which these imbalances are regarded as 
being endemic to political action, and are regarded as expressing 
the pervasiveness of disagreement. A world in which the use of 
political power is as entrenched as it is already contains L 
discrepant practical judgments. 
The previous section argued that rational discourse can proceed 
in spite of evaluative disagreements. The existence of 
intelligible disagreement between political agents suggests that 
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there may be norms of discursive rationality even in the absence 
of 'agreement in judgments'. As one prominent strand in liberal 
thought has always stressed, it is possible to see the prevalence 
of such disagreements not as the product of some error, but as 
22 being a positive good. Indeed, as Mill argued, the prevalence of 
contrary opinions or judgments may sustain rather than damage 
their integrity as discrete bodies of doctrine. It is the 
experience of conflict which in some cases enables the 
participants to understand, from within such a doctrine, what 
their own rational purposes are. 
If certain forms of evaluative disagreement are rationally 
interminable, as argued in the previous section, there is no 
reason to think that a single paradigm of rational interchange, 
such as is offered by liberal neutralists or by Habermas, will 
enjoy the universal applicability these writers expect. Pluralism, 
in the sense in which it has been understood in this work, just is 
the claim that there is no means by which certain fundamental 
moral disputes can be rationally resolved. This already casts 
serious doubt on the project of deriving political institutions 
and processes from supposedly consensual moral notions: if the 
notions are modelled accurately, they will have to allow for the 
possibility of practical conflict. 
There are, it should be said, other obstacles in the path of 
any very general theories of moral rationalization. One notable 
example is the role of notions of 
, 
character in explaining action. 
While these need not be mirrored directly in agents' practical 
reasoning, it seems undeniable that they are frequently of use in 
explaining actions. The most direct way in which such notions 
could feature in deliberation is through an agent's acting out of 
a reflective conception of himself as a certain kind of person, 
i. e. as having a certain character. But, though this does happen, 
an agent's reasoning may express his character while not mirroring 
it directly in his subjective deliberation - for example, in the 
respective weights given to different concerns (which is not to 
imply that there need be any single scale on which all such 
concerns can be weighed). The notion of character may be 
indispensable if we are to bring subjective and intersubjective 
accounts of action into equilibrium. 
Once the notion of character is introduced into analysis of 
rational agency, then, there is no longer any reason to suppose 
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that there is any completely general structure of rationalization 
in practical reasoning. If not, some degree of agent- 
relativization seems- to be called for in analyzing rational 
action. It is common in utilitarian writing to assume that the 
belief/ desire model can handle changes in deliberated wants by 
allowing for the possibility of imp roved, or at least altered, 
information over time. But the motivational discontinuities under 
consideration here are more radical than this purely cognitive 
possibility. Nor are they adequately handled by the thought that a 
person's desires may change in the manner envisaged by Humean 
philosophical psychology. The latter gives no countenance to the 
idea that such changes may be rational, rather than brute (e. g. 
physiological) facts of nature. By contrast, the present account 
construes these changes as the result of a rational process which 
is., however, not in principle open to the kind of synchronic 
. 
deliberation allowed for by the Enlightenment models. 
In part the more dynamic conception of practical reasoning is 
manifested in the relationship between character and moral 
reasoning. One way in which a person's character may significantly 
change is in the kinds of deliberative concerns which have 
importance for him (a change which may equally affect his attitude 
to non-moral practical concerns). This is a case in which the 
synchronic model of practical reasoning proves inadequate - the 
situation is not one where it would be possible in principle, with 
perfect information, to complete the reasoning in one go, so to 
speak, because the example involves changes in the agent's 
perception of what has deliberative value. The agent could not, 
therefore, execute the reasoning at the start, unless he foresaw 
that he would undergo such changes; and this realization would 
only give him reason to act on his future values if he saw them as 
being in some sense an improvement on his present ones - which is 
as much as to say that the latter had ceased to have any 
deliberative weight for him. 
At the most fundamental level this comes out in the way 
practical concerns are distributed over a persons's life. It is 
integral to our notion of a life that the person living it can 
d6velop an understanding of his practical commitments through 
practical experience, and that those commitments sometimes undergo 
radical transformation as a result of this. The forms of! 
rationalization which a person can apply to his past actions in 
172 
such circumstances are in their nature different from those 
available to him beforehand. These transformations are such that 
the agent's understanding of what counts as an effective 
rationalization will itself depend on what he has lived through, 
not only in the obvious sense that his deeds determine what has to 
be explained in the first place, but also what forms of 
rationalization count for him as providing an explanation of what 
he has done. It is not a question of applying some pre-determined 
theory to the vagaries of subjective experience, but of working 
out an understanding of action from experience itself. 
This emphasis on the experiential character of subjective 
rationalization does not have to assume that the process of 
accounting for one's past actions is therefore trivially self- 
justifying. It may be said that the situation is all too familiar 
in which an agent is drawn to a particular form of justification 
because it conveniently squares with what he actually did. But 
even the mode of justification which consists solely of a 
redescription in commendatory terms of an agent's actions has to 
make itself intelligible to its intended audience if it is to 
achieve its object. The audience must not only recognize the 
redescription as an intended justification, but as being 
applicable to the action in question. The project of justification 
has to work within the public language constraints already noted. 
To claim that such forms of rationalization may be circular and 
therefore self-defeating ignores the anti-foundationalist thrust 
of Wittgenstein's arguments. If meaning is, as these arguments 
claim, to be explicated not through an internalized semantic model 
but through public practices or language-games, the justification 
for our using evaluative terms must in some way consist in these 
practices and not in their relationship to some ultimate model of 
their meaning. 
A clear example of the limiting of options in rationalization 
is the character of Garcin in Sartre's play Huis Clos, mentioned 
earlier. Garcin is tormented by the thought that his past life has 
failed to substantiate his own self-image as a man of action and 
courage. His fumbling attempts at self-justification waver between 
two accounts of his actions, which depict him either as adhering 
to his pacifist principles or as running away from danger. Part of 
Garcin's agony, as Sartre represents it, is his own realization 
that these alternatives exist, and that he may have acted out of 
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cowardice while believing himself at the time to be motivated byý 
principle. It is essential to the situation that either of these, 
descriptions, while mutually incompatible, could have been appliedý 
in principle to Garcin's projected action at the time he was! 
deliberating it. But it is made clear, and Garcin is aware, thatý 
subsequent events in his life have pushed out of reach the account, 
of his actions which he wants -a fact which is brought out, 
remorselessly by those to whom he is trying to justify himself. ý 
The circumstances of Garcin's death make it impossible for him toi 
redescribe his actions as he wishes - not because death makesi 
anything impossible (Sartre's dramatization removes that source of 
difficulty) but because they simply remove his desired form ofJ 
self-justification. 
So far it has been argued that there is an irreducible 
experiential element in rationalization, not only in the obvious 
sense that what has to be rationalized (retrospectively) depends 
on what an agent has done, but also that the repertoire of 
justifications open to an agent is limited by his past actions. 
Hegel's historicist teleology is one example of this experientiall 
claim. 23 But the present account differs from Hegel's in 
maintaining that there is a plurality of standpoints from which an!, 
action can be rationalized: there is no definitive position - in 
Hegelian terms, that of absolute Spirit having achieved full self-! 
consciousness - from which the course of history, or an agent'sl 
life, must be understood (a claim which is not, of course, 
1 
inconsistent with the argument above about the experiential limitsi, 
of rationalization). At the same time, there is no assumption that'l 
an agent must be able to rationalize his actions in some way or 
other, merely by dint of having consciously acted (a further 
implication of Hegel's views). 
As in the case of Garcin, the only possible rationalization mayj 
be one which, given the agent's other dispositions andi 
commitments, was not deliberable ex ante. This is particularly 
clear in circumstances involving akrasia. For if akratic action isl 
possible at all, it must be seen as non-deliberable. An agent can 
only go wrong in this way if his actions fail in some- way to, 
I 
corresond to his deliberated reasons - which is not, however, to 
claim that the akratic. action cannot be captured by some, 
24 intentional description. Since akrasia has this surd character, 
a correct appraisal of akratic actions has to take into account 
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their non-rationalizable status. Garcin's difficulty, in t. LY. L116 LL I 
come to terms with his past, is that the only form of explanatior 
which he regards as -rationally acceptable is inapplicable to hic 
I 
actions. His quest for rationalization cannot deal with the brutý 
fact of his cowardice. 
This example amplifies the point made earlier in this sectior 
about character as a limiting condition on rationalization, 
i 
Garcin's situation is not one of deficient information. It is not 
that he could, had he known at the time, acted better - that there 
is to hand, ex post, some account of his action which could have 
featured among his reasons for acting. Rather the best account ol 
his action is one which itself acknowledges the limits of 
I 
rationalization, and uses instead a character-based notion (that I 
of cowardice) in describing what he did. But this characteristi( 
i 
does not stand on an equal footing with other forms of rational 
explanation, as it could not rationally have figured in Garcin', C. 
own deliberations - both because of the nature of Garcin, 4W. I 
because of his cowardice. The account of his action which can be 
given afterwards is not one which would have been available to hin I 
at the time of acting. There are attributes of character which are I 
manifested in the agent's inability to accept certain ways ol, 
rationalizing his actions. 
These remarks to a significant extent apply to political actior' 
also, in its individual and, more ambiguously, its collective 
i 
forms. At the individual level it is plain that character-base( I 
notions are frequently employed in political explanation, L. U aj. 
extent belied by much theoretical writing: for example, the wholE i 
question of a politician's style of professional operation ii' 
closely involved with notions of character. Such questions are noi 
i 
easily handled by theories which take policy-making to bc i 
impersonal matters of executive or administrative decision. It maj 
be said, of course, that these considerations, while undeniably 
feature of real-life politics, would ideally be absent from 
rationally ordered political culture. In particular, it may b( 
said that vagaries of character are only of significance ii 
imperfectly democratic societies, where political decisions depenc I 
to an inordinate degree on personal fiat. 
It is not possible here to discuss in any detail the relativ( 
-merits of representative and delegatory or participatory theorie! 
of democracy. No doubt it is true that issues of personal styl( 
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their non-rationalizable status. Garcin's difficulty, in trying to 
come to terms with his past, is that the only form of explanation. 
which he regards as -rationally acceptable is inapplicable to hislý 
actions. His quest for rationalization cannot deal with the bruteý 
fact of his cowardice. 
i 
This example amplifies the point made earlier in this section 
about character as a limiting condition on rationalization. 
Garcin's situation is not one of deficient information. It is notý 
that he could, had he known at the time, acted better - that there'l 
is to hand, ex post, some account of his action which could hav& 
featured among his reasons for acting. Rather the best account of! 
his action is one which itself acknowledges the limits on 
rationalization. and uses instead a character-based notion (that! 
of cowardice) in describing what he did. But this characteristic 
does not stand on an equal footing with other forms of rationalý 
explanation, as it could not rationally have figured in Garcin's 
own deliberations - both because of the nature of Garcin an& 
because of his cowardice. The account of his action which can bel 
given afterwards is not one which would have been available to him 
at the time of acting. There are attributes of character which are 
manifested in the agent's inability to accept certain ways of, 
rationalizing his actions. 
These remarks to a significant extent apply to political action 
also, in its individual and, more ambiguously, its collective 
forms. At the individual level it is plain that character-based 
notions are frequently employed in political explanation, to an, 
extent belied by much theoretical writing: for example, the whole, 
question of a politician's style of professional operation is 
closely involved with notions of character. Such questions are not 
! 
easily handled by theories which take policy-making to be, 
impersonal matters of executive or administrative decision. It may 
! 
be- said, of course, that these considerations, while undeniably a 
feature of real-life politics, would ideally be absent from a: 
rationally ordered political culture. In particular, it may be, 
said that vagaries of character are only of significance in 
imperfectly democratic societies, where political decisions depend 
to an inordinate degree on personal fiat. 
It is not possible here to discuss in any detail the relative 
merits of representative and delegatory or participatory theories 
of democracy. No doubt it is true that issues of personal style 
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will be more to the fore in regimes where power is concentrated in 
relatively few hands. But it is mistaken to conclude from this 
that these dimensions-of political action are eliminable - or that 
ideally they should be. To some extent, in any case, the question 
of forms of political organization- is irrelevant, since if the 
general claim about about character as an explanatory notion is 
correct, it applies to political action however decentralized or 
participatory the form of government. Nor is it part of the 
present thesis that these considerations are always foremost or of 
fundamental explanatory significance. There are, however, forms of 
political behaviour which can only be satisfactorily accounted for 
using character-based notions. 
Most obviously these occur when a conflict of policy is 
embodied in two (or more) personalities proposing them. These may 
take place even where the policy issues, viewed in isolation, seem 
fairly clear-cut. The power struggle in the Soviet Communist Party 
between Stalin and Trotsky after Lenin's death in 1924 is a case 
25 in point. While the ostensible political issues concerned the 
direction of economic policy and whether to pursue the path of 
? socialism in one country', it is clear that (though these issues 
in themselves were of course substantive) the episode is fully 
intelligible only as a clash between the dominant personalities in 
the party not merely over policies, but power -a point vividly 
confirmed by Stalin's conversion in the thirties, after the 
Trotskyite faction had been defeated and purged, to the very 
policy of industrialization he had condemned as anti-Leninist 
during the power struggle. In this case, it would be naive to view 
Stalin's original adherence to a proletariat-peasant alliance and 
his subsequent volte-face as deriving purely from considerations 
of policy (though Trotsky later represented the power struggle as 
being wholly abstracted from questions of personality26). 
-These events seem to leave out of reach the Marxian objective 
of a neutral politics consisting solely in the 'administration of 
things', just as, in the context of liberal democratic politics, 
the neutralist aim of finding some purely procedural means of 
resolving political dispute is illusory. In part this is because 
there are certain institutional factors in democratic political 
societies which serve to accentuate rather than eliminate 
conflict. But it is doubtful whether political conflict would 
disappear in the absence of these factors. This is apparent in the 
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fluctuations in the level of ideological conflict which a given 
system may manifest over time. 
In Britain after the Second World War, for example, the 
nationalization programme undertaken by the Attlee government was 
broadly accepted by subsequent Conservative administrations, and a 
new 'Butskellist' consensus formed around the welfare state. This 
social democratic consensus continued until the Conservative 
election victory of 1979. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that 
the end of consensus politics was largely the effect of Margaret 
Thatcher's personality as Conservative party leader and her 
27 
adversarial style. The separation of style and content is to 
some extent over-schematic, since (as in this example) the more 
confrontational style of Thatcherite politics accompanied a 
radical revision of policy. This however could be taken as a 
confirmation rather than a refutation of the argument of this 
section, depending on the direction in which the (partial) 
reduction is taken: the example suggests not that personality is 
reducible to policy so much as that the formulation of policy is 
inseparable from questions of personal style. Part of the reason 
why a person may find certain forms of policy and styles of 
argument compelling is that they exhibit a dynamism and clarity 
(or, unfavourably viewed, excessive simplicity) which suits his 
personality. 
The matter of style in political argument, it should be noted, 
has ramifications beyond the character-based considerations 
already discussed. Some of these impose further limits on the 
neutralist ideal of discursive rationality. For example, it is 
plausible to suppose that, considerations of personality aside, 
certain styles of argument comport more naturally with some 
strains of political ideology than with others. This can lead to 
the acknowledgement that the discursive ideal will only be 
persuasive to those already disposed to accept certain patterns of 
(liberal) political justification. In a period in Britain where 
the political centre of gravity has shifted from centre-left to 
the right, radicals on the left often resort to forms of argument 
which explicitly reject the possibility of consensus and of 
meaningful dialogue. Here, again, it is hard to view style and 
content as wholly separable - particularly in view of the 
dialectical structure of these Marxist and neo-Marxist ideologies. 
In the latter, a commitment to neutrality of procedure is 
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misleading because it veils anterior ideological commitments, 
primarily concerning the location of economic and political power. 
To accept a certain argumentative style is, then, to be committed 
already to certain forms of justification and therefore to 
substantive - and contestable - ideological claims. Perhaps these 
assertions are wrong. But it is hard to maintain the appearance of 
neutrality when they are made in the name of genuine political 
commitments. It is for the neutralist to show that they are wrong 
from entirely neutral argumentative premises. 
This naturally raises the question of the relationship of the 
present study to these questions of commitment. If it abandons 
neutrality, then it seems to be limited, on the arguments above, 
to those of a particular ideological persuasion; but if, on the 
other hand, it pretends to neutrality, it would appear that the 
impartial standpoint is after all available, contrary to what has 
been argued. Surely, it may be said, neutrality demands that the 
foregoing arguments are ideologically non-partisan, and if they 
are, neutral forms of political justification do exist after all. 
An objection of this kind leads fairly quickly to larger issues 
concerning the relationship between theorizing and practice in 
political philosophy. I will offer some further comments on this 
topic at the end of this chapter. It should be said in advance, 
however, that I take the tenor of the argument so far to be 
sceptical about the closeness of fit between philosophical 
theorizing and substantive political commitments. If there were 
this closeness of fit, the objection would have some force, since 
there would be less reason to think of first-level and theoretical 
argument about politics as distinct: in this case, it would be 
harder to maintain that there is a sharp line between partisan 
argument in politics, and ideologically neutral philosophical 
reflection about politics. This chapter and those preceding it 
have already given pluralistic reasons for doubting whether 
neutrality can be imported into political structures as readily as 
the liberal neutralist supposes. At the same time, it does not 
appear to be inconsistent to combine the form of pluralism 
identified earlier with a theoretical account of politics which 
aI ims for generality and avoids explicit ideological commitments - 
beyond repudiating a certain recent strain of liberal theory. 
This is, admittedly, a difficult position. It can best be 
sustained, I think, in the presence of a firm distinction of 
178 
levels between philosophical theorizing about politics and 
explicit ideology. Given this distinction, it seems possible to 
argue against liberal-neutrality at the theoretical level, and for 
reasons which are themselves based on a conception of neutrality 
or at least of even-handedness. This possibility becomes clearer 
in the light of the redefined pluralism explained earlier. 
Pluralism, as was argued, can be interpreted not merely as 
claiming that there is a diversity of values in society, but also 
that this may be expressed through the political competition of 
groups representing or supporting these values. On this view, 
pluralism cannot be contained within any single definitive 
procedural or institutional expression of the values concerned; 
the values are so heterogeneous that the relationship between them 
must reflect competition as well as coexistence. (This is not to 
claim that conflict can only occur between groups each of which 
single-mindedly espouses one and only one value: a group with a 
more generous range of values may experience internal conflict. 
)28 
Given this version of pluralism, it is possible, I think, to 
describe ideological conflict as being enacted through the 
conflict of values, without giving way to explicit first-level 
partisanship. It seems unexceptionable to maintain that liberal 
neutrality is inconsistent with this form of pluralism, while also 
arguing that the present analysis makes no explicit commitments 
between first-order values or ideologies. For liberal theory holds 
that neutrality can either be embodied in specific legislation, or 
at least in the terms of competition between competing ideologies. 
But the present account differs even from the latter procedural 
claim, since it denies that there is a clear notion of fair 
ideological competition: indeed, an incommensurability between 
values of the form manifested by this radical pluralism is partly 
the grounds of this denial. 
- It is, again, important to keep in view the wider implications 
of the present discussion. The possibility that character can play 
a role in explaining action is disruptive of neutrality. What 
differentiates characters, in part, is their embodiment of diverse 
and in some cases incompatible values: as was argued earlier, part 
lof the distinction between characters consists in the significance 
which practical concerns have for different persons. In this 
sense, what distinguishes persons is just the differential 
significance they attach to such concerns. Pluralism is in part, 
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then, a character-based phenomenon: given this differential 
weighting of concerns, it is unlikely that the neutralist aim of 
steering an impartial course between values can be sustained. 
There need be no purely procedural means of determining what 
persons have good reason to value. The limits on neutrality, 
accordingly, derive both from the different substantive values 
which persons endorse, and from the absence of any agreed 
mechanism for deciding between these values. 
Parallel considerations impede the attempt in moral philosophy 
to devise rational procedures for reaching moral agreement, as 
29 
some recent work has suggested. Once the focus moves from 
algorithmic methods of Enlightenment-influenced moral theorizing 
to moral or ethical notions related to character, such as that of 
virtue, it becomes much less obvious that there can be any 
mechanical procedure for resolving disagreements. If different 
persons embody different characteristic virtues, then at least 
some forms of ethical consideration must apply to them in 
different ways, and this seems to preclude the blanket application 
of moral obligations to all (similarly situated) agents in the way 
Kantian theory claims. This means, for example, that a given kind 
of practical reason will have greater force for one character than 
for another; it quickly follows, at a general level, that the 
force enjoyed by a particular category of practical reasons, 
namely morality, will vary from person to person rather than being 
applicable to all rational agents as such. 
Less generally, specific kinds of moral concern may depend for 
their practical force on considerations related to character: one 
way in which this can come out is in different attitudes towards 
moral conflict and its resolution - or even to whether there is a 
moral conflict to be resolved. It is of course conceptually 
possible that someone can fail to recognize the latter through 
moral ignorance (as Socrates, in Plato's account of him, thought 
was true of all wrongdoing). But discrepant moral perceptions of 
some practical decision need not arise purely from ignorance. They 
may result from differences of character which cannot be explained 
as mere cognitive failures. One of the ways of distinguishing a 
1person's character consists precisely in what weight she gives to 
forms of practical reason and how she is disposed to act on them. 
Perhaps it will be said that this only reveals a difference in 
the extent to which people are prepared to act on a schedule of 
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moral obligations which is, in itself and with due allowance for 
agents' circumstances, both static and applicable to all agents. 
Reasons have already been given for doubting either that such a 
view captures the nature of persons' actual moral thinking, or 
that a universalistic theory of this kind is the definitive 
expression of moral rationality. Certain of our moral - or perhaps 
better, ethica, 
30 
- notions are resilient to this sort of 
treatment. For example, the character-related notion of integrity 
is hard to bring within the universalistic theory: one aspect of 
integrity (not the only one) concerns the relationship between a 
person's character and her moral actions or dispositions. It is 
plain that the practical importance given to integrity as a value 
varies from one person to the next, and that this in itself will 
affect the way she views her other practical (including moral) 
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concerns. It may be debatable whether integrity is necessarily a 
virtue - it is fairly obvious that a wholehearted commitment to 
integrity may only be possible if certain other concerns are 
neglected. But it is undeniably a character-related notion if it 
is a virtue at all, and therefore difficult to draw into a 
completely general theory of rational agency. 
It is notable that certain virtues have been almost ignored in 
recent Anglophone moral philosophy, while others have been 
misconstrued because efforts have been made to bring them within 
the compass of a general rationalistic theory structured by the 
notion of obligation. One example of the latter is the virtue of 
tolerance. Attempts have been made32 in some recent writing to fit 
tolerance into the general structure, with the result that 
important features of our notion of acting tolerantly have been 
obscured. One of these is the centrality of the agent in accounts 
of tolerant action: not merely in the obvious sense that any 
action must be performed by an agent, but in bringing out the fact 
that the agent's own values and moral commitments need to be 
understood if his acting tolerantly is to be understood. 
33 Another 
feature is the non-obligatoriness of tolerant action. Again, this 
may be better understood as a disposition to certain forms of 
forbearance on the part of the agent than through obligation- 
related notions like rights (to, for example, religious 
toleration), which reintroduce the idea that the action is either 
required or at most morally indifferent. There is little point in 
modifying obligations to give them greater flexibility, as duties 
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of 'imperfect, 
34 or 'prima facie, 
35 obligation, whose stringency 
conveniently relaxes to suit theoretical requirements. 
Some virtues have simply been ignored because they resist 
explication in terms of moral obligations. The virtue of kindness, 
for example, falls into this category. This need not be because 
kindness is a trait not much valued in modern society, though (as 
I shall suggest below) there are political as well as theoretical 
reasons why it has been relatively neglected in recent work. From 
the theoretical angle, it should be fairly clear why the 
Enlightenment accounts of morality have little to say about 
kindness: in a framework which regards all actions as either 
rationally required or proscribed, no room is left for the idea 
that there can be actions (and an associated disposition to 
perform them) which, though non-obligatory, are however in some 
way productive of good. In both utilitarian and Kantian theory, 
there is some single course of action which is rationally 
required. As a result there is nothing in the idea that there are 
other good actions outside the class of those which are 
obligatory. Kindness in action is hard to understand within this 
framework, still less as a disposition of character. Indeed, the 
very notion of a disposition seems unaccountable in the 
Enlightenment theories: it falls prey to Kantianism's theory of 
metaphysical freedom and utilitarianism's aspiration to agent- 
neutrality in the assessment of outcomes. 
As was mentioned, there are political reasons for this neglect 
as well, though the tacitly utilitarian assumptions informing much 
modern political argument certainly constitute one of those 
reasons. The political language of welfarism is more apt to talk 
of promoting benefits or satisfying entitlements than of kindness, 
with its unwelcome connotations, to modern ears, of paternalism or 
charitable condescension. This is an area in which utilitarianism, 
unsurprisingly, finds the argumentative context of modern politics 
congenial: unsurprisingly, because the egalitarian animus towards 
charity has its counterpart in the baseline equality of 'each to 
count for one and none for more than one' (it need not, of course, 
lead to equality in distributions). It should be stressed that 
, this is not to claim that egalitarianism is in any sense 
regrettable or has undesirable consequences - on the contrary, 
this bias in political argument often conceals rather than exposes 
such inequalities in power and wealth as remain. But it does 
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prompt the question why a virtue like kindness may be recognized 
in personal life and yet be distrusted, even resented, in a 
political context. Not far behind that lie larger questions about 
the nature of political virtue - whether the notion of personal 
virtue has any application in a political context, or (as 
Machiavelli has been taken to have claimed) political virtue is 
entirely sui generis. It also provokes reflection on the 
relationship of virtue to moral notions such as that of innocence-, 
and the latter's place in political life. 
These are obviously large questions, which cannot be dealt with 
36 fully here. The following merely attempts to relate them to the 
thematic concerns of this chapter. It is perhaps instructive to 
begin from the other end, by considering the attitude of 
instrumentalist moralities towards the concept of innocence. I 
have already argued that these make little sense of the notion of 
virtue in either private or, especially, political life. There is, 
however, a sense in which both utilitarian and Kantian morality 
lead to a markedly innocent view of politics. In part this derives 
from their application of a theory of rational action to politics 
which is both optimific and universally applicable, with little 
allowance made for the idea that political life might impose 
peculiar demands on those participating in it: as a result, they 
are unlikely to have the Machiavellian thought that politicians 
can be selected, in the recruitment process, for traits which 
preclude - and even wipe out - innocence. 
There is also an emphasis, certainly present in Kantianism and 
at least some forms of utilitarian theory, on the public 
accountability of politicians. This is seen in, for example, 
Rawls' stress on publicity as a condition of legitimacy in 
government. In the utilitarian case, the worst that can happen is 
some version of the utilitarian form of paternalism perhaps 
-favoured by Sidgwick, in which latter-day Platonic guardians 
sometimes deceive the populace in the name of greater long-term 
utility - but in consistently utilitarian terms, there is nothing 
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wrong with that, as long as it achieves its aim. No doubt 
deceiving the public, even for these paternalistic reasons, does 
require a lack of innocence. But what even the Sidgwickian 
guardians must be innocent about is the value of the optimific 
enterprise itself: there is no sense in the idea that 
, 
their 
virtues (which can only be those of efficient administration) may 
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run afoul of that enterprise Or that there is moral knowledge 
which may frustrate its implementation. 
But the other variants of the theory are, so to speak, too 
deeply embedded in innocence to have any functional conception of 
it. In monistic accounts of value such as these, there is no place 
for the idea that an increase in knowledge may be accompanied by a 
loss of virtue or goodness, or, more generally, that moral 
38 knowledge may be non-additive. This means that certain forms of 
moral conception are placed out of the reach of these theories - 
notably that of innocence itself. 
These remarks should help to make it clear why innocence is not 
an operable notion within the Enlightenment theories, though 
predicable of them. Perhaps it needs to be added that this does 
not leave, as the sole alternative, a wearily cynical view of 
political activity as at best jobbery and at worst legitimized 
murder. Nor, indeed, should it encourage an unduly rosy view of 
the political activity permitted by instrumentalist theories 
quite the reverse, as the lack of moral knowledge implicit in 
these forms of political innocence may sanction atrocities in the 
name of the (utilitarianly) greater good. (Admittedly this is much 
less likely in the Kantian Kingdom of Ends, with its strong 
emphasis on the value of personal integrity. ) 
Once we move away from the instrumentalist theories, however, a 
more complex relationship between virtue and innocence emerges. 
The first step towards this more complex view comes with the 
recognition that to realize even the instrumental kinds of benefit 
may demand non-virtuous, even vicious, dispositions of character. 
This may arise even while remaining within instrumentalism, if the 
dispositions which help politicians to maximize benefits in one 
case prevent maximization in another. Moving further out, we 
encounter the possibility that certain forms of virtue are 
intrinsically political, and that these may psychologically 
preclude innocence. For example, if effectiveness is regarded as a 
virtue in politicians, it may easily run counter to certain forms 
of innocence. While it is possible for innocence to be manifested 
in a political context - in, for example, the attitude of many on 
the British left towards Stalinist Russia in the 1930s - it is 
doubtful whether it has any distinctive political expression. 
It is hard to see how innocence can coexist with a recognition 
that there is a radical mismatch between one's values, on the one 
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hand, and the world on the other, which may offer no means of 
living them through. Perhaps there just is no deliberative route 
onward for such a person, given his substantive commitments and 
his circumstances. By now it should be clear why the 
instrumentalist theories cannot conceive that agents may reach 
this kind of deliberative dead end: since they abstract from 
differences of character., and the subjective values which 
characters embody, there is no reason to think that an agent can 
find himself in this impasse. All that is required is that he 
apply the rules applicable to rational action in general. These 
preclude conflicts of the form depicted in tragedy. As has perhaps 
less frequently been observed, they equally rule out suicide. 
Both tragedy and suicide can be rationally explained, however, 
by an account of practical reasoning which emphasizes character- 
based notions like that of virtue. Rather than adopting a theory 
of deliberation tailored to fit the world, or an abstract 
conception of rational agency, the present account allows for. a 
more diversified view of action according to which character 
influences an agent's deliberative priorities. This can be true 
both of what kinds of concern have weight for the person and of 
the ways in which, if at all, they are translated into action. If 
character contours the practical landscape in these ways, it is 
easier to see how conflicts of the 'tragic dilemma' sort may 
arise. These may not be satisfactorily explicable either by 
realist theories of ultimate metaphysical conflict, or by a 
subjectivized account which locates the source of tragedy wholly 
in the agent. While, as has been argued, notions of character are 
important in understanding tragedy as they are with any other form 
of action, it is also necessary to retain some sense of how, in 
these conflicts, human purposes are negated by the world - or by 
how it appears to be (which itself may in part be a function of 
character). The same sense can lead to the belief that there is no 
reason to go on. 
It is hard to see how such a belief can rationally arise within 
the Enlightenment theories. These reduce the unity of the self by 
understating its rational discontinuities with other selves - 
whether as a set of causal properties coupled with affective 
states, or as an intrinsically unknowable locus of rational 
potentialities. Curiously, these theories have tended to undermine 
the self while having been invoked as the rational foundation for 
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liberal philosophies which have enshrined the human subject as the 
supreme source of value in the world: it is unclear how this 
evaluative claim can- survive the collapse of the self into (in 
Sandel's useful terminology39) either radical disembodiment or 
radical situatedness. As a result, the translation of these 
metaphysical theories of the self into a political expression is 
highly ambiguous, and it is highly uncertain that modern 
liberalism has any effective conception of political action. 
In this section I have given some indications as to how such a 
conception might be recovered. The salvage operation begins with a 
more diversified account of rationality than that permitted by the 
instrumentalist theories. In particular, once allowance is made 
for dispositional and other character-based notions in explaining 
action, the possibility arises that there is no completely general 
theory of rational action which can encompass politics and all 
other branches of human endeavour. One explanation for this would 
be that political professionalism selects for certain types of 
character in its recruitment processes, and that the practice of 
politics may only be explicable using character-related notions 
such as those of disposition and virtue (and of course vice). In 
the latter part of this section I have considered some of the 
implications of this revised view, such as 'its impact on our 
understanding of moral goodness. We cannot assume that all forms 
of goodness are mutually compatible - more specifically, there are 
virtues which require moral knowledge incompatible with other 
forms of goodness such as innocence (I pass over the question 
whet her innocence itself is best regarded as a virtue). This being 
so, the Rawlsian project of projecting political institutions from 
(supposedly) consensual ideas of goodness seems doomed to failure: 
some of these ideas resist translation into political forms. 
To this extent Larmore is right to reject lexpressivist, 
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theories of politics, which aim to enshrine conceptions of value 
in political institutions. But it is naive to think that the 
neutrality preferred by Larmore is a coherent response to the 
anomalousness of value. As this chapter has argued, any set of 
political procedures and institutions will only partially capture 
current notions of value. In place of the neutralist aspiration 
for a value-free or entirely consensual political order, there can 
only be a conflict between different groups for political power. 
So politics can be a channel through which values are expressed. 
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But a recognition of pluralism demands that this expression is at 
best partial, that the public commitment to certain forms of value 
must exclude and perhaps inhibit others. More generally, the 
commitment to political action itself will realize certain values 
at the expense of others. In the next section I examine further 
limits on the scope of political rationalization, looking towards 
a more dynamic understanding of action than that offered by 
instrumentalism. 
IV 
This chapter has so far suggested certain limits on the scope 
of political rationalization, and on the ability of moral theories 
founded on the Enlightenment understanding of rationality to guide 
political practice. To claim that there are these limits on the 
power of general theories of rational action to account for 
politics is not, however, to propose that there must be some 
alternative theory which can do this job more effectively. 
Although the focus has been on utilitarian and Kantian moral 
theory, the interpretation of pluralism offered in this chapter 
restricts the applicability of any general account of rational 
action. 
In principle this may be because, as in the more drastic forms 
of relativism, the values concerned are associated with 
conflicting theories of rationality, so that any conflict which 
arises between them is not resolvable. But it is doubtful, first, 
whether there really are no criteria of rationality, such as 
consistency, shared even between the value-systems embodied in 
(historically or geographically) remote cultures. And secondly, 
most real-world political conflict is not of this form: it is 
fanciful to think of socialists and conservatives in a modern 
western industrial nation such as Britain, for example, as 
subscribing to quite different criteria of rationality. A more 
plausible explanation for the phenomenon is that homogeneous 
theories of rationality have produced internal inconsistencies - 
or else have failed to cope with the challenge posed by contact 
with previously alien cultures. A further possibility, consistent 
with these, is that political (and perhaps ethical) structures may 
have developed to the point where they can no longer be brought 
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within any such broad theories of rational action. On a more 
drastic view, they never could. 
These general accounts of rationality have had unfortunate 
consequences in other areas of theory. The pressure of deontology 
from Kantian and neo-Kantian theories of morality has, for 
example, given rise to implausibly general treatments of political 
obligation. Once the rationalistic structure for morality is 
accepted, it is natural to suppose that these can be extended to 
encompass politics as well: this follows from the idea that 
obligations are universalistic and mutually consistent, as in the 
Kantian model. Questions then arise about the relationship between 
political and (other forms of) moral obligation, whether these can 
conflict, and whether the former is a sub-class of the latter. As 
a consequence of the universalistic aspect of moral obligations, 
the search is launched for the grounds on which political 
obligations are incurred, with predictable difficulties when 
exceptions arise or these grounds are invalidated. Consent-based 
theories of political obligation are a notable example. Such 
theories standardly maintain4l that the grounds for incurring 
political obligation is the express or tacit consent of those to 
be governed. They have problems in sustaining universality when 
consent either has not been granted in the first place, or clashes 
with other moral obligations held to be incumbent on citizens 
(when for example the authorities require acquiescence or active 
assistance from the citizenry in carrying out racist or genocidal 
policies). One prominent reason for these difficulties is the 
attempt to assimilate a notion drawn from moral philosophy to a 
distinct, and in some ways quite different, category of reasons 
for action. One response to this recognition is just to abandon 
the search for any universalistic theory modelled on the 
rationalistic structure. 
It may be more enlightening to direct attention away from this 
form of practical necessity, and towards a broader conception of 
the good of political participation. One possibility is that the 
latter offers opportunities for the exercise of distinctively 
political virtues. This does not, as might be thought, invite the 
same criticism as that just made of theories of political 
obligation, that they transfer inappropriate categories of 
understanding from moral to political philosophy. But on the 
present account the virtues lack the homogeneity and consistency 
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required of structures of moral obligation. There is no assumption 
that they must, or even can, form a self-consistent unity (the 
possibility of such unity importantly depends on psychological 
factors). As a result, the ways in which virtue can be expressed 
may be fragmentary and partial, and irreducible to compliance with 
a universally-applicable set of obligations. 
In addition, the relationship between political value and the 
virtues may be ambiguous, even leaving aside the question of 
internal consistency. The value of political participation may be 
only partially captured by its promoting the exercise of political 
virtues. But even the latter may not best be represented as the 
trading of participatory benefits for certain forms of obligation. 
This trade-off model may seem appropriate to understanding, for 
example, the distribution of welfare benefits to citizens in 
return for certain fiscal exactions. But it is very unclear even 
in this sort of case what the ground is for incurring the specific 
obligation to pay certain taxes - certainly not that the person or 
institution obligated is the likely recipient of the public 
revenues so created. Nor is it very convincing to claim that 
eligibility for public benefits somehow grounds all political 
obligations: it is hard to believe, for example, that a taxpayer's 
eligibility for unemployment benefit in the event of redundancy 
creates the full panoply of obligations enforced by modern states. 
This is true even if the person would agree to take on these 
obligations when asked to do so. A person's willingness to accept 
an obligation in hypothetical circumstances does not in fact place 
the person under that obligation, the force of the latter 
remaining as hypothetical as the circumstances themselves. 
No doubt there is good prudential reason, most of the time, to 
do what the law requires. But it is very doubtful whether this 
practical requirement is best expressed in terms of obligations. 
Whatever the nature of the prudential reasons for obeying the law, 
it is hard to see how they can be framed in the language of 
obligations except as (in the notoriously discredited terminology) 
obligations to oneself. 
42 There is good reason to doubt whether 
such obligations exist at all. But even if they do, they mislocate 
the object of citizens' political obligations as being directed to 
themselves rather than to the state. In this as in other areas, 
obligations merely fail to handle satisfactorily phenomena whose 
real source is to be found in subjective motivation or (as Kant 
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called it) inclination. 
It seems more plausible instead to think of some political 
goods as being partly expressible in terms of certain 
characteristic virtues. This does not of course answer the 
obligation theorist's worries about how to justify state power; 
such a universalistic theory may simply be unavailable. An 
emphasis on the virtues may however help to understand the goods 
produced by membership of a political community - as well as 
indicating, in the case of certain other virtues, the goods to be 
had from a life outside the community. Theorists of obligation, 
particularly those working in the contractarian tradition, have 
usually seen the relationship of state and citizen as involving a 
trade-off between obligation and rights or claims against the 
state (to personal protection and - welfare 
benefits). On the 
alternative view, the notion of political virtue may be better 
. equipped to understand the values realized 
by political life than 
that of obligation, which demands, in different respects, both too 
little and too much of politics. Too little, because it takes a 
negative view of citizens' relationship to the state as 
exclusively concerned with imposed restraints, and confines their 
experience of politics to this relationship; and too much, because 
it draws all citizens into the net of obligation and makes little 
allowance for different levels of participation (or abstention). 
The general account of citizens' relationship with the state 
sought by theories of political obligation may be unsustainable in 
a pluralistic society. 
If this is so, it appears that the principal objective of 
obligation theories, to refute anarchist objections to state 
power, is unachieved. A theory of political virtue cannot neatly 
fill the gap left by failed theories of political obligation. But 
it may be able to provide an understanding of the values promoted 
by a life of political action, and the value of political 
participation itself. Familiarly, this may mean becoming a 
professional politician in order to secure certain public 
benefits, such as improving housing or helping to eliminate 
poverty. But it is important that politics is not seen merely as 
the instrument to achieving such goods, however intrinsically 
worthwhile. Rather the good state of politics is one in which 
civic virtues are intrinsically valued,,, and not solely as 
instrumentalities. In place of the neutralist picture of a 
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citizenry negatively bound to certain duties of forbearance while 
pursuing their private interests in civil society, an emphasis on 
the political virtues offers an alternat 
, 
ive view of the 
relationship between value and political action. According to this 
view, citizens' relationship to their political community is not 
best expressed as a network of" obligations, but through 
opportunities for active participation in the community. 
There is no maximal life of virtue. But there are perhaps. 
certain virtues best realized through exercising these'i, 
opportunities. One example, already mentioned, is the virtue of 
kindness. This is not to say, of course, that this virtue cannot 
be expressed in private life: it is a familiar sentiment, indeed a 
platitude, that 'charity begins at home'. But if it is not to end 
there as well, there must be c ivic contexts in which kindness can 
be exercised. Instrumentalism, as the dominant ethos of political 
life, may preclude the growth and flourishing of public virtue; in 
this way, some private virtues may simply lack any public 
manifestation. Thus a repudiation of instrumentalism rests less on 
on the claim that there are certain exclusively political virtues,;, 
than that the pursuit of instrumental benefits excludes certainý 
private virtues, such as kindness, from public life. 
The absence of public kindness may be felt as a loss in 
several, and diverse, ways. To those in receipt of state welfare,! 
for example, the impersonal and bureaucratic administration ofý 
personal benefits adversely affects both the recipients'; 
perception of these benefits and of themselves. Relatedly, a;, 
public culture of effectiveness may lead to over-emphasis on: 
statistically measurable forms of welfare and the neglect of theý 
human costs incurred by its administration - both to public 
employees and to welfare recipients. Kindness (perhaps in contrast 
with related virtues such as generosity) cannot be assessed in' 
purely volumetric terms: it depends on how a benefit is given, not. 
just on how much. At another level, the conduct of politics! 
itself, when devoted to the pursuit of instrumental benefits, may 
lose sight of these public virtues. When political action is 
directed exclusively towards procuring these benefits, it becomes 
difficult to avoid regarding politicians as omnicompetent and as 
being under a professional obligation to secure them. Appreciating 
kindness implicitly accepts both value lying beyond obligation and 
the constraints on agents' powers. Thus an ethos of kindness is 
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more likely to prevail where agents' powers are acknowledged as 
being limited and where the value of action is not judged solely 
in terms of its - tangible outcome, as a criterion of 
professionalism. The atrophy of certain public virtues may betoken 
a depreciation in the quality of political life. This is not to 
say that the virtue of kindness can simply be restored to politics 
without otherwise disrupting the status quo. As was mentioned 
before, it may be unattainable without lapsing into paternalism 
or charitable condescension given existing inequalities in 
wealth and power. 
This is not to say that political life is that even of max 
achievable virtue; again, it may simply be that there is no 
I 
content in this notion, given the plurality of value. But it is 
I 
notable that the conduct of politics so often proceeds in this 
I 
vacuum, where virtues do not merely happen to be absent but seem, 
to be actively excluded. 
I 
This line of thought can, of course, be traced back to I 
Machiavelli and, through him, to Aristotle. The idea that there 
I 
are goods obtainable only from political life is prominent both in 
I 
the Prince and in the Discourses, in their reaffirmation of ! 
classical conceptions of virtue as (something akin to)' 
institutionalized virility, realized through the standing 
engagement of the populace in public affairs. For Machiavelli, ý 
there is indeed a supreme life of virtue, which is that of the man 
of virtu - one who imposes his will on fortune, achieves 
spectacular feats of martial valour, and so forth. For Aristotle, ' 
by contrast (whose ideas are notable influences on Machiavelli's 
conception of civic virtue), there is no perhaps no presupposition 
that political life is supremely valuable. In Book Ten of the 
Nichomachean Ethics, for example, Aristotle seems to uphold the 
value of 
* 
theoria or solitary contemplation as the human ideal, ý 
while his emphasis on autarkeia or self-sufficiency seems clearly 
inimical to a life of political engagement. 
43 At the same time, ' 
however, Aristotle also regards polis life, in terms of his own 
teleological biology, as the supreme form of human development, 
and as offering goods not otherwise available. 
44 It is tempting to 
conclude that this reflects an unresolved tension in Aristotle's 
own mind between the life of philosophical reflection and that of 
politics; but whether or not this is so, it remains true that some 
virtues, and thus some human values, can only be realized 
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politically. 
It may be thought that this stress on the political aspect of 
the virtues is merely a means of rehabilitating liberal 
individualism, shifting the focus away from civil society to 
public action while retaining the liberal emphasis on personal 
development. The character-based notion of virtue might seem to 
reinforce this. But it is doubtful whether the refocussing can be 
achieved without disturbing the liberal conception of civil 
society itself - particularly of the relationship between public 
and' private spheres of action. The liberal neutralist is at least 
right to this extent, that the distinction between the spheres can 
only be maintained if public institutions remain studiously 
impartial, at some level, between competing ideals of value: 
otherwise there is no guarantee that the integrity of civil 
society, as the sphere in which private concerns are transacted, 
will be preserved. The danger facing the Millian (non-neutralist) 
liberal is that this integrity will be undermined by democratic 
decision-making mechanisms -a danger of which Mill himself was 
well aware. 
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Once neutrality is abandoned, with its implicit distinction of 
public and private, it is much harder for liberalism to prevent 
the encroachment of politics on civil society. This is not, it 
should be said, to go so far as to claim that all concerns, 
whether public or ostensibly private, are political. There are 
reasons for doubting this beyond the purely phenomenological - 
that there is a fairly well defined understanding, in a society 
and at any given time, of which concerns count as political (which 
is not to deny that there is no obvious criterion which prevents 
any given concern from becoming the subject of political dispute). 
Apart from the phenomenological type of objection, the attempted 
conflation also fails to take account of the ethical peculiarity 
of politics as a field of action, which has already been mentioned 
in this chapter. This need not mean the invasion of civil society 
by politics, but it is naive to think that private concerns will 
remain intact and unchanged through the process Of politicization 
- unsurprisingly, since the pressure for political action in civil 
society is likely to arise from dissatisfaction with the status 
quo. One important recent example in developed nations has been 
the (still continuing) revolution in attitudes towards the role of 
46 
women in society. 
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There is then little reason to think that the Aristotelian- 
Machiavellian view of politics as a field of autonomous concerns 
will preserve the integrity of civil society against (what are 
claimed to be) abuses of power, as liberals have tried to do. As 
Machiavelli himself makes clear, 
47 the nature of political power 
is such that its use cannot be circumscribed in advance - indeed 
he regards the versatile use of power as one of the characteristic 
qualities marking the man of virtu. It is not necessary to endorse 
Machiavelli's own preferred list of political virtues to find this 
a persuasive account of the use of power; in place of the martial 
prowess extolled by Machiavelli, we may find political virtue to 
consist in a readiness to engage in public debate, in a state of 
society which does not merely accept passively political decisions 
handed down from above but rather participates actively in 
questioning them and in helping to determine which issues are of 
public concern. 
No doubt the relationship between citizens and political 
activity in (for example) western democracies is, for much of the 
time, a sad caricature of this picture. But this may mean only 
that practice usually falls short of the mark, not that the mark 
itself does not exist. In so far as there is any effective notion 
of political virtue in societies such as Britain today it 
presumably encompasses some form of judgmental capacity, as Beiner 
48 has argued, together with (or including) some degree of 
professional integrity in the day-to-day conduct of public 
business. It has also to take account of the more stylistic sorts 
of consideration mentioned earlier. This need not be an entirely 
frivolous or aesthetic matter. To understand political behaviour 
through character-based notions such as that of style can be both 
to set it in a more comprehensible context and to see it as 
manifesting certain forms of virtue (or of characteristic vices). 
These are forms of rational explanation which we already use in 
understanding political action. It is, however, undeniable that a 
form of instrumentalism coexists alongside this in much commentary 
on and in public expectation about politics. This. is true of much 
electioneering rhetoric, for example, and in politicians' habits 
ýof justifying their past actions: in these situations Politicians 
typically represent themselves as having acted, or proposing to 
act, so as to realize certain public benefits. As has already been 
indicated, what is important here is not whether these claims are 
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true (rather than, say, that the persons concerned were advancing 
their careers or making other personal gains). The important point 
is that politicians feel obliged, even insincerely, to frame their 
self-justifications in this way. To the extent that this rhetoric 
assumes that securing, or at least attempting to secure, the 
instrumental benefits is a condition of political justification, 
instrumentalism reigns supreme in the everyday discourse of 
politics. But while this is true, the public also expects more of 
politicians than mere effectiveness in promoting instrumental 
benefits. 
It is doubtful whether this is adequately represented as the 
imposition of a code of conduct on professional politicians whose 
content derives solely from moral precepts 'applicable to all 
action. It is true that there is no very well-defined code of 
conduct to which politicians are answerable in their professional 
dealings. This however only gives further reason for doubting that 
the orthodox view of morality as a structure of obligations is 
appropriate to politics. The judgmental capacities discussed by 
49 Beiner, for example, seem to defy formulation in these terms, 
and indeed in terms of any explicit rules (as Beiner himself 
pe rsuasively argues); there is also little reason to think that 
such capacities can be defined as proficiency in the patterns of 
strategic thinking required to promote the public goods. Political 
judgment goes beyond the facility for implementing rules. It is a 
dispositional quality, and as such an attribute of character which 
is manifested in politicians' actions. One consequence of this is 
that whether a politician displays sound judgment or not in a 
given case is partly a contingent matter - dependent, that is, on 
factors some of which are outside his or her control. This is 
again inimical to the rule-governed instrumentalist approach, 
which tends to view success or failure in politics, as in other 
areas of life, as a matter of knowing which causal levers to 
operate. 
This is an important aspect of the virtues in general, one 
which sharply distinguishes them from the Kantian 'holy will'. 
While the latter, in line with Kant's insistence on the totally 
unconditioned nature of moral agency, is held to be beyond the 
reach of contingency, it is characteristic of the virtues that 
their exercise or manifestation is not unconditioned in this way. 
To the extent that the virtues are embodied in agents' intentions, 
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they are proof against this contingency, since it is possible to 
identify such an intention regardless of whether the action 
succeeds or not (very often, of course, the means by which the 
intention is identified is just that the action was successfully 
performed). These cases look as if they can be handled easily 
enough by Kant's 'holy will'. But there are cases where the 
translation of virtue into action is not as straightforward as; 
this. One is where the virtue cannot be directly reflected in' 
deliberation, and so is not represented directly in the agent 
conscious intentions, or more commonly, where 
:s 
an observer s 
assessment of the action in question would be different if it; ' 
transpired that a reflexive conception of virtue played aný 
essential part in the deliberation. For example, an agent who acts 
out of charitable concern for others is relevantly different fromý 
one who acts from a conception of himself as somebody who so acts. 
One example is the character of Mrs Solness in Ibsen's The Master 
Builder, discussed by Winch: 50 her life is so dominated by, a 
desire to fulfil her perceived duties, with the result that she is 
morally dead. The inference we are invited to draw, presumably, is 
that virtue need not - and cannot always - be embodied in this 
intentional form, of conscious adherence to duty. Another obstacle' 
takes the form of psychological conflict. This is a possibility' 
notoriously discountenanced by Kantian morality and by Aristotlels' 
own account of the virtues. It seems clear, however, that the 
latter is one form taken by the wider phenomenon of dispositional 
conflict. Besides the familiar possibility of conflict between 
virtuous and other (notably egoistic) dispositions, there can also 
be conflict between virtuous dispositions. 
More generally, the virtues and their exercise cannot be wholly 
immunized against contingency, and politics provides a prime 
example of this. One aspect of this contingency is precisely the 
dispositional conflicts just mentioned, whether between virtues or. 
between virtuous and other dispositions. Contingency lies not 
merely in the fact (with which even the Kantian has to contend) 
that being an agent of a certain kind -. having certain 
dispositions, and at the limit even being an agent at all - is, 
-itself a contingent matter. It is also witnessed in the 
psychological conflicts to which virtuous dispositions can give 
rise. In contrast with the Kantian and, indeed, the Platonic 
accounts of the virtues, the Aristotelian approach allows for this 
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dimension of contingency. This is one reason why it is able to 
make more sense of the notion of political virtue. 
It is not surprising that ethical theories like Kant's which 
have sought to eliminate contingency from the moral life should 
lack any distinctive conception of political virtue (the latter 
merely consists, for Kant, in following universal rules applicable 
to all rational agents as such) . For it seems to be a contingent 
matter whether or not political circumstances, at a given time and 
place, will prove conducive to the exercise of virtue. Theories 
which regard the virtuous agent as (definitionally) immune from 
contingency are inclined to see the practical manifestation of 
virtue as the life of contemplation, an activity held to be as 
invulnerable as is humanly possible to the depredations of 
fortune; and, in the Platonic version of the theory, in so far as 
politics enters into such a life at all, the political task is 
held to be the elimination of contingency from public life. The 
eugenic breeding and censorship of non-celebratory art favoured by 
Plato is meant to secure the political stability held necessary 
for the guardian class to live the life of philosophical 
contemplation, which alone is virtuous in Plato's thought. Thus 
virtue is only attainable once politics is out of the way - one 
might say that for Plato the only purpose of politics is to secure 
the conditions of its own transcendence. Similar remarks, mutatis 
mutandis, apply to Rawls' theory: the well-ordered society is one 
in which value-based political dispute has in effect ceased. 
This example also suggests that the notion of political virtue 
can survive only where politics itself is not regarded in purely 
instrumental terms. If politics is solely concerned with promoting 
external benefits, it is hard to see what specifically political 
virtues there could be, beyond that of effectiveness. This may or 
may not be a disposition of character; but, if the instrumentalist 
thesis is right, it cannot be part of what is ultimately valued, 
since the value of effectiveness consists solely in its capacity 
to secure other goods valued for their own sake. It is also clear 
from the nature of virtue itself that it cannot be understood in 
purely instrumental terms, whatever the context. One reason for 
this is that it makes little sense to ask what virtues are forý 
what end they serve: they exist as natural features of the moral 
world. This is not to relapse into a form of ethical naturalism or 
realism. Rather it is to acknowledge that there is an 
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anthropomorphic basis for value not only in projection itself, but 
also in the object of projection - that is, we can take the 
dispositions of character constitutive of virtue as natural 
objects. Virtues of character can be taken as natural facts in 
this sense. But these facts appear as instrumentalities only given 
a discredited functional view of nature. The account of thei 
virtues given above is quite compatible with a wholly non- 
teleological view of nature. 
Thus we are not required to accept Aristotle's teleologicaL, 
biology as a necessary feature of any neo-Aristotelian theory of 
the virtues. Aristotle's is a general theory of human flourishingl 
in which the attainment of virtue is seen as integral to realizingý 
one's species-essence. The present theory retains the Aristotelian 
conception while rejecting its associated biological claims. One 
of the advantages of these assumptions, of course, is that the 
theory of virtue is thereby made compatible with a naturalistic 
metaethics, avoiding the dangers of indeterminacy in moral 
judgments and, at the limit, of arbitrariness. In rejecting 
Aristotelian biology, however, we need not fall into this Rortian 
trap. Even in the absence of any naturalistically-interpreted listý 
of the human virtues) we can retain the idea of standards of 
appropriateness in ascribing virtues to persons (as we can indeed 
with other, non-ethical dispositions). 
These dispositions are so-called Ithick, 51 ethical notions,: 
which as such may embody quasi-objective criteria of application, 
while remaining peculiar to a certain culture. In this respect' 
they resemble the emotional judgments discussed in the lastýi 
chapter: this is not very surprising, since possessing a givený 
virtue often depends on having - or lacking -a relevant emotional 
disposition. The virtue of courage, for examplei seems 
unintelligible without an understanding of the emotion of fear, 
and that some persons are less disposed to feel this emotion or at- 
least to act on it while under its influence. In such cases, as: 
has already been argued, identifying the disposition implicitly 
relies on shared evaluations: we can only identify courage, for 
instance, given a prior understanding of what counts as reasonably 
provoking fear. 
This is not to claim, of course, that virtues merely designate 
emotional dispositions. Many virtues, like that of kindness, seem 
to ' connote no particular pattern of emotional behaviour. 
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Nonetheless even in these latter examples the point made before in 
analysing the emotions holds, that shared patterns of evaluation 
underpin our ascriptions of virtues to agents and render them 
intelligible. In this sense our understanding of the virtues, in 
politics as in other contexts, rests on 'agreement in judgments' - 
a truth which naturally leaves plenty of room for disagreement 
about which persons manifest a given virtue or which occasions are 
appropriate for its exercise. 
It is perhaps doubtful whether we can simply move back to a 
form of thinking about ethics which is based on the notion of 
virtue. In so far as it survives in everyday discourse about 
politics, it coexists uneasily with alien, instrumentalist 
concerns - relating, for example, to managerial efficiency or to 
effectiveness. But it does not require wholesale conceptual 
reorientation. As I have indicated, the notion remains current in 
some important aspects of our ethical thinking, including 
politics. Rejecting instrumentalism does not mean hankering for. a 
full-scale return to the heroic values of a pre-modern age. It 
does, however, demand some hard thinking about what we have good 
reason to value. Its outcome should acknowledge that there are 
goods in politics beyond those computable in means-end terms - 
goods whose value lies in the cultivation of civic virtue. 
V 
It will be clear from the preceding section that I have no 
systematic theory to offer as a replacement for instrumentalism, 
still less any concrete policy proposals. In some respects I feel 
duly apologetic about this, in others less so. It seems fair 
enough, for example, to complain that this chapter has failed to 
give much substance to the counter-theory adumbrated in the 
earlier critical chapters on instrumentalism; it is not 
unreasonable, furthermore, to wonder whether the absence of any 
fully-articulated alternative leaves instrumentalism, albeit faute 
de mieux, in possession of the field. I have given some historical 
indication of how instrumentalism arose from the rationalizing 
philosophies of the Enlightenment: in, so far as modernity remains 
in the thrall of these philosophies, we are bound to find some of 
the demands which first elicited instrumentalism compelling - 
notably the insistence on transparency, on the susceptibility of 
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public decision-making to rational justification, and the linked 
(though not identical) notion of public accountability. As a 
result, the pressure for explication cannot merely be ignored by 
any proposed alternative theory. What I have tried to do, in place' 
of this, is to suggest some more drastic limits on rationalization 
than those entertained by instrumentalism (the sense in which I 
feel less apologetic about not devising a replacement for it). 
It should not be thought that acknowledging these limits 
commits us to some quasi-mystical view of political processes as 
forever beyond the pale of reason, a celebration of the irrational 
(itself one of the banes of 'post-modern' culture). Rather the 
analysis offered earlier should be read as a rationalistically- 
minded critique of reason itself, as applied to ethical and 
political systems -a familiar enough Kantian form of enterprise. 
This work has concluded that politics is largely refractory to the 
totalizing and system-building bent of the Enlightenment 
philosophies: its relationship with other ethical concerns is 
partly, and irreducibly, a political question. As far as this 
goes, the role of theory may at best be a negative one, suggesting 
what courses of action are unjustified by particular ethical 
commitments, rather than (as the system-building tendency of 
recent decades has aimed to do) furnishing universal conditions of 
justification. It may be able to show, for instance, that a 
particular, economic, interpretation of liberty is too 
restrictive, or that it leaves other important political freedoms 
out of account. 
In a century of appalling political crimes, this is not 
demanding as little as it may seem. Of course making the demand 
will not of itself prevent their repetition in the future. It may 
however serve as a reminder that a sceptical and non-instrumental 
view of politics is a surer theoretical basis for repudiating such 
actions than more ambitious forms of recent theory; and that a 
rationalistic theory of rationality is no more appropriate to 
politics than to other ethical concerns. Future theory may be 
better served by focussing less on the use of power to effect a 
well-ordered society, than on the abuses of power - and, as a 
concomitant of that, on empowerment, as a means to the self- 
betterment of the powerless. 
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